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Brennan center for Justice
every new technology brings with it both 
excitement and anxiety. no sooner was the in-
ternet upon us in the 1990s than anxiety arose 
over the ease of accessing pornography and 
other controversial content. in response, en-
trepreneurs soon developed filtering products. 
By the end of the decade, a new industry had 
emerged to create and market internet filters. 
These filters were highly imprecise. The 
problem was intrinsic to filtering technology. 
The sheer size of the internet meant that iden-
tifying potentially offensive content had to be 
done mechanically, by matching “key” words 
and phrases; hence, the blocking of web sites 
for “Middlesex county,” “Beaver college,” 
and “breast cancer”—just three of the bet-
ter-known among thousands of examples of 
overly broad filtering. internet filters were 
crude and error-prone because they catego-
rized expression without regard to its context, 
meaning, and value. 
Some policymakers argued that these inac-
curacies were an acceptable cost of keeping 
the internet safe, especially for kids. oth-
ers—including many librarians, educators, and 
civil libertarians—argued that the cost was 
too high. to help inform this policy debate, 
the free expression policy project (fepp) 
published a report in the fall of 2001 sum-
marizing the results of more than 70 empirical 
studies on the performance of internet filters. 
These studies ranged from anecdotal accounts 
of blocked sites to extensive research applying 
social-science methods. 
nearly every study revealed substantial over-
blocking. That is, even taking into account 
that filter manufacturers use broad and vague 
blocking categories—for example, “violence,” 
“tasteless/gross,” or “lifestyle”—their products 
arbitrarily and irrationally blocked many web 
pages that had no relation to the disapproved 
content categories. for example:
• net nanny, Surfwatch, cyBersitter, and 
Bess blocked house Majority leader rich-
ard “dick” armey’s official web site upon 
detecting the word “dick.”
• Smartfilter blocked the declaration of 
independence, Shakespeare’s complete 
plays, Moby Dick, and Marijuana: Facts for 
Teens, a brochure published by the national 
institute on drug abuse. 
• Surfwatch blocked the human rights 
site algeria watch and the university of 
Kansas’s archie r. dykes Medical library 
(upon detecting the word “dykes”).
• cyBersitter blocked a news item on the 
amnesty international site after detecting 
the phrase “least 21.” (The offending sen-
tence described “at least 21” people killed 
or wounded in indonesia.) 
• X-Stop blocked carnegie Mellon universi-
ty’s Banned Books page, the “let’s have an 
affair” catering company, and, through its 
“foul word” function, searches for Bastard 
Out of Carolina and “The owl and the 
pussy cat.”
despite such consistently irrational results, 
the internet filtering business continued to 
grow. Schools and offices installed filters on 
their computers, and public libraries came 
under pressure to do so. in december 2000, 
president Bill clinton signed the “children’s 
internet protection act,” mandating filters in 
all schools and libraries that receive federal aid 
for internet connections. The Supreme court 
executve Summary
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upheld this law in 2003 despite extensive 
evidence that filtering products block tens of 
thousands of valuable, inoffensive web pages.
in 2004, fepp, now part of the Brennan 
center for Justice at n.y.u. School of law, 
decided to update the Internet Filters report—a 
project that continued through early 2006. 
we found several large studies published dur-
ing or after 2001, in addition to new, smaller-
scale tests of filtering products. Studies by the 
u.S. department of Justice, the Kaiser family 
foundation, and others found that despite 
improved technology and effectiveness in 
blocking some pornographic content, filters 
are still seriously flawed. They continue to 
deprive their users of many thousands of valu-
able web pages, on subjects ranging from war 
and genocide to safer sex and public health. 
among the hundreds of examples:
• webSenSe blocked “Keep nacogdoches 
Beautiful,” a texas cleanup project, under 
the category of “sex,” and The Shoah proj-
ect, a holocaust remembrance page, under 
the category of “racism/hate.”
• Bess blocked all Google and altavista im-
age searches as “pornography.”
• Google’s SafeSearch blocked congress.gov 
and shuttle.nasa.gov; a chemistry class at 
Middlebury college; vietnam war materi-
als at u.c.-Berkeley; and news articles from 
the New York Times and Washington Post.
The conclusion of the revised and updated 
Internet Filters: A Public Policy Report is that 
the widespread use of filters presents a serious 
threat to our most fundamental free expres-
sion values. There are much more effective 
ways to address concerns about offensive 
internet content. filters provide a false sense 
of security, while blocking large amounts of 
important information in an often irrational 
or biased way. although some may say that 
the debate is over and that filters are now a 
fact of life, it is never too late to rethink bad 
policy choices.
The widespread use of filters 
presents a serious threat to  
our most fundamental free  
expression values.  
Brennan center for Justice
The orgns of internet Flterng
The internet has transformed human commu-
nication. world wide web sites on every con-
ceivable topic, e-newsletters and listservs, and 
billions of emails racing around the planet 
daily have given us a wealth of information, 
ideas, and opportunities for communication 
never before imagined. as the u.S. Supreme 
court put it in 1997, “the content on the 
internet is as diverse as human thought.”1
not all of this online content is accurate, 
pleasant, or inoffensive. virtually since the 
arrival of the internet, concerns have arisen 
about minors’ access to online pornography, 
about the proliferation of web sites advocat-
ing racial hatred, and about other online ex-
pression thought to be offensive or dangerous. 
congress and the states responded in the late 
1990s with censorship laws, but most of them 
were struck down by the courts. partly as a re-
sult, parents, employers, school districts, and 
other government entities turned to privately 
manufactured internet filters.
in the communications decency act of 
1996, for example, congress attempted to 
block minors from internet pornography 
by criminalizing virtually all “indecent” or 
“patently offensive” communications online. 
in response to a 1997 Supreme court deci-
sion invalidating the law as a violation of the 
first amendment,2 the clinton administra-
tion began a campaign to encourage internet 
filtering.  
early filtering was based on either “self-
rating” by online publishers or “third-party 
1  Reno v. ACLU, 521 u.S. 844, 870 (1997), quoting ACLU v. 
Reno, 929 f. Supp. 824, 842 (e.d. pa. 1996).
2 Id.
rating” by filter manufacturers. Because of 
the internet’s explosive growth (by 2001, 
more than a billion web sites, many of them 
changing daily)3, and the consequent in-
ability of filtering company employees to 
evaluate even a tiny fraction of it, third-party 
rating had to rely on mechanical blocking 
by key words or phrases such as “over 18,” 
“breast,” or “sex.” The results were not dif-
ficult to predict: large quantities of valuable 
information and literature, particularly about 
health, sexuality, women’s rights, gay and 
lesbian issues, and other important subjects, 
were blocked.
even where filtering companies hired staff 
to review some web sites, there were serious 
problems of subjectivity. The political atti-
tudes of the filter manufacturers were reflected 
in their blocking decisions, particularly on 
such subjects as homosexuality, human rights, 
and criticism of filtering software. The alterna-
tive method, self-rating, did not suffer these 
disadvantages, but the great majority of online 
speakers refused to self-rate their sites. online 
news organizations, for example, were not 
willing to reduce their content to simplistic 
letters or codes through self-rating.
Third-party filtering thus became the indus-
try standard. from early filter companies such 
as Surfwatch and cyber patrol, the industry 
quickly expanded, marketing its products 
to school districts and corporate employ-
ers as well as families. Most of the products 
contained multiple categories of potentially 
3  two scholars estimated the size of the world wide web 
in January 2005 at more than 11.5 billion separate index-
able pages. a. Gulli & a. Signorini, “The indexable web is 
More Than 11.5 Billion pages” (May 2005). Source citations 
throughout this report do not include urls if they can be 
found in the Bibliography.
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offensive or “inappropriate” material. (Some 
had more than 50 categories.) internet service 
providers such as america online provided 
parental control options using the same tech-
nology. 
Some manufacturers marketed products 
that were essentially “whitelists” — that is, 
they blocked most of the internet, leaving just 
a few hundred or thousand pre-selected sites 
accessible. The more common configuration, 
though, was some form of blacklist, created 
through technology that trolled the web for 
suspect words and phrases. Supplementing the 
blacklist might be a mechanism that screened 
web searches as they happened; then blocked 
those that triggered words or phrases embed-
ded in the company’s software program.
The marketing claims of many filtering 
companies were exaggerated, if not flatly false. 
one company, for example, claimed that its 
“X-Stop” software identified and blocked only 
“illegal” obscenity and child pornography. 
This was literally impossible, since no one 
can be sure in advance what a court will rule 
“obscene.” The legal definition of obscenity 
depends on subjective judgments about “pru-
rience” and “patent offensiveness” that will be 
different for different communities.4
The “chldren’s internet  
Protecton Act” (ciPA)
The late 1990s saw political battles in many 
communities over computer access in public 
libraries. new groups such as family friendly 
libraries attacked the american library as-
sociation (ala) for adhering to a no-censor-
ship and no-filtering policy, even for minors. 
The ala and other champions of intellectual 
freedom considered the overblocking of valu-
4   The Supreme court defined obscenity for constitutional 
purposes in Miller v. California, 413 u.S. 15, 24 (1973). The 
three-part Miller test asks whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value”; 
whether, judged by local community standards, it appeals pri-
marily to a “prurient” interest; and whether—again judged by 
community standards—it describes sexual organs or activities 
in a “patently offensive way.” 
able sites by filtering software to be incom-
patible with the basic function of libraries, 
and advocated alternative approaches such as 
privacy screens and “acceptable use” policies. 
Meanwhile, anti-filtering groups such as the 
censorware project and peacefire began to 
publish reports on the erroneous or question-
able blocking of internet sites by filtering 
products. 
in december 2000, president clinton 
signed the “children’s internet protection 
act” (cipa). cipa requires all schools and 
libraries that receive federal financial assis-
tance for internet access through the e-rate or 
“universal service” program, or through direct 
federal funding, to install filters on all com-
puters used by adults as well as minors.5 
technically, cipa only requires libraries 
and schools to have a “technology protec-
tion measure” that prevents access to “vi-
sual depictions” that are “obscene” or “child 
pornography,” or, for computers accessed by 
minors, depictions that are “obscene,” “child 
pornography,” or “harmful to minors.”6 But 
no “technological protection measure” (that is, 
no filter) can make these legal judgments, and 
even the narrowest categories offered by filter 
manufacturers, such as “adult” or “pornog-
raphy,” block both text and “visual depic-
tions” that almost surely would not be found 
obscene, child pornography, or “harmful to 
minors” by a court of law. 
5  public law 106-554, §1(a)(4), 114 Stat. 2763a-335, amend-
ing 20 u.S. code §6801 (the elementary & Secondary edu-
cation act); 20 u.S. code §9134(b) (the Museum & library 
Services act); and 47 u.S. code §254(h) (the e-rate provision 
of the communications act).
6  “harmful to minors” is a variation on the three-part obscenity 
test for adults (see note 4). cipa defines it as: “any picture, 
image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that 
     (i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a 
prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
     (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive 
way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or 
simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated 
normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the 
genitals; and
     (iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value as to minors.” 
  47 u.S. code §254(h)(7)(G).
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By delegating blocking decisions to pri-
vate companies, cipa thus accomplished far 
broader censorship than could be achieved 
through a direct government ban. as the 
evidence in the case that was brought to 
challenge cipa showed, filters, even when 
set only to block “adult” or “sexually explicit” 
content, in fact block tens of thousands of 
nonpornographic sites. 
cipa does permit library and school 
administrators to disable the required filters 
“for bona fide research or other lawful pur-
poses.” The sections of the law that condition 
direct federal funding on the installation of 
filters allow disabling for minors and adults; 
the section governing the e-rate program 
only permits disabling for adults.7
cipa put school and library administra-
tors to a difficult choice: forgo federal aid in 
order to preserve full internet access, or install 
filters in order to keep government grants and 
e-rate discounts. not surprisingly, wealthy 
districts were better able to forgo aid than their 
lower-income neighbors. The impact of cipa 
thus has fallen disproportionately on lower-in-
come communities, where many citizens’ only 
access to the internet is in public schools and 
libraries. cipa also hurts other demographic 
groups that are on the wrong side of the “digi-
tal divide” and that depend on libraries for 
internet access, including people living in rural 
areas, racial minorities, and the elderly.
in 2001, the ala, the american civil 
liberties union, and several state and lo-
cal library associations filed suit to challenge 
the library provisions of cipa. no suit was 
brought to challenge the school provisions, 
and by 2005, the department of education 
estimated that 90% of K-12 schools were 
using some sort of filter in accordance with 
cipa guidelines.8
7  20 u.S. code §6777(c); 20 u.S. code §9134(f )(3); 47 u.S. 
code §254(h)(6)(d).
8  corey Murray, “overzealous filters hinder research,” eSchool 
News Online (oct. 13, 2005).
a three-judge federal court was convened to 
decide the library suit. after extensive fact-
finding on the operation and performance 
of filters, the judges struck down cipa as 
applied to libraries. They ruled that the law 
forces librarians to violate their patrons’ first 
amendment right of access to information 
and ideas.
The decision included a detailed discus-
sion of how filters operate. initially, they 
trawl the web in much the same way that 
search engines do, “harvesting” for possibly 
relevant sites by looking for key words and 
phrases. There follows a process of “winnow-
ing,” which also relies largely on mechanical 
techniques. large portions of the web are 
never reached by the harvesting and winnow-
ing process. 
The court found that most filtering compa-
nies also use some form of human review. But 
because 10,000-30,000 new web pages enter 
their “work queues” each day, the companies’ 
relatively small staffs (between eight and a 
few dozen people) can give at most a cursory 
review to a fraction of the sites that are har-
vested, and human error is inevitable.9
as a result of their keyword-based tech-
nology, the three-judge court found, filters 
wrongly block tens of thousands of valuable 
web pages. focusing on the three filters used 
most often in libraries — cyber patrol, Bess, 
and Smartfilter — the court gave dozens of 
examples of overblocking, among them: a 
Knights of columbus site, misidentified by 
cyber patrol as “adult/sexually explicit”; a 
site on fly fishing, misidentified by Bess as 
“pornography”; a guide to allergies and a site 
opposing the death penalty, both blocked by 
Bess as “pornography”; a site for aspiring den-
tists, blocked by cyber patrol as “adult/sexu-
ally explicit”; and a site that sells religious wall 
hangings, blocked by webSenSe as “sex.”10 
9  American Library Association v. United States, 201 f. Supp. 2d 
401, 431-48 (e.d. pa. 2002).
10 Id., 431-48.
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The judges noted also that filters frequently 
block all pages on a site, no matter how inno-
cent, based on a “root url.” The root urls 
for large sites like yahoo or Geocities contain 
not only educational pages created by non-
profit organizations, but thousands of person-
al web pages. likewise, the court found, one 
item of disapproved content — for example, 
a sexuality column on Salon.com — often 
results in blocking of the entire site.11
The trial court struck down cipa’s library 
provisions as applied to both adults and mi-
nors. it found that there are less burdensome 
ways for libraries to address concerns about 
illegal obscenity on the internet, and about 
minors’ access to material that most adults 
consider inappropriate for them — including 
“acceptable use” policies, internet use logs, 
and supervision by library staff.12
The government appealed the decision 
of the three-judge court, and in June 2003, 
the Supreme court reversed, upholding the 
constitutionality of cipa. chief Justice wil-
liam rehnquist’s opinion (for a “plurality” of 
four of the nine justices) asserted that library 
patrons have no right to unfiltered internet 
access — that is, filtering is no different, in 
principle, from librarians’ decisions not to 
select certain books for library shelves. More-
over, rehnquist said, because the government 
is providing financial aid for internet access, it 
can limit the scope of the information that is 
accessed. he added that if erroneous blocking 
of “completely innocuous” sites creates a first 
amendment problem, “any such concerns are 
dispelled” by cipa’s provision giving librar-
ies the discretion to disable the filter upon 
request from an adult.13
Justices anthony Kennedy and Stephen 
Breyer wrote separate opinions concurring in 
the judgment upholding cipa. Both relied 
11  Id.
12 Id., 480-84.
13  U.S. v. American Library Association, 123 S. ct. 2297, 2304-
09 (2003) (plurality opinion).
on the “disabling” provisions of the law as a 
way for libraries to avoid restricting adults’ 
access to the internet. Kennedy emphasized 
that if librarians fail to unblock on request, 
or adults are otherwise burdened in their 
internet searches, then a lawsuit challenging 
cipa “as applied” to that situation might be 
appropriate.14
Three justices—John paul Stevens, david 
Souter, and ruth Bader Ginsberg—dissented 
from the Supreme court decision uphold-
ing cipa. Their dissents drew attention to 
the district court’s detailed description of 
how filters work, and to the delays and other 
burdens that make discretionary disabling 
a poor substitute for unfettered internet ac-
cess. Souter objected to rehnquist’s analogy 
between internet filtering and library book 
selection, arguing that filtering is actually 
more akin to “buying an encyclopedia and 
then cutting out pages.” Stevens, in a separate 
dissent, noted that censorship is not necessar-
ily constitutional just because it is a condition 
of government funding—especially when 
funded programs are designed to facilitate 
free expression, as in universities and libraries, 
or on the internet.15
lvng wth ciPA
after the Supreme court upheld cipa, pub-
lic libraries confronted a stark choice — forgo 
federal aid, including e-rate discounts, or 
invest resources in a filtering system that, 
even at its narrowest settings, will censor large 
quantities of valuable material for reasons 
usually known only to the manufacturer. The 
ala and other groups began developing in-
formation about different filtering products, 
and suggestions for choosing products and 
settings that block as little of the internet as 
possible, consistent with cipa.
These materials remind librarians that 
14 Id., 2309-12 (concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and 
Breyer).
15  Id., 2317, 2321-22 (dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens 
and Souter).
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whatever filter system they choose should 
allow configuration of the default page to 
educate the user on how the filter works and 
how to request disabling. libraries should 
adopt systems that can be easily disabled, in 
accordance with the Supreme court’s state-
ment that cipa doesn’t violate the first 
amendment in large part because it autho-
rizes librarians to disable filters on the request 
of any adult.16 
in order to avoid commercial products that 
maintain secret source codes and blacklists, 
the Kansas library system developed its own 
filter, KanGuard. Billed as “a library-friendly 
alternative,” KanGuard was created by cus-
tomizing the open-source filter SquidGuard, 
and aims to block only pornography. But 
although KanGuard’s and SquidGuard’s open 
lists may make it easier for administrators to 
unblock nonpornographic sites that are erro-
neously targeted, they cannot avoid the errors 
of the commercial products, since they rely on 
essentially the same technology.17 
how have libraries responded to cipa? ac-
cording to reports collected by the ala, some 
systems have decided to forgo federal aid or 
e-rate discounts rather than install filters. one 
of them, in San francisco, is subject to a city 
ordinance that “explicitly bans the filtering of 
internet content on adult and teen public ac-
cess computers.” a librarian at the San fran-
cisco public library explained that although 
the ban could cost the library up to $225,000  
16 E.g., lori Bowen ayre, Filtering and Filter Software (ala 
library technology reports, 2004); open net initiative, 
“introduction to internet filtering” (2004); derek hansen, 
“cipa: which filtering Software to use?” (aug. 31, 2003).
17  The coordinator of the system says that KanGuard’s lists are 
compiled “with an open-source ‘robot’ program that scours 
the web, searching for language and images that are clearly 
obscene or harmful to minors.” walter Minkel, “a filter 
That lets Good information in,” TechKnowledge (Mar. 1, 
2004). But no “robot” looking for language or images can 
make these legal determinations, and SquidGuard admits 
that its blacklists “are entirely the product of a dumb robot. 
we strongly recommend that you review the lists before 
using them.” “The SquidGuard Blacklist,” www.squidguard.
org/blacklist (visited 4/3/05). as of 2005, the “porn” section 
of SquidGuard had more than 100,000 entries. 
in lost e-rate funds, the “community doesn’t 
want filtering.”18 
likewise, several libraries in new hampshire 
decided to forgo federal aid. They were encour-
aged by the new hampshire library associa-
tion, which posted a statement on its web 
site noting that filters block research on breast 
cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, “and even 
Super Bowl XXX.”19
These libraries were the exception, though. 
a preliminary study by the ala and the 
center for democracy and technology in 
2004, based on a sample of about 50 librar-
ies, indicated that a large majority now use 
filters, “and most of the filtering is motivated 
by cipa requirements.” only 11% of the 
libraries that filter confine their filters to the 
children’s section. 64% will disable the filter 
upon request, but fewer than 20% will disable 
the filter for minors as well as adults.20 This 
picture contrasts sharply with the situation be-
fore the Supreme court’s decision upholding 
cipa, when researchers reported that 73% of 
libraries overall, and 58% of public libraries, 
did not use filters. 43% of the public libraries 
were receiving e-rate discounts; only 18.9% 
said they would not continue to apply for the 
e-rate should cipa be upheld.21
in 2005, the rhode island affiliate of the 
american civil liberties union reported 
that before the Supreme court upheld cipa, 
fewer than ¼ of the libraries in the state that 
responded to its survey had installed inter-
net filters, and many had official policies 
18  Joseph anderson, “cipa and San francisco: why we don’t 
filter,” WebJunction (aug. 31, 2003). 
19  associated press, “libraries oppose internet filters, turn 
down federal funds” (June 13, 2004).
20  center for democracy & technology & ala, “children’s 
internet protection act Survey: executive Summary” (2004) 
(on file at the free expression policy project). 
21  paul Jaeger, John carlo Bertot, & charles Mcclure, “The 
effects of the children’s internet protection act (cipa) 
in public libraries and its implications for research: a 
Statistical, policy, and legal analysis,” 55(13) Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and Technology 1131, 
1133 (2004).  
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prohibiting them. By July 1, 2004, how-
ever—the government’s deadline for imple-
menting cipa — all of them were using the 
webSenSe filter, as recommended by the 
statewide consortium responsible for internet 
access in libraries.22
although each library system in rhode 
island is allowed to choose its own filter set-
tings, the survey showed that most of them 
followed the consortium’s recommendations 
and configured webSenSe to block the “sex,” 
“adult content,” and “nudity” categories. four 
libraries blocked additional categories such as 
“gambling,” “games,” “personals and dating,” 
and “chat.” and even though the Supreme 
court conditioned its approval of cipa on the 
ability of libraries to disable filters on request, 
the survey found that many of the state’s 
library directors were confused about disabling 
their filter and had received no training on 
how to do so. More than ⅓ of them said they 
did not notify patrons that the filters could be 
disabled or even that they were in use.23
The rhode island aclu concluded with 
four recommendations on how to minimize 
cipa’s impact on access to information: 
• filters should be set at the minimum block-
ing level necessary to comply with the law; 
• libraries should notify patrons that they 
have a right to request that the filter be 
disabled; 
• libraries should train their staff on how to 
disable the filter and on patrons’ right to 
request disabling; and 
• all adult patrons should be given the op-
portunity to use an unfiltered internet con-
nection.24
22  amy Myrick, Reader’s Block: Internet Censorship in Rhode 
Island Public Libraries (rhode island aclu, 2005). 
23  Myrick, 16. Moreover, on two occasions when a researcher 
asked a librarian at the providence public library to unblock a 
wrongly blocked site, the librarian refused and subjected the 
researcher to judgmental comments and questioning about 
the site’s subject matter. Id., 15.
24 Id., 17.
public schools also have to deal with the 
complexities and choices occasioned by 
cipa. in 2001, the consortium for School 
networking (coSn) published a primer, 
Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse, di-
rected at policymakers in K-12 schools. The 
primer seemed to accept filtering as a politi-
cal necessity in many school districts; after 
congress passed cipa, of course, it became 
a legal necessity as well. coSn’s later materi-
als outline school districts’ options, but note 
that its resources “should not be read as an 
endorsement of [cipa], of content controls 
in general, or of a particular technological 
approach.”25 
a further indication of the educational envi-
ronment came from a reporter who observed:
Many school technology coordina-
tors argue that the inexact science of 
internet filtering and blocking is a 
reasonable trade-off for greater peace 
of mind. Given the political reality 
in many school districts, they say, the 
choice often comes down to censor-
ware or no internet access at all. 
he quotes an administrator as saying: “it 
would be politically disastrous for us not to 
filter. all the good network infrastructure 
we’ve installed would come down with the 
first instance of an elementary school student 
accessing some of the absolutely raunchy sites 
out there.”26
yet studies indicate that filters in schools 
also frustrate legitimate research and exacer-
bate the digital divide.27 The more privileged 
25  “School district options for providing access to appropri-
ate internet content” (power point), www.safewiredschools.
org/pubs_and_tools/sws_powerpoint.ppt (visited 2/21/06); 
Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse (coSn, June 2001).
26  lars Kongshem, “censorware—how well does internet 
filtering Software protect Students?” Electronic School Online 
(Jan. 1998) (quoting Joe hill, supervisor at rockingham 
county, virginia public Schools).
27  See the reports of the electronic frontier foundation/online 
policy Group and the Kaiser family foundation; and the 
phd dissertation of lynn Sutton, pages 66, 62, 70.
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students, who have unfiltered internet access 
at home, are able to complete their research 
projects. The students from less prosperous 
homes are further disadvantaged in their edu-
cational opportunities.
Flterng Studes Durng and  
After 00
By 2001, some filter manufacturers said 
that they had corrected the problem of 
overblocking, and that instead of keywords, 
they were now using “artificial intelligence.” 
But no matter how impressive-sounding the 
terminology, the fact remains that all filtering 
depends on mechanical searches to identify 
potentially inappropriate sites. although some 
of the sillier technologies—such as blocking 
one word in a sentence and thereby changing 
the entire meaning28—are less often seen today, 
studies have continued to document the erro-
neous blocking of thousands of valuable web 
sites, much of it clearly due to mechanical 
identification of key words and phrases.29 
The first edition of Internet Filters: A Public 
Policy Report was intended to advance in-
formed debate on the filtering issue by sum-
marizing all of the studies and tests to date, in 
one place and in readily accessible form. This 
second edition brings the report up-to-date, 
with summaries of new studies and additional 
background on the filtering dilemma.
part i is a revision of our 2001 report, and 
is organized by filtering product. necessar-
ily, there is some overlap, since many studies 
sampled more than one product. we have up-
dated the entries to reflect changes in blocking 
categories, or the fact that some of the filters 
mentioned are no longer on the market. in 
the interest of space, we have omitted an ap-
28  The most notorious example was cyBersitter’s blocking the 
word “homosexual” in the phrase: “The catholic church 
opposes homosexual marriage” (see page 22).
29  in addition to the primary research reports described in part 
ii, see commission on child online protection (copa), Re-
port to Congress, (oct. 20, 2000); national research council, 
Youth, Pornography, and the Internet (2002). 
pendix from the 2001 report listing blocked 
sites according to subject: artistic and liter-
ary sites; sexuality education; gay and lesbian 
information; political topics; and sites relating 
to censorship itself. This appendix is available 
online at www.fepproject.org/policyreports/
appendixa.html.
part ii describes the tests and studies pub-
lished during or after 2001. Several of these 
are larger and more ambitious than the earlier 
studies, and combine empirical results with 
policy and legal analysis. our summaries of 
these more complex reports are necessarily 
longer than the summaries in the 2001 re-
search scan. we have focused on the empirical 
results and sometimes, in the interest of read-
ability, have rounded off statistics to the near-
est whole number. we urge readers to consult 
the studies themselves for further detail. 
Some of the reports described in part ii 
attempt to estimate the overall statistical ac-
curacy of different filtering products. filtering 
companies sometimes rely on these reports to 
boast that their percentage of error is relatively 
small. But reducing the problems of over- and 
underblocking to numerical percentages is 
problematic. 
for one thing, percentages and statistics can 
be easily manipulated. Since it is very dif-
ficult to create a truly random sample of web 
sites for testing, the rates of over- and under-
blocking will vary depending on what sites 
are chosen. if, for example, the test sample 
has a large proportion of nonpornographic 
educational sites on a controversial topic such 
as birth control, the error rate will likely be 
much higher than if the sample has a large 
number of sites devoted to children’s toys. 
overblocking rates will also vary depending 
on the denominator of the fraction—that is, 
whether the number of wrongly blocked sites 
is compared to the overall total of blocked 
sites or to the overall total of sites tested.30 
30  See the discussion of resnick et al.’s article on test methodol-
ogy, page 45.
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Moreover, even when researchers report a 
relatively low error rate, this does not mean 
that the filter is a good tool for libraries, 
schools, or even homes. with billions of 
internet pages, many changing daily, even a 
1% error rate can result in millions of wrongly 
blocked sites.
finally, there are no consistent or agreed-
upon criteria for measuring over- and un-
derblocking. as we have seen, no filter can 
make the legal judgments required by cipa. 
But even if errors are measured based on the 
content categories created by filter manufac-
turers, it is not always easy for researchers to 
decide whether particular blocked pages fit 
within those categories. percentage summaries 
of correctly or incorrectly blocked sites are 
often based on mushy and variable underly-
ing judgments about what qualifies as, for 
example, “alternative lifestyle,” “drug culture,” 
or “intolerance.” 
Because of these difficulties in coming 
up with reliable statistics, and the ease with 
which error rates can be manipulated, we be-
lieve that the most useful research on internet 
filters is cumulative and descriptive—that is, 
research that reveals the multitude of sites that 
are blocked and the types of information and 
ideas that filters censor from view.
Since the first edition of Internet Filters, 
the market for these products has expanded 
enormously. in our original research, we 
found studies that tested one or more of 19 
different filters. in 2005, we found 133 filter-
ing products. Some of them come in multiple 
formats for home, school, or business mar-
kets. But there are probably fewer than 133 
separate products, because the basic software 
for popular filters like Bess and cyber patrol 
is licensed to internet service providers and 
other companies that want to offer filtering 
under their own brand name. 
Many companies now offer all-purpose 
“web protection” tools that combine censor-
ship-based filters with other functions such 
as screening out spam and viruses. Security 
screening tools have become necessary on the 
internet, but they are quite different from 
filters that block based not on capacity to 
harm a computer or drown a user’s mailbox 
with spam, but on a particular manufacturer’s 
concept of offensiveness, appropriateness, or 
child protection.
The contnung challenge 
internet filtering continues to be a major 
policy issue, and a challenge for our system 
of free expression. Some might say that the 
debate is over and that despite their many 
flaws, filters are now a fact of life in american 
homes, schools, offices, and libraries. But 
censorship on such a large scale, controlled by 
private companies that maintain secret black-
lists and screening technologies, should always 
be a subject of debate and concern.
we hope that the revised and updated 
Internet Filters will be a useful resource for 
policymakers, parents, teachers, librarians, 
and all others concerned with the internet, in-
tellectual freedom, or the education of youth. 
internet filtering is popular, despite its unreli-
ability, because many parents, political leaders, 
and educators feel that the alternative—unfet-
tered internet access—is even worse. But to 
make these policy choices, it is necessary to 
have accurate information about what filters 
do. ultimately, as the national research 
council observed in a 2002 report, less censo-
rial approaches such as media literacy and 
sexuality education are the only effective ways 
to address concerns about young people’s ac-
cess to controversial or disturbing ideas.31
31  national research council, Youth, Pornography, and the 
Internet, exec. Summary; ch. 10. 
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This section is organized by filtering product, 
and describes each test or study that we found 
up through the fall of 2001. 
Amerca onlne Parental controls
aol offers three levels of parental controls: 
“Kids only,” for children 12 and under; 
“young teen,” for ages 13-15; and “Mature 
teen,” for ages 16-17, which allows access 
to “all content on aol and the internet, 
except certain sites deemed for an adult (18+) 
audience.”32 aol encourages parents to cre-
ate unique screen names for their children 
and to assign each name to one of the four 
age categories. at one time, aol employed 
cyber patrol’s block list; at another point it 
stated it was using Surfwatch. in May 2001, 
aol announced that parental controls had 
integrated the ruleSpace company’s “contex-
ion Services,” which identifies “objectionable” 
sites “by analyzing both the words on a page 
and the context in which they are used.”33
Gay and lesbian alliance against defama-
tion (Glaad), Access Denied, Version 2.0: 
The Continuing Threat Against Internet Access 
and Privacy and Its Impact on the Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Community (1999)
This 1999 report was a follow-up to 
Glaad’s 1997 publication, Access Denied: 
The Impact of Internet Filtering Software on the 
Lesbian and Gay Community, which described 
32  aol, “parental controls,” site.aol.com/info/parentcontrol.
html (visited 3/6/06).
33  aol press release, “aol deploys ruleSpace technology 
within parental controls” (May 2, 2001), www.rulespace.
com/news/pr107.php (visited 2/23/06).
the defects of various filtering products with-
out identifying particular blocked sites. Access 
Denied, Version 2.0 addressed aol parental 
controls only in its introduction, where it 
reported that the “Kids only” setting blocked 
the web site of children of lesbians and Gays 
everywhere (colaGe), as well as a number 
of “family, youth and national organization 
web sites with lesbian and gay content,” none 
of which were named in the report.
Brian livingston, “aol’s ‘youth filters’  
protect Kids from democrats,” CNet News 
(apr. 24, 2000)
livingston investigated aol’s filtering for 
signs of political bias. he found that the “Kids 
only” setting blocked the web sites of the 
democratic national committee, the Green 
party, and ross perot’s reform party, but not 
those of the republican national committee 
and the conservative constitution and lib-
ertarian parties. aol’s “young teen” setting 
blocked the home pages of the coalition to 
Stop Gun violence, Safer Guns now, and the 
Million Mom March, but neither the nation-
al rifle association site nor the commercial 
sites for colt & Browning firearms.
Bennett haselton, “aol parental controls 
error rate for the first 1,000 .com domains” 
(peacefire, oct. 23, 2000)
peacefire webmaster Bennett haselton 
tested aol parental controls on 1,000 dot-
com domains he had compiled for a similar 
test of Surfwatch two months earlier (see page 
36). he attempted to access each site on aol 
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5.0 adjusted to its “Mature teen” setting. five 
of the 1,000 working domains were blocked, 
including a-aji.com, a site that sold vinegar 
and seasonings. haselton decided the four 
others were pornographic and thus accurately 
blocked. This produced an “error rate” of 
20%, the lowest, by peacefire’s calculation, of 
the five filters tested. aol also “blocked far 
fewer pornographic sites than any of the other 
programs,” however. haselton stated that five 
blocked domains was an insufficient sample to 
gauge the efficacy of aol parental controls 
accurately, and that the true error rate could 
fall anywhere between 5-75%.
“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
Consumer Reports assessed aol’s “young 
teen” and “Mature teen” settings along with 
various other filtering technologies. for each 
filter, the researchers attempted to access 
86 web sites that they deemed objection-
able because of “sexually explicit content or 
violently graphic images,” or promotion of 
“drugs, tobacco, crime, or bigotry.” They also 
tested the filters against 53 sites they deemed 
legitimate because they “featured serious con-
tent on controversial subjects.” The “Mature 
teen” setting left 30% of the “objectionable” 
sites unblocked; the “young teen” filter failed 
to block 14% – the lowest underblocking rate 
of all products reviewed. But “young teen” 
also blocked 63% of the “legitimate” sites, 
including peacefire.org; lesbian.org, an online 
guide to lesbian politics, history, arts, and 
culture; the citizens’ committee for the right 
to Keep and Bear arms; the Southern poverty 
law center; and SEX, Etc., a sex education 
site hosted by rutgers university.
Miscellaneous reports
• in “Babelfish Blocked by censorware” 
(feb. 27, 2001), peacefire reported that 
aol’s “Mature teen” setting barred access 
to Babelfish, altavista’s foreign-language 
translation service.
bess
Bess, originally manufactured by n2h2,  
was acquired by Secure computing in  
october 2003. By late 2005, Bess had been 
merged into Smartfilter, another Secure 
computing product, and was being marketed 
to schools under the name Smartfilter, Bess 
edition.34 
Bess combines technology with some hu-
man review. although n2h2 initially claimed 
that all sites were reviewed by its employees 
before being added to the block list, the cur-
rent promotional literature simply states that 
the filter’s “unique combination of technology 
and human review … reduces frustrations as-
sociated with ‘keyword blocking’ methods, in-
cluding denied access to sites regarding breast 
cancer, sex education, religion, and health.”35 
in 2001, Bess had 29 blocking categories; 
by 2006, the number was 38, ranging from 
“adults only” and “alcohol” to “gambling,” 
“jokes,” “lingerie,” and “tasteless/gross.” its 
four “exception” categories in 2001 were ex-
panded to six: “history,” “medical,” “moderat-
ed,” “text/spoken only,” “education,” and “for 
kids.” each exception category allows access 
to sites that have educational value but might 
otherwise be filtered – for example, children’s 
games that would be blocked under “games” 
or “jokes”; classic literature, history, art, or sex 
education that would be blocked under “sex,” 
“nudity,” or “violence.”
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
from april to September 1997, Karen 
Schneider supervised a nationwide team of 
librarians in testing 13 filters, including Bess. 
34  “Secure computing acquires n2h2,” www.securecomput-
ing.com/index.cfm?skey=1453 (visited 3/3/06). Secure 
computing also embeds filtering for “inappropriate” content 
in other pr.oducts such as cyberGuard and webwasher. 
“Secure computing products at a Glance,” www.bess.
com/index.cfm?skey=496; www.securecomputing.com/index.
cfm?skey=496 (visited 3/3/06).
35  “Smartfilter, Bess edition, filtering categories,” www.bess.
com/index.cfm?skey=1379 (visited 3/3/06).
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The results of this internet filter assessment 
project, or tifap, were published later that 
year in Schneider’s Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters.
The researchers began by seeking answers 
to 100 common research queries, on both 
unfiltered computers and ones equipped with 
Bess (and the various other filters) configured 
for maximum blocking, including keyword 
blocking. each query fell into one of 11 
categories: “sex and pornography,’” “anatomy,” 
“drugs, alcohol, and tobacco,” “gay issues,” 
“crimes (including pedophilia and child por-
nography),” “obscene or ‘racy’ language,” “cul-
ture and religion,” “women’s issues,” “gam-
bling,” “hate groups and intolerance,” and 
“politics.” The queries were devised to gauge 
filters’ handling of controversial issues – for 
instance, “i’d like some information on safe 
sex”; “i want information on the legalization 
of marijuana”; “is the aryan nation the same 
thing as nazis?” and “who are the founders 
of the electronic frontier foundation and 
what does it stand for?” in some cases, the 
queries contained potentially provocative 
terms “intended to trip up keyword-blocking 
mechanisms,” such as “how do beavers make 
their dams?”; “can you find me some pictures 
from Babes in Toyland?”; and “i’m trying to 
find out about the paul newman movie The 
Hustler.”
Schneider used web sites, blocked and 
unblocked, that arose from these searches to 
construct a test sample of 240 urls. her 
researchers tested these urls against a version 
of Bess configured for “maximum filtering,” 
but with keyword filtering disabled. tifap 
found that “several” (Schneider did not say 
how many) nonpornographic sites were 
blocked, including a page discussing X-rated 
videos but not containing any pornographic 
imagery, and an informational page on tri-
chomaniasis, a vaginal disease. upon notifi-
cation and review, Bess later unblocked the 
trichomaniasis site. A Practical Guide included 
neither the names nor the web addresses of 
the blocked sites.
censorware project, Passing Porn, Banning the 
Bible: N2H2’s Bess in Public Schools (2000)
from July 23-26, 2000, the censorware 
project tested “thousands” of urls against 
10 Bess proxy servers, seven of which were in 
use in public schools across the united States. 
among the blocked sites were a page from 
Mother Jones magazine; the institute of aus-
tralasian psychiatry; the nonprofit effort Stop 
prisoner rape; and a portion of the columbia 
university health education program site, on 
which users are invited to submit “questions 
about relationships; sexuality: sexual health; 
emotional health; fitness; nutrition; alcohol, 
nicotine, and other drugs; and general health.” 
Bess also blocked the united Kingdom-based 
feminists against censorship, the personal 
site of a librarian opposing internet filter 
use in libraries, and Time magazine’s “netly 
news,” which had reported, positively and 
negatively, on filtering software.
The report noted that, contrary to the im-
plication in Bess’s published filtering criteria, 
Bess does not review home pages hosted by 
such free site providers as angelfire, Geocities, 
and tripod (owing, it seems, to their sheer 
number). instead, users must configure the 
software to block none or all of these sites; 
some schools opt for the latter, thus prohibit-
ing access to such sites as The Jefferson Bible, a 
compendium of Biblical passages selected by 
Thomas Jefferson, and the eustis panthers, a 
high school baseball team. Though each proxy 
was configured to filter out pornography to 
the highest degree, censorware reported that 
it was able to access hundreds of pornographic 
web sites, of which 46 are listed in Passing 
Porn.  
peacefire, “‘BeSS, the internet retriever’ 
examined” (2000; since updated)
This report lists 15 sites that peacefire 
deemed inappropriately blocked by Bess 
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during the first half of 2000. They included 
peacefire.org itself, which was blocked for 
“profanity” when the word “piss” appeared on 
the site (in a quotation from a letter written 
by Brian Milburn, president of cyBersitter’s 
manufacturer, Solid oak Software, to jour-
nalist Brock Meeks). also blocked were: two 
portions of the web site of princeton univer-
sity’s office of population research; the Safer 
Sex page; five gay-interest sites, including the 
home page of the illinois federation for hu-
man rights; two online magazines devoted to 
gay topics; two web sites providing resources 
on eating disorders; and three sites discussing 
breast cancer.36
Jamie Mccarthy, “Mandated Mediocrity: 
Blocking Software Gets a failing Grade” 
(peacefire/ electronic privacy information 
center, oct. 2000)
“Mandated Mediocrity” describes another 
23 web sites inappropriately blocked by Bess. 
The urls were tested against an n2h2 proxy 
as well as a trial copy of the n2h2 inter-
net filtering Manager set to “typical school 
filtering.” among the blocked sites were the 
traditional values coalition; “hillary for 
president”; “The Smoking Gun,” an online 
selection of primary documents relating to 
current events; a selection of photographs of 
utah’s national parks; “what is Memorial 
day?”, an essay lamenting the “capitalistic 
american” conception of the holiday as noth-
ing more than an occasion for a three-day 
36  These last three pages were not filtered because of an auto-
matic ban on the keyword “breast,” but either were reviewed 
and deemed unacceptable by a Bess employee, or had other 
words or phrases that triggered the filter. The report noted: 
“in our tests, we created empty pages that contained the 
words breast and breast cancer in the titles, to test whether 
Bess was using a word filter. The pages we created were ac-
cessible, but the previous three sites about breast cancer were 
still blocked.”
weekend; the home page of “american Gov-
ernment and politics,” a course at St. John’s 
university; and the circumcision information 
and research pages, a site that contained no 
nudity and was designated a “Select parenting 
Site” by parenthoodweb.com.
Bennett haselton, “BeSS error rate for 1,000 
.com domains” (peacefire, oct. 23, 2000)
Bennett haselton performed the same test 
of 1,000 active dot-com domains for Bess as 
he did for aol (see page 9). n2h2 officials 
had evidently reviewed his earlier report on 
Surfwatch, and prepared for a similar test by 
unblocking any of the 1,000 sites inappropri-
ately filtered by Bess,37 so peacefire selected 
a second 1,000 dot-com domains for testing 
against a Bess proxy server in use at a school 
where a student had offered to help measure 
Bess’s performance.
The filter was configured to block sites 
in the categories of “adults only,” “alcohol,” 
“chat,” “drugs,” “free pages,” “gambling,” 
“hate/discrimination,” “illegal,” “lingerie,” 
“nudity,” “personals,” “personal information,” 
“porn site,” “profanity,” “school cheating 
info,” “sex,” “suicide/murder,” “tasteless/gross,” 
“tobacco,” “violence,” and “weapons.” The 
keyword-blocking features were also enabled. 
The BeSS proxy blocked 176 of the 1,000 
domains; among these, 150 were “under 
construction.” of the remaining 26 sites, 
peacefire deemed seven wrongly blocked: 
a-celebrity.com, a-csecurite.com, a-desk.com, 
a-eda.com, a-gordon.com, a-h-e.com, and 
a-intec.com.
The report said the resulting “error rate” of 
27% was unreliable given how small a sample 
was examined; the true error rate “could be 
as low as 15%.” haselton also noted that the 
dot-com domains tested here were “more 
likely to contain commercial pornography 
than, say, .org domains. ... we should expect 
37  Bennett haselton, “Study of average error rates for censor-
ware programs” (peacefire, oct. 23, 2000).
Bess blocked the Traditional 
Values Coalition and “Hillary 
for President.”
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the error rate to be even higher for .org sites.” 
he added that the results called into question 
n2h2 ceo peter nickerson’s claim, in 1998 
testimony before a congressional committee, 
that “all sites that are blocked are reviewed by 
n2h2 staff before being added to the block 
lists.”38
Bennett haselton & Jamie Mccarthy, “Blind 
Ballots: web Sites of u.S. political candidates 
censored by censorware” (peacefire, nov. 7, 
2000)
“Blind Ballots” was published on election 
day, 2000. The authors obtained a random 
sample of political candidates’ web sites from 
netelection.org, and set out to see which 
sites Bess’s (and cyber patrol’s) “typical school 
filtering” would allow users to access. (around 
the start of the 2000 school year, Bess and 
cyber patrol asserted that together they were 
providing filtered internet access to more than 
30,000 schools nationwide.39)
Bess’s wholesale blocking of free web host-
ing services caused the sites of one democrat-
ic candidate, five republicans, six libertarians 
(as well as the entire Missouri libertarian 
party site), and 13 other third-party candi-
dates to be blocked. The authors commented 
that, as “many of our political candidates run 
their campaigns on a shoestring, and use free-
hosting services to save money,” Bess’s barring 
of such hosts leads it to an inadvertent bias 
toward wealthy or established politicians’ sites. 
congressman edward Markey (a democrat 
from Massachusetts), also had his site blocked 
– unlike the others, it was not hosted by 
Geocities or tripod, but was blocked because 
Bess categorized its content as “hate, illegal, 
38  peter nickerson testimony, house Subcom. on telecom-
munications, trade, and consumer protection (Sept. 11, 
1998), www.peacefire.org/censorware/BeSS/peter-nickerson.
filtering-bill-testimony.9-11-1998.txt (visited 3/6/06).
39 n2h2 press release, “n2h2 launches online curriculum 
partners program, offers leading education publishers access 
to Massive user Base” (Sept. 6, 2000); Surf control press 
release, “cyber patrol tells copa commission that Market 
for internet filtering Software to protect Kids is Booming” 
(July 20, 2000). 
pornography, and/or violence.” “while block-
ing software companies often justify their 
errors by pointing out that they are quickly 
corrected,” the report concluded, “this does 
not help any of the candidates listed above. ... 
corrections made after election day do not 
help them at all.”
Bennett haselton, “amnesty intercepted: 
Global human rights Groups Blocked by 
web censoring Software” (peacefire, dec. 12, 
2000)
in response to complaints from students 
barred from the amnesty international web 
page, among others, at their school computer 
stations, peacefire examined various filters’ 
treatment of human rights sites. it found that 
Bess’s “typical school filtering” blocked the 
home pages of the international coptic con-
gress, which tracked human rights violations 
against coptic christians living in egypt; 
and friends of Sean Sellers, which contained 
links to the works of the Multiple personality 
disorder-afflicted writer who was executed 
in 1999 for murders he had committed as a 
16-year-old. (The site opposed capital punish-
ment.) 
“typical school filtering” also denied access 
to the official sites of recording artists Suzanne 
vega and the art dogs; both contained state-
ments that portions of their proceeds would 
be donated to amnesty international. Bess’s 
“minimal filtering” configuration blocked the 
web sites of human rights & tamil people, 
which tracks government and police violence 
against hindu tamils in Sri lanka; and casa 
alianza, which documents the condition of 
homeless children in the cities of central 
america.
Miscellaneous reports
• in its “winners of the foil the filter con-
test” (Sept. 28, 2000), the digital freedom 
network reported that Bess blocked house 
Majority leader richard “dick” armey’s 
official web site upon detecting the word 
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“dick.” armey, himself a filtering advocate, 
won “The poetic Justice award – for those 
bitten by their own snake.”
• peacefire reported, in “Babelfish Blocked 
by censorware” (feb. 27, 2001), that Bess 
blocked the url-translation site Babelfish.
• in “teen health Sites praised in article, 
Blocked by censorware” (Mar. 23, 2001), 
peacefire’s Bennett haselton noted that 
Bess blocked portions of teenGrowth, a 
teen-oriented health education site that 
was recognized by the New York Times in 
the recent article, “teenagers find health 
answers with a click.”40
clckSafe
rather than relying on a list of objection-
able urls, clickSafe software reviewed each 
requested page in real time. in an outline 
for testimony submitted to the commission 
created by the 1998 child online protection 
act (the “copa commission”), company 
co-founder richard Schwartz claimed that 
clickSafe “uses state-of-the-art, content-based 
filtering software that combines cutting edge 
graphic, word and phrase-recognition technol-
ogy to achieve extraordinarily high rates of ac-
curacy in filtering pornographic content,” and 
“can precisely distinguish between appropriate 
and inappropriate sites.”41 This was vigorously 
disputed by peacefire (see below). By 2005, 
a web site for the clickSafe filter could no 
longer be found, although a european com-
pany using the same name had launched a site 
focused on internet safety for minors.42
peacefire, “Sites Blocked by clickSafe” (July 
2000)
upon learning that clickSafe blocked the 
40  Bonnie rothman Morris, “teenagers find health answers with a 
click,” New York Times (Mar. 20, 2001), f8.
41  outline for testimony presented by richard Schwartz, co-
founder, clickSafe.com, www.copacommission.org/meetings/
hearing2/schwartz.test.pdf (visited 3/13/05). 
42  “new clicksafe” (site in dutch and french), www.clicksafe.be/taalkeuze.
html (visited 3/13/05); “Background clicksafe,” www.saferinternet.
org/ww/en/pub/insafe/focus/belgium/be_node.htm (visited 3/13/05).
home page of cyberlaw scholar lawrence 
lessig, who was to testify before the copa 
commission, peacefire attempted to access 
various pages on the copa commission site, 
as well as the web sites of organizations and 
companies with which the commissioners 
were affiliated, through a computer equipped 
with clickSafe. on the commission’s site, 
clickSafe blocked the frequently asked 
Questions page; the biographies of commis-
sion members Stephen Balkam, donna rice 
hughes, and John Bastian; a list of “tech-
nologies and methods” within the scope of 
the commission’s inquiry; the commission’s 
Scope and timeline proposal; and two ver-
sions of the copa law.
as for groups with representatives on the 
commission, clickSafe blocked several orga-
nizations’ and companies’ sites, at least partial-
ly: network Solutions; the internet content 
rating association; Security Software’s infor-
mation page on its signature filtering product, 
cyber Sentinel; familyconnect, a brand of 
blocking software; the national law center 
for children and families; the christian site 
crosswalk.com; and the center for democ-
racy and technology (cdt). in addition to 
the cdt, clickSafe blocked the home pages 
of the aclu, the electronic frontier founda-
tion, and the american family association, as 
well as part of the official site for donna rice 
hughes’s book, Kids Online: Protecting Your 
Children in Cyberspace.
cyber Patrol
in 2001, cyber patrol operated with 12 
default blocking categories, including “partial 
nudity,” “intolerance,” “drugs/drug culture,” 
and “sex education.”43 The manufacturer’s 
web site in 2001 implied that “a team of 
professional researchers” reviewed all sites to 
decide whether they should be blocked; by 
2006, the company described its filter as a mix 
43  By 2005, cyber patrol had 13 categories, several of them different 
from the original 12. cyberlist, www.cyberpatrol.com/default.
aspx?id=123&mnuid=2.5 (visited 3/14/06).
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of human researchers and automated tools.44 
like most filter manufacturers, cyber patrol 
does not make its list of prohibited sites pub-
lic, but its “test-a-site” search engine (formerly 
called “cybernot”) allows users to enter 
urls and learn immediately whether those 
pages are on the list. in 2001, the company 
stated that it blocked all internet sites “that 
contain information or software programs 
designed to hack into filtering software” in all 
of its blocking categories; this statement is no 
longer on the cyber patrol site.
Brock Meeks & declan Mccullagh, “Jack-
ing in from the ‘Keys to the Kingdom’ port,” 
CyberWire Dispatch (July 3, 1996)
The first evaluation of cyber patrol ap-
peared in this early report on the problems 
of internet filtering by journalists Brock 
Meeks and declan Mccullagh. They viewed a 
decrypted version of cyber patrol’s block list 
(along with those of cyBersitter and net 
nanny), and noticed that cyber patrol stored 
the web addresses it blocked only partially, 
cutting off all but the first three characters at 
the end of a url. for instance, the software 
was meant to block loiosh.andrew.cmu.
edu/~shawn, a carnegie Mellon student home 
page containing information on the occult; 
yet on its block list cyber patrol recorded 
only loiosh.andrew.cmu.edu/ ~sha, thereby 
blocking every site beginning with that 
url segment and leaving, at the time of the 
report’s publication, 23 unrelated sites on the 
university’s server blocked.
The authors also found that with all de-
fault categories enabled, cyber patrol barred 
multiple sites concerning cyberliberties – the 
electronic frontier foundation’s censorship 
archive, for example, and Mit’s league for 
programming freedom. also blocked were 
the Queer resources directory, which counts 
among its resources information from the 
44  cyber patrol, “accurate, current & relevant filtering,” www.
cyberpatrol.com/default.aspx?id=129&mnuid=2.5 (visited 
2/26/06).
centers for disease control and prevention, 
the AIDS Book Review Journal, and AIDS 
Treatment News. cyber patrol also blocked a 
number of newsgroups dealing with homosex-
uality or gender issues, such as alt.journalism.
gay-press; soc.support.youth.gay-lesbian-bi; 
alt.feminism; and soc.support.fat-acceptance.
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
The internet filter assessment project tested 
cyber patrol configured to block only “full 
nudity” and “sexual acts.” Schneider reported 
that the software “blocked “good sites” 5-10% 
of the time, and pornographic sites slipped 
through about 10% of the time. one of the 
“good sites” was www.disinfo.com, described 
by Schneider as a site “devoted to debunking 
propaganda.”
Jonathan wallace, “cyber patrol: The friendly 
censor” (censorware project, nov. 22, 1997)
Jonathan wallace tested approximately 270 
sites on ethics, politics, and law – all “con-
taining controversial speech but no obscenity 
or illegal material” – against the cybernot 
search engine after learning that the web 
pages of Sex, Laws, and Cyberspace, the 1996 
book he co-authored with Mark Mangan, 
were blocked by cyber patrol. wallace found 
12 of his chosen sites were barred, including 
Deja News, a searchable archive of usenet ma-
terials, and the Society for the promotion of 
unconditional relationships, an organization 
advocating monogamy. he could not find out 
which of cyber patrol’s categories these sites 
fit into. when asked, a cyber patrol represen-
tative simply said that the company consid-
ered the sites “inappropriate for children.”
wallace reported that cyber patrol also 
blocked sites featuring politically loaded 
content, such as the flag Burning page, which 
examines the issue of flag burning from a con-
stitutional perspective; interactivism, which 
invites users to engage in political activism 
by corresponding with politicians on issues 
 internet filters: a public policy report
such as campaign finance reform and tibetan 
independence; newtwatch, a democratic 
party-funded page that consisted of reports 
and satires on the former Speaker of the 
house; dr. Bonzo, which featured “satirical 
essays on religious matters”45; and the Second 
amendment foundation – though, as wal-
lace noted, cyber patrol did not block other 
gun-related sites, such as the national rifle 
association’s.
Gay and lesbian alliance against defamation 
(Glaad) press release, “Gay Sites netted in 
cyber patrol Sting” (dec. 19, 1997)
Glaad reported that cyber patrol was 
blocking the entire “westhollywood” subdi-
rectory of Geocities. westhollywood, at that 
time, was home to more than 20,000 gay- and 
lesbian-interest sites, including the national 
Black lesbian and Gay leadership forum’s 
young adult program. when contacted, 
cyber patrol’s then-manufacturer Microsys-
tems Software cited, by way of explanation, 
the high potential for westhollywood sites 
to contain nudity or pornographic imagery. 
Glaad’s press release pointed out, however, 
that Geocities expressly prohibited “nudity 
and pornographic material of any kind” on its 
server.
Microsystems ceo dick Gorgens respond-
ed to further inquiry with the admission that 
Glaad was “absolutely correct in [its] assess-
ment that the subdirectory block on westhol-
lywood is prejudicial to the Gay and lesbian 
Geocities community. ... over the next week 
the problem will be corrected.” yet according 
to the press release, after a week had passed, 
the block on westhollywood remained.
censorware project, Blacklisted by Cyber Pa-
trol: From Ada to Yoyo (dec. 22, 1997)
This report documented a number of 
sites that the censorware project consid-
45  wallace added that the blocking of this site, “long removed 
from the web, raises questions about the frequency with 
which the cyber patrol database is updated.”
ered wrongly blocked in the “full nudity” 
and “sexual acts” categories, among them 
creature’s comfort pet Service; air penny (a 
nike site devoted to basketball player penny 
hardaway); the Mit project on Mathematics 
and computation; aaa wholesale nutrition; 
the national academy of clinical Biochemis-
try; the online edition of Explore Underwater 
magazine; the computer science department 
of england’s Queen Mary and westfield col-
lege; and the united States army corps of 
engineers construction engineering research 
laboratories. The report took its title from 
two additional sites blocked for “full nudity” 
and “sexual acts”: “we, the people of ada,” an 
ada, Michigan, committee devoted to “bring-
ing about a change for a more honest, fiscally 
responsible and knowledgeable township gov-
ernment,” and yoyo, a server of Melbourne, 
australia’s Monash university.
Blacklisted also reported that every site 
hosted by the free web page provider tri-
pod was barred, not only for nudity or 
sexually explicit content, but also for “vio-
lence/profanity,” “gross depictions,” “intoler-
ance,” “satanic/cult,” “drugs/drug culture,” 
“militant/extreme,” “questionable/illegal & 
gambling,” and “alcohol & tobacco.” tripod 
was home, at the time of the report, to 1.4 
million distinct pages, but smaller servers and 
service providers were also blocked in their 
entirety—Blacklisted lists 40 of them. another 
section of the report lists hundreds of blocked 
newsgroups, including alt.atheism; alt.adop-
tion; alt.censorship; alt.journalism; rec.games.
bridge (for bridge enthusiasts); and support.
soc.depression.misc (on depression and mood 
disorders).
The day after Blacklisted was published, 
Microsystems Software unblocked 55 of the 
67 urls and domains the report had cited. 
eight of the remaining 12, according to 
the censorware project, were still wrongly 
blocked: nike’s penny hardaway site; the 
national academy of Biochemistry sites; 
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four internet service providers; tripod; and a 
site-in-progress for a software company. This 
last site, at the time of censorware’s decem-
ber 25, 1997 update to Blacklisted, contained 
very little content, but did contain the words 
“hot weB linKS,” which was “apparently 
enough for cyber patrol to continue to block 
it as pornography through a second review.” 
of the four other sites left blocked, two, 
censorware acknowledged, fell within cyber 
patrol’s blocking criteria and “shouldn’t have 
been listed as wrongful blocks originally.”46
christopher hunter, Filtering the Future?: 
Software Filters, Porn, PICS, and the Internet 
Content Conundrum (Master’s thesis, annen-
berg School for communication, university 
of pennsylvania, July 1999)
in June 1999, christopher hunter tested 
200 urls against cyber patrol and three 
other filters. contending that existing reports 
on blocked sites applied “largely unscientific 
methods” (that is, they did not attempt to 
assess overall percentages of wrongly blocked 
sites), hunter tested cyber patrol, cyBersit-
ter, net nanny, and Surfwatch by “social sci-
ence methods of randomization and content 
analysis.”
hunter intended half of his testing sample 
to approximate an average internet user’s surf-
ing habits. Thus, the first 100 sites consisted 
of 50 that were “randomly generated” by 
webcrawler’s random links feature and 50 
others that hunter compiled through alta-
vista searches for the five most frequently 
requested search terms as of april 1999: 
“yahoo,” “warez” (commercial software ob-
tainable for download), “hotmail,” “sex,” and 
“Mp3.” hunter gathered the first 10 matches 
from each of these five searches.
for the other 100 sites, hunter focused on 
material often identified as controversial, such 
as the web sites of the 36 plaintiff organiza-
46  censorware project, Blacklisted By Cyber Patrol: From Ada to 
Yoyo – The Aftermath (dec. 25, 1997).
tions in ACLU v. Reno and ACLU v. Reno II, 
the american civil liberties union’s chal-
lenges to the 1997 communications decency 
act and 1998 child online protection act. 
hunter then conducted yahoo searches for 
sites pertaining to internet portals, political 
issues, feminism, hate speech, gambling, re-
ligion, gay pride and homosexuality, alcohol, 
tobacco, and drugs, pornography, news, vio-
lent computer games, safe sex, and abortion. 
from each of the first 12 of these 13 searches, 
hunter chose five of the resulting matches for 
his sample, and then selected four abortion-
related sites (two pro- and two anti-) in order 
to arrive at a total of 100 urls.
hunter evaluated the first page of each site 
using the rating system devised by an indus-
try group called the recreational Software 
advisory council (rSac). under the rSac’s 
four categories (violence, nudity, sex, and lan-
guage) and five grades within each category, a 
site with a rating of zero in the “sex” category, 
for example, would contain no sexual content 
or else only “innocent kissing; romance,” 
while a site with a “sex” rating of 4 might 
contain “explicit sexual acts or sex crimes.” 
using these categories, hunter made his own 
judgments as to whether a filtering product 
erroneously blocked or failed to block a site, 
characterizing a site whose highest rSac 
rating he thought would be zero or one as 
nonobjectionable, while determining that any 
site with a rating of 2, 3, or 4 in at least one 
rSac category should have been blocked.47
after testing each filter at its “default” set-
ting, hunter concluded that cyber patrol 
blocked 20 sites, or 55.6%, of the material 
he deemed objectionable according to rSac 
47  Because the rSac’s system depended on self-rating, it 
never gained much traction in the u.S., where third-party 
filtering products soon dominated the market. in 1999, the 
rSac merged with the internet content rating association 
(icra), a British-based industry group. See www.rsac.org; 
www.icra.org/about (both visited 3/14/05). for background 
on rSac, icra, and their difficulty achieving wide ac-
ceptance, see Marjorie heins, Not in Front of the Children: 
“Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001), 
224, 261, 351-52.
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standards, and 15 sites, or 9.1%, of the mate-
rial he deemed innocuous. among the 15 in-
nocuous sites were the feminist literary group 
RiotGrrl; Stop prisoner rape; the Qworld 
contents page, a collection of links to online 
gay-interest resources; an article on “promot-
ing with pride” on the Queer living page; the 
coalition for positive Sexuality, which pro-
motes “complete and honest sex education”; 
SiecuS, the Sexuality information and edu-
cation council of the united States; and Gay 
wired presents wildcat press, a page devoted 
to an award-winning independent press. 
although hunter may well have been right 
that many of the blocked sites were relatively 
unobjectionable according to the rSac rat-
ings, cyber patrol’s default settings for these 
filters (for example, “sex education”) were 
specifically designed to sweep broadly across 
many useful sites. it’s not entirely accurate, 
therefore, to conclude that the blocking of all 
these sites would be erroneous; rather, it would 
be the result of restrictive default settings and 
user failure to disable the pre-set categories. 
five of the sites hunter deemed overblocked 
by cyber patrol, for example, were alcohol- 
and tobacco-related, and thus fell squarely 
within the company’s default filtering criteria. 
in february 2000, filtering advocate david 
Burt (later to become an employee of n2h2) 
responded to hunter’s study with a press 
release citing potential sources of error.48 
Burt argued that “200 sites is far too small to 
adequately represent the breadth of the entire 
world wide web” and charged that all but the 
50 randomly generated urls constituted a 
skewed sample, containing content “instantly 
recognizable as likely to trigger filters” and 
“not represented in the sample proportion-
ately to the entire internet,” thus giving rise 
to “much higher-than-normal error rates.” 
a more serious problem, however, is that in 
attempting to arrive at “scientific” estimates of 
48  filtering facts press release, “ala touts filter Study whose 
own author calls flawed” (feb. 18, 2000).
percentages of wrongly blocked sites, hunter 
relied on his own subjective judgments on how 
the different web sites fit into the rSac’s 20 
separate rating categories.49
center for Media education (cMe), Youth 
Access to Alcohol and Tobacco Web Marketing: 
The Filtering and Rating Debate (oct. 1999)
The cMe tested cyber patrol and five 
other filters for underinclusive blocking of 
alcohol and tobacco marketing materials. 
They first selected the official sites of 10 beer 
manufacturers and 10 liquor companies that 
are popular and “[have] elements that ap-
peal to youth.” They added 10 sites pertain-
ing to alcohol – discussing drinking games 
or containing cocktail-making instructions, 
for example – and 14 sites promoting smok-
ing. (as major u.S. cigarette brands are not 
advertised online, cMe chose the home pages 
of such magazines as Cigar Aficionado and 
Smoke.) cyber patrol blocked only 43% of the 
promotional sites.
The cMe also conducted web searches on 
three popular search engines – yahoo, Go/
infoSeek, and excite – for the alcohol- and 
tobacco-related terms “beer,” “Budweiser liz-
ards,” “cigarettes,” “cigars,” “drinking games,” 
“home brewing,” “Joe camel,” “liquor,” and 
“mixed drinks.” it then attempted to access 
the first five sites returned in each search. 
cyber patrol blocked 30% of the result pages, 
allowing, for example, cigarettes4u.com, 
tobaccotraders.com, and homebrewshop.com, 
which, according to the report, “not only 
promoted the use of alcohol and tobacco, but 
also sold products and accessories related to 
their consumption.”
to test blocking of educational and public 
health information on alcohol and tobacco, 
49  hunter later testified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in 
the lawsuit challenging cipa. The district court noted that 
his attempt to calculate over- and underblocking rates scien-
tifically, like a similar attempt by experts for the government, 
was flawed because neither began with a truly random sample 
of web sites for testing. American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. 
Supp. 2d at 437-38.
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the cMe added to its sample 10 sites relating 
to alcohol consumption – for instance, www.
alcoholismhelp.com, Mothers against drunk 
driving and the national organization 
on fetal alcohol Syndrome, along with 10 
anti-smoking sites, and the american cancer 
Society. cyber patrol did not block any of the 
sites in this group. nor did it block most sites 
returned by the three search engines when 
terms like “alcohol,” “alcoholism,” “fetal alco-
hol syndrome,” “lung cancer,” or “substance 
abuse” were entered. cyber patrol allowed ac-
cess to an average of 4.8 of the top five search 
results in each case; cMe deemed an average 
of 4.1 of these contained important educa-
tional information.
eddy Jansson and Matthew Skala, The Break-
ing of Cyber Patrol ®4 (Mar. 11, 2000)
Jansson and Skala decrypted cyber patrol’s 
blacklist and found questionable blocking of 
peacefire, as well as a number of anonymizer 
and foreign-language translation services, 
which the company blocked under all of its de-
fault categories. Blocked under every category 
but “sex education” was the church of the Sub-
Genius site, which parodies christian churches 
as well as corporate and consumer culture.
also on the block list, for “intolerance,” 
were a personal home page on which the word 
“voodoo” appeared (in a mention of voodoo-
cycles.com) and the web archives of declan 
Mccullagh’s Justice on campus project, 
which worked “to preserve free expression and 
due process at universities.” Blocked in the 
“satanic/cults” category were webdevils.com 
(a site of multimedia net-art projects) and 
Mega’s Metal asylum, a page devoted to heavy 
metal music; the latter site was also branded 
“militant/extremist.” also blocked as “mili-
tant/extremist,” as well as “violence/profanity” 
and “questionable/illegal & gambling,” were a 
portion of the nuclear control institute site; 
a personal page dedicated, in part, to rais-
ing awareness of neo-nazi activity; multiple 
editorials opposing nuclear arms from wash-
ington State’s Tri-City Herald; part of the 
city of hiroshima site; the former web site 
of the american airpower heritage Museum 
in Midland, texas; an illinois Mathematics 
and Science academy student’s personal home 
page, which at the time of Jansson and Skala’s 
report consisted only of the student’s résumé; 
and the web site of a sheet-music publisher. 
The “Marston family home page,” a per-
sonal site, was also blocked under the “mili-
tant/extremist” and “questionable/illegal & 
gambling” categories – presumably, according 
to the report, because one of the children 
wrote, “This new law the communications 
decency act totally defys [sic] all that the 
constitution was. fight the system, take the 
power back. ...”
Bennett haselton, “cyber patrol error rate 
for first 1,000 .com domains” (peacefire, 
oct. 23, 2000)
haselton tested cyber patrol’s average rate 
of error, using the same 1,000 dot-com do-
mains as a sample that he used for an identical 
investigation of Surfwatch (see page 36). The 
cybernot list blocked 121 sites for portray-
als of “partial nudity,” “full nudity,” or “sexual 
acts.” of these 121 sites, he eliminated 100 
that were “under construction,” and assessed 
the remaining 21. he considered 17 wrongly 
blocked, including a-actionhomeinspection.
com; a-1bonded.com (a locksmith’s site); 
a-1janitorial.com; a-1radiatorservice.com; 
and a-attorney-virginia.com. he deemed 
four sites appropriately blocked under cyber 
patrol’s definition of sexually explicit content, 
for an error rate of 81%. haselton wrote that 
cyber patrol’s actual error rate was anywhere 
between 65-95%, but was unlikely to be “less 
than 60% across all domains,” and as with 
Bess, that the results may have been skewed in 
cyber patrol’s favor owing to the test’s focus 
on dot-com domains, which “are more likely 
to contain commercial pornography than, say, 
.org domains.”
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Bennett haselton & Jamie Mccarthy, “Blind 
Ballots: web Sites of u.S. political candidates 
censored by censorware” (peacefire, nov. 7, 
2000)
in this election day report, peacefire re-
vealed that cyber patrol, configured to block 
“partial nudity,” “full nudity,” and “sexual 
acts,” blocked the web sites of four repub-
lican candidates, four democrats, and one 
libertarian. The site of an additional demo-
cratic candidate, lloyd doggett, was blocked 
under cyber patrol’s “questionable/illegal/
gambling” category.  The day after peacefire 
published these findings, ZDNet News re-
porter lisa Bowman contacted cyber patrol’s 
then-manufacturer, Surfcontrol. a company 
spokesperson directed Bowman to the cy-
bernot search engine, which indicated that 
none of the urls was actually prohibited. 
But later the same day, after downloading 
cyber patrol’s most recent block list, Bow-
man attempted to access each site, and found 
that the software did indeed bar her from the 
candidate sites in question.50
“amnesty intercepted: Global human rights 
Groups Blocked by web censoring Software” 
(peacefire, dec. 12, 2000)
“amnesty intercepted” reported the follow-
ing organizations (among others) blocked by 
cyber patrol in the category of “sexually ex-
50  peacefire, “inaccuracies in the ‘cybernot Search engine,’” 
(n.d.); lisa Bowman, “filtering programs Block candidate 
Sites,” ZDNet News (nov. 8, 2000). 
plicit” content: amnesty international israel; 
the canadian labour congress; the american 
Kurdish information network, which tracks 
human rights violations against Kurds in iran, 
iraq, Syria, and turkey; the Milarepa fund, 
a tibetan interest group; Peace Magazine; 
the Bonn international center for conver-
sion, which promotes the transfer of human, 
industrial, and economic resources away from 
the defense sector; the canada asia pacific 
resource network, whose stated mission “is 
to promote regional solidarity among trade 
unions and nGos in the asia pacific” region; 
the Sisterhood is Global institute, an orga-
nization opposing violations of the human 
rights of women worldwide; the Metro  
network for Social Justice; the Society  
for peace, unity, and human rights for  
Sri lanka; and the international coptic  
congress.
“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
Consumer Reports found that cyber patrol 
failed to block 23% of the magazine’s cho-
sen 86 “easily located web sites that contain 
sexually explicit content or violently graphic 
images, or that promote drugs, tobacco, 
crime, or bigotry.” yet it did block the home 
page of operation rescue (which the authors 
classified as objectionable on account of its 
graphic images of aborted fetuses). The filter 
also blocked such nonpornographic sites as 
peacefire and lesbian.org.
Kieren Mccarthy, “cyber patrol Bans The 
Register,” The Register (Mar. 5, 2001); drew 
cullen, “cyber patrol unblocks The Register,” 
The Register (Mar. 9, 2001)
days after the Consumer Reports article 
appeared, the British newspaper The Register 
received word from an employee of citrix 
Systems that he had been unable to access the 
Register from his office computer, on which 
the company had installed cyber patrol. 
Surfcontrol unblocked the site within days, 
Cyber Patrol, configured to 
block “partial nudity,” “full  
nudity,” and “sexual acts,” 
blocked the Web sites of  
four Republican candidates, 
four Democrats, and one  
Libertarian. 
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with the exception of a page containing the 
december 12, 2000, article that was the basis 
of the initial block: a piece by Register staff 
reporter John leyden on peacefire’s recently 
introduced filter-disabling program.51 
a Surfcontrol representative explained: 
“The Register published an article written by 
peacefire containing information on how to 
access inappropriate sites specifically blocked 
by cyber patrol. Given [the] irresponsible 
nature of the article, apparently encourag-
ing users to override cyber patrol’s filtering 
mechanism, we took the decision to block 
The Register – upholding our first obliga-
tion to customers by preventing children 
or pupils from being able to surf web sites 
containing sexually explicit, racist or inflam-
matory material.” cullen responded that 
there was no “sexually explicit, racist,” or 
“inflammatory” material in the article, which 
“merely describes peacefire.exe and provides 
a link to the peacefire.org web site.”52
Miscellaneous reports
• in “censorware: how well does inter-
net filtering Software protect Students?” 
(Jan. 1998), Electronic School columnist 
lars Kongshem reported that cyber patrol 
blocked the “educator’s home page for 
tobacco use prevention,” part of a site 
maintained by Maryland’s department of 
health and Mental hygiene.
• in his expert witness report for the defen-
dants in the case of Mainstream Loudoun v. 
Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Li-
brary (July 14, 1998), david Burt reported 
that his comparative testing of cyber patrol, 
i-Gear, Surfwatch, and X-Stop revealed 
that cyber patrol blocked 40% of sites Burt 
51  John leyden, “porn-filter disabler unleashed,” The Register 
(dec. 19, 2000). 
52  The Surfcontrol representative also wrote: “we should be 
grateful if The Register would adopt a policy of allowing 
companies, such as ourselves, the opportunity to respond in 
full before going to press.” “astonishing,” cullen commented. 
“cyber patrol blocked The Register without informing us, or 
giving us a chance to respond in full, or at all.”
had selected as nonobscene, including the 
sex information sites Di Que Si; all about 
Sex; new Male Sexuality; and internet Sex 
radio.
• in the New York Times article “library 
Grapples with internet freedom” (oct. 
15, 1998), Katie hafner reported that 
cyber patrol blocked searches for Georgia 
o’Keeffe and vincent van Gogh, while 
allowing hits from searches for “toys” that 
included sites selling sex toys.
• peacefire reported, in “Babelfish Blocked 
by censorware” (feb. 27, 2001), that cyber 
patrol blocked the foreign-language web 
page translation service featured on alta-
vista in all 12 filtering categories.
• in “teen health Sites praised in article, 
Blocked by censorware” (Mar. 23, 2001), 
Bennett haselton reported that cyber 
patrol blocked Zaphealth, a health educa-
tion site containing articles of interest to a 
teenage audience.
cyber Sentnel
rather than maintaining and updating a list 
of sites to be blocked, or designating forbid-
den categories, cyber Sentinel scans each 
requested page for key words and phrases in 
its various databases, or “libraries.” in 2001, 
for example, its “child predator library” 
contained such phrases and “do you have a 
pic” and “can i call you.” promotional text 
on cyber Sentinel’s web site claims it is “the 
most advanced and flexible” internet filtering 
product on the market.53 
center for Media education, Youth Access to 
Alcohol and Tobacco Web Marketing: The Filter-
ing and Rating Debate (oct. 1999)
The cMe found cyber Sentinel ineffec-
53  “cyber Sentinel filtering network,” www.cyber-sentinel.
net (visited 3/7/06). This site is operated by Software4par-
ents.com. another product, “cyber Sentinel network,” is 
made by Security Software Systems and seems to use similar 
technology, adjusted for office rather than home use, www.
securitysoft.com/default.asp?pageid=49 (visited 3/7/06).  
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tive in screening out promotions for alcohol 
and tobacco use. it blocked only 11% of 
the promotional sites selected by the testers, 
allowing users to access an average of 39 of 
the 44 pages, and blocked just 3% of the 
pages resulting from searches for alcohol- and 
tobacco-related promotional material.
Bennett haselton, “Sites Blocked by cyber 
Sentinel” (peacefire, aug. 2, 2000)
having conducted “about an hour of ad-
hoc experimentation,” haselton found that 
cyber Sentinel blocked cnn because, as 
system log files revealed, the word “erotic” 
appeared on the front page (in the title of 
an article, “naples Museum exposes public 
to ancient erotica”). also blocked were: a 
result page for a search of the word “censor-
ship” on Wired magazine’s site (one of the 
results contained the word “porn” in the title, 
“feds try odd anti-porn approach”); result 
pages for searches of the term “copa” on 
Wired and other news sites, also on account of 
article titles containing the word “porn” (for 
instance, “appeals court rules against net 
porn law”); and a portion of the web site of 
the ontario center for religious tolerance, 
containing an essay on collisions between sci-
ence and religion throughout history.
cyber Sentinel also blocked sites associ-
ated with both sides of the civil liberties and 
internet censorship debates: an aclu press 
release, “calls for arrest of openly Gay Gop 
convention Speaker reveal danger of Sod-
omy laws nationwide”; the american family 
association, because of the word “porn” 
(“the current administration and the Justice 
department have been good to the porn 
industry”); on account of the word “cum,” the 
biographies of copa commission members 
Stephen Balkam and donna rice hughes 
(both graduated magna cum laude); the copa 
commission’s list of research papers, because 
the word “porn” appeared in the title of one 
report; and the home page for donna rice 
hughes’s book, Kids Online: Protecting Your 
Children in Cyberspace, an appendix of which 
is titled “porn on the net.”
cybeRstter
Before 1999, cyBersitter, in addition to 
blocking entire sites and searches for terms on 
its block list, would excise terms it deemed 
objectionable and leave blank spaces where 
they would otherwise appear. This procedure 
led to some early notoriety for the product, 
as when it deleted the word “homosexual” 
from the sentence, “The catholic church 
opposes homosexual marriage” – and left web 
users reading “The catholic church opposes 
marriage.”54
in 1999, cyBersitter, manufactured by 
Solid oak Software, modified its system and 
established seven default settings, including 
“picS rating adult topics,” which covered “all 
topics not suitable for children under the age of 
13,” “sites promoting the gay and lesbian life-
style,” and “sites advocating illegal/radical activi-
ties.” its total list of blocking categories grew to 
22. users could enable or disable any category.
By 2005, cyBersitter had 32 content 
categories, including “cults,” “gambling,” and 
“file sharing.” its default setting blocked “sex,” 
“violence,” “drugs,” and “hate,” as well as all 
image searches. PC Magazine called it “the 
strongest filtering we’ve seen. … cyBersitter 
errs on the conservative side.” it also blocked 
“bad words” in email and instant messages.55
Brock Meeks & declan Mccullagh, “Jack-
ing in from the ‘Keys to the Kingdom’ port,” 
CyberWire Dispatch (July 3, 1996)
Meeks and Mccullagh reported that cy-
Bersitter blocked a newsgroup devoted to 
gay issues (alt.politics.homosexual), the Queer 
resources directory, and the home page 
of the national organization for women. 
cyBersitter’s prohibited words included 
54 peacefire, “cyBersitter examined” (2000).
55  “cyBersitter 9.0,” PC Magazine (aug. 3, 2004), www.pcmag.com/ar-
ticle2/0,1759,1618830,00.asp (visited 2/1/06); see also “cyBersitter® 
– for a family friendly internet,” cyBersitter.com (visited 2/10/06).
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“gay, queer, bisexual” combined with “male, 
men, boy, group, rights, community, activi-
ties…” and “gay, queer, homosexual, lesbian, 
bisexual” combined with “society, culture.” 
according to the report, Brian Milburn, 
president of Solid oak Software, responded: 
“we have not and will not bow to pressure 
from any organization that disagrees with our 
philosophy. ... we don’t simply block pornog-
raphy. That’s not the intention of our product. 
The majority of our customers are strong 
family-oriented people with traditional family 
values. ... i wouldn’t even care to debate if gay 
and lesbian issues are suitable for teenagers. 
… we filter anything that has to do with sex. 
Sexual orientation [is about sex] by virtue of 
the fact that it has sex in the name.”
Bennett haselton, “cyBersitter: where do 
we not want you to Go today?”, Ethical 
Spectacle (nov. 5-dec. 11, 1996)
haselton reported that among cyBer-
sitter’s blocked domains were, in addition 
to peacefire itself, the online communities 
echo communications and whole earth 
’lectronic link; the web site of community 
conneXion, which manufactured an anony-
mous-surfing program; and the home page 
of the national organization for women. 
cyBersitter also barred any yahoo search for 
the term “gay rights.”
ethical Spectacle press release, “cyBersitter 
Blocks The Ethical Spectacle” (Jan. 19, 1997)
in early 1997, cyBersitter blocked the 
Ethical Spectacle, an online magazine “examin-
ing the intersection of ethics, law and politics 
in our society,” after editor Jonathan wallace 
added a link to a site titled “don’t Buy cy-
Bersitter,” which directed users to peacefire’s 
report “cyBersitter: where do we not 
want you to Go today?” wallace wrote to 
Milburn and Solid oak technical support “de-
manding an explanation. i pointed out that 
The Spectacle does not fit any of their pub-
lished criteria for blocking a site. i received 
mail in return demanding that i cease writing 
to them and calling my mail ‘harassment’ 
—with a copy to the postmaster at my iSp.”
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
Schneider’s internet filter assessment 
project reported that unlike other filtering 
products, cyBersitter does not permit its 
keyword-blocking feature to be disabled. 
regarding cyBersitter’s claim that it “looks 
at how the word or phrase is used in context,” 
Schneider quoted one tifap tester: “noth-
ing could be further from the truth.” The 
filter deleted the word “queer,” for example, 
from robert frost’s “Stopping by woods on a 
Snowy evening” (“My little horse must think 
it queer / to stop without a farmhouse near”). 
cyBersitter did not block sites containing 
instructions for growing marijuana, but did 
block a news item on the legislation surround-
ing it.
Marie José Klaver, “what does cyBersitter 
Block?” (June 23, 1998)
in June 1998, Marie-José Klaver decrypted 
and published cyBersitter’s full list of 
blocked words, strings, sites, and domains. 
among the domains on the block list were 
servers of the university of chicago, the 
university of virginia’s information technol-
ogy & communication division, Georgia 
State university, the university of Michigan’s 
engineering department, and rutgers univer-
sity; several large dutch domains, including 
euronet.nl, huizen.dds.nl, and worldaccess.nl; 
and the phrases “bennetthaselton,” “peacefire,” 
and “dontbuycyBersitter.”
christopher hunter, Filtering the Future (July 
1999)
Though christopher hunter’s study (see 
page 17) concluded that cyBersitter was the 
most reliable filter at screening out “objection-
able” sites (it blocked 25, or 69.4%, of such 
sites in his sample), he also noted that the 
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software performed well below the 90-95% 
rate of accuracy boasted by the manufacturer. 
cyBersitter fared worst in its treatment of 
“nonobjectionable” material, blocking 24, or 
14.6%, of the sites to which hunter assigned 
rSac ratings no higher than one. among 
these were Sharktagger, a site promoting 
responsible shark fishing and conservation; 
a listing of local events posted on yahoo; 
RiotGrrl; planned parenthood; Stop prisoner 
rape; the national organization for women; 
the feminist performance-art and activist 
troupe Guerrilla Girls; the church of Scien-
tology; The Body, an informational site on 
aidS and hiv; williams college’s informa-
tion page on safe sex; the coalition for posi-
tive Sexuality, SiecuS, and pro-life america.
cyBersitter proved particularly likely to 
deny access to nonpornographic sites relating 
to homosexuality, blocking the Qworld con-
tents page; the gay communities planet out, 
pridenet, and the Queer Zone; a different 
light Bookstore, which specializes in gay and 
lesbian literature; Gay wired presents wildcat 
press; and Queer living’s “promoting with 
pride” page. (These sites, while not falling 
under rSac’s definition of unacceptability, 
do fall within cyBersitter’s default filter-
ing category of “sites promoting the gay and 
lesbian lifestyle.”)
center for Media education, Youth Access  
to Alcohol and Tobacco Web Marketing  
(oct. 1999)
The cMe charged cyBersitter with 
under- and overinclusive filtering of alcohol- 
and tobacco-related material, as it blocked 
only 19% of the promotional sites in the test 
sample – leaving unblocked beer sites such 
as heineken.com, and sites on which tobacco 
products were sold, such as lylessmokeshop 
.com. while performing better than most 
other filters in its response to searches for 
promotional content – cyBersitter prohib-
ited searches for “beer,” “cigarettes,” “cigars,” 
and “liquor” – it subsequently blocked just 
3% of the result pages (from the allowed 
searches) that the cMe testers attempted to 
view. cyBersitter also blocked 13% of the 
cMe’s chosen educational and public health 
sites, and prohibited testers from conduct-
ing searches for “alcohol,” “alcoholism,” “fetal 
alcohol syndrome,” “tobacco,” and “tobacco 
settlement.”
peacefire, “cyBersitter examined” (2000)
The original report on this study described 
cyBersitter’s blocking of numerous non-
profit sites, including the penal lexicon, a 
British project documenting prison conditions 
worldwide; the department of astronomy 
at Smith college; the computer animation 
laboratory at the california institute of the 
arts; and the college of humanities & Social 
Sciences at carnegie Mellon university. The 
filter’s by-then well-known propensity for 
overblocking resulted from its keyword-based 
technology, combined with the manufacturer’s 
decision to block sites like the national or-
ganization for women in order to appeal to 
a rightwing constituency. The current text of 
“cyBersitter examined” recounts the history 
of cyBersitter’s disputes with its critics, and 
links to lists of previously blocked sites.
Bennett haselton, “amnesty intercepted: 
Global human rights Groups Blocked  
by web censoring Software” (peacefire,  
dec. 12, 2000)
cyBersitter blocked a number of pages on 
the amnesty international site because of its 
keyword filtering mechanism. a news item 
containing the sentence, “reports of shoot-
ings in irian Jaya bring to at least 21 the num-
ber of people in indonesia and east timor 
killed or wounded,” was prohibited for its 
“sexually explicit” content. peacefire’s review 
Cybersitter left Web users  
reading “the Catholic  
Church opposes marriage.” 
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of the system log revealed that cyBersitter 
had blocked the site after detecting the words 
“least 21.” The filter blocked another human 
rights page, which noted that the united na-
tions convention on the rights of the child 
“defines all individuals below the age of 18 
years as children,” for the words “age of 18.”
“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
while failing to block 22% of sites that 
Consumer Reports deemed objectionable 
because of “sexually explicit content or 
violently graphic images” or promotion of 
“drugs, tobacco, crime, or bigotry,” cyBer-
sitter blocked nearly one in five of the sites 
the authors considered inoffensive, including 
lesbian.org, the citizens’ committee for the 
right to Keep and Bear arms, and the South-
ern poverty law center.
Miscellaneous reports
• in a review of “filtering utilities” (apr. 8, 
1997), PC Magazine noted that cyBersit-
ter blocked an engineering site with “Bour-
bonStreet” in its url.
• according to the digital freedom net-
work’s “winners of the foil the filter 
contest” (Sept. 28, 2000), cyBersitter 
blocked house Majority leader richard 
“dick” armey’s official web site upon 
detecting the word “dick,” and focus on the 
family’s pure intimacy page, which protests 
pornogaphy and is geared toward individu-
als “struggling with sexual temptations.”
• in “teen health Sites praised in article, 
Blocked by censorware” (Mar. 23, 2001), 
peacefire’s Bennett haselton reported that 
cyBersitter barred part or all of three 
out of the four sites discussed in a recent 
New York Times article on health education 
resources for teenagers: Zaphealth; various 
pages on Kidshealth.org, including its anti-
smoking page, a page of advice on travel 
safety, and a profile of Kidshealth staff 
member pamela arn – presumably because 
cyBersitter detected its blacklisted phrase 
“pamela.html” in the url and confused 
the site with one devoted to pamela ander-
son; and part of iemily.com, including the 
terms of Service page, on which the words 
“sexually oriented” appeared. (one of the 
terms of service is that users “will not use 
[iemily’s] message boards or chat rooms 
to post any material which is ... sexually 
oriented.”)
• in a censorware project post, “columnist 
opines against censorware, Gets column 
Blocked” (Mar. 29, 2001), Bennett hasel-
ton reported that cyBersitter blocked 
“web filters Backfire on their fans,” a Chi-
cago Tribune article that criticized filtering 
software, apparently because the software 
detected the words “porno,” “internet 
porn,” and “peacefire” in the article.
• a short article by Greg lindsay in Time 
Digital (aug. 8, 1997), referenced by peace-
fire’s “Blocking Software faQ” reported 
that cyBersitter blocked a Time magazine 
article critical of the filter. 
Famlyclck
familyclick, whose spokesperson was anti-
pornography activist donna rice hughes, 
allowed users to choose from five configura-
tions. its least restrictive “full familyclick 
access” setting, recommended for ages 18+, 
blocked sites falling into any of seven cat-
egories, including “crime,” “gambling,” and 
“chat.” its “teen access” setting, for ages 
15-17, blocked the previous seven categories 
plus “personals,” “illegal drug promotion,” 
“chat/message boards,” and “non-family-
click email services.” “preteen access,” for 
ages 12-14, barred four additional catego-
ries, including “advanced sex education” and 
“weapons.” “Kids access,” geared toward ages 
8-11, blocked “basic sex education.” finally, 
the “children’s playroom,” for ages seven 
and under, was described as “100% safe. it 
contains activities, games and content that 
have been pre-selected and pre-approved by 
familyclick.” 
The filter’s web site in 2005 stated that 
“familyclick has ceased operating its filtering 
service until further notice.”56
Bennett haselton, “Sites blocked by family-
click” (peacefire, aug. 1, 2000)
haselton conducted “about an hour’s worth 
of ad-hoc testing” of familyclick on its 
least restrictive “18+” setting and found that 
among the sites blocked were: a report from 
the u.S. embassy in Beijing on the aidS epi-
demic in china; a research study on gambling 
in washington State; a Spanish-language glos-
sary of aidS terms; the home page of camp 
Sussex, which organizes summer programs for 
children of low-income households; Psyart, an 
online journal published by the university of 
florida’s institute for the psychological Study 
of the arts; an essay titled “triangles and 
tribulations: The politics of nazi Symbols,” 
on a holocaust Studies site; a Christian Re-
search Journal article condemning homosexu-
ality; and the genealogical page for one alice 
ficken – perhaps, haselton observed, because 
“ficken” is the infinitive form of “fuck” in 
German.
other blocked sites included an inventory 
of state sodomy laws on the web site of the 
aclu; a genealogical index of individuals 
bearing the name “Mumma”; a background 
report on pornography by the Minnesota 
family council; a page on the ontario center 
for religious tolerance site that tracked anti-
wiccan content on christian web sites; an 
essay on the federation of american Scientists 
56  family click: your Guide to the web,” www.familyclick.com 
(visited 3/13/05).
site called “countering terrorism,” regarding 
the slaying of 11 israeli athletes at the 1972 
Munich olympics; and a guide to “eating 
right” for chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease patients.
online policy Group, “online oddities and 
atrocities Museum” (n.d.)
The online policy Group maintained, as 
part of its “online oddities and atrocities 
Museum,” a list of sites at different times 
mistakenly blocked by familyclick. These 
included the christian coalition (which is 
headed by familyclick founder tim rob-
ertson’s father, pat robertson), The oprah 
winfrey Show, which was blocked, in the 
midst of a product demonstration by donna 
rice hughes during her appearance on that 
program; and the familyclick site itself.
i-Gear
i-Gear, manufactured by the Symantec cor-
poration, as of 2001 operated through a com-
bination of predefined url databases and 
“dynamic document review.” as it described 
the process, i-Gear divided its site database 
into 22 categories. if a url was not in any 
of the databases, i-Gear scanned the page 
for trigger words from its “ddr dictionar-
ies.” each matching word on a site received a 
numerical score; if the total score for the page 
exceeded 50 (the default maximum score, 
which could be adjusted to anywhere between 
1-200), the site was blocked. 
By 2005, Symantec had reconfigured i-Gear 
to be a component of larger products such as 
“Symantec web Security,” which combines 
filtering out “inappropriate” content with 
anti-virus and other noncensorship-based 
protections.57 we were unable to find any de-
scription of the filtering method used, beyond 
the assurance that Symantec web Security 
“ensures maximum protection by combining 
57  “Symantec web Security,” enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/prod-
ucts/products.cfm?productid=60 (visited 3/14/05). 
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I-Gear barred searches on  
eating disorders, AIDS,  
and child labor. 
list-based techniques with heuristic, context-
sensitive analysis tools.”58 
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
Schneider suggested that i-Gear’s state-of-
the-art-sounding dynamic document review 
basically amounted to keyword blocking. 
for this reason, tifap tested i-Gear under 
its least restrictive “adult” setting with ddr 
disabled, thus using only the list of pro-
scribed urls. it found that, even with this 
configuration, i-Gear blocked the entire Gay 
and lesbian directory of yahoo, as well as 
pages containing the words “cockfighting” and 
“pussycat.”
anemona hartocollis, “Board Blocks Student 
access to web Sites: computer filter hobbles 
internet research work,” New York Times 
(nov. 10, 1999)
The New York Times reported that i-Gear 
barred students at Benjamin cardozo high 
School in new york city from conducting 
searches on such topics as breast cancer, eating 
disorders, aidS, and child labor. Though Sy-
mantec senior product manager Bernard May 
responded to the news by insisting that i-Gear 
demonstrated “absolutely no preference of one 
group or another,” the article also noted that 
i-Gear blocked the pro-choice groups planned 
parenthood and alan Guttmacher institute, 
but not right to life and operation rescue. 
Students were also unable to access portions 
of an electronic text of The Grapes of Wrath 
– specifically, “a passage in which a woman 
lets a starving man suckle at her breast.”
peacefire, “analysis of first 50 urls Blocked 
by i-Gear in the .edu domain” (Mar. 2000)
peacefire evaluated the first 50 dot-edu sites 
blocked in the “sexual acts” category accord-
ing to a february 2000 i-Gear block list. of 
the 50 blocks, peacefire determined that 27 
58  “Symantec web Security,” eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/fact_
sheets/ent-factsheet_web_security_3.0_05-2005.en-us.pdf (visited 
3/2/06).
were “obvious errors” and 10, “marginal er-
rors” (blocking of sites with moderately adult 
content but not falling within i-Gear’s defini-
tion of “sexual acts”). among the “obvious” 
wrongful blocks were sites containing refer-
ences to or information on homosexuality, 
such as the personal home page of carnegie 
Mellon robotics institute programmer duane 
t. williams and an anti-gay pamphlet, posted 
on the web site of the Gay and lesbian alli-
ance at the Georgia institute of technology. 
also blocked were sites with anti-censorship 
content; astronomy, cartography, and art 
museum sites; and an essay on “indecency on 
the internet: lessons from the art world,” by 
Julie van camp, a philosophy professor at the 
university of california.
other sites blocked for reasons unknown 
included “Semi-automatic Morph Between 
two Supermodels,” an animation sequence 
written by an Mit student in which images 
of two models’ faces morph into each other; a 
diagram of a milk pasteurization system; a site 
containing Book X, in latin, of the Confes-
sions of St. augustine – possibly because of the 
common appearance of the word “cum”;59 two 
pages on the wheaton college server contain-
ing sections of The Decline and Fall of the Ro-
man Empire; and lecture notes from a philoso-
phy course at the university of notre dame.
peacefire, “i-Gear examined” (2000)
in tests of i-Gear throughout the first half 
of 2000, peacefire found more sites blocked 
for questionable reasons, including the full 
text of Jane Eyre; the federal district court’s 
ruling on the communications decency act 
in ACLU v. Reno; transcripts of testimony 
from ACLU v. Reno; “readings on computer 
communications and freedom of expres-
sion,” a supplementary reading list for a 
course on internet ethics at Mit; and the free 
speech page of the center for democracy and 
technology.
59  chris oakes, “censorware exposed again,” Wired News  
(Mar. 9, 2000)
Brennan center for Justice
i-Gear also barred a united nations report, 
“hiv/aidS: The Global epidemic”; the 
albert Kennedy trust, which works on behalf 
of homeless gay teenagers; the anti-violence 
project, which opposes anti-gay violence; the 
international Gay and lesbian human rights 
committee; the human rights campaign; 
the harvard Gay and lesbian caucus; two 
pages of the national organization for 
women site, one providing information on 
gay rights, the other a press release on the 
legal status of gay marriage in hawaii; a state-
ment on equal rights for homosexuals and 
women in the workplace from the industrial 
workers of the world; a portion of Glaad’s 
site containing information for prospective 
volunteers; “The homosexual Movement: a 
response,” a statement by a group of Jew-
ish and christian theologians, ethicists, and 
scholars; two web sites relating to the chris-
tian coalition – the organization’s legal arm, 
the american center for law and Justice, and 
the pat robertson-owned christian Broad-
casting network; and the home page of the 
British conservative party.
other blocked sites included a cato insti-
tute policy paper titled “feminist Jurispru-
dence: equal rights or neo-paternalism?”; 
a gender studies page on carnegie Mellon 
university’s english server; planned parent-
hood; cybernothinG’s critical commen-
tary on a 1995 Time magazine cover story 
about pornography online; and the article 
“peta and a pornographic culture,” which 
protested the use of nude models in recent 
peta advertising campaigns, but contained 
no nude images. peacefire does not indicate 
which i-Gear categories were enabled when 
the various sites were blocked.
Miscellaneous reports
• in his July 1998 expert witness report for 
the defendants in Mainstream Loudoun v. 
Board of Trustees of Loudoun County Library, 
david Burt reported that i-Gear blocked 
the Born-again virgins site; the fine art 
nude webring; and the home pages of four 
fine art photography galleries.
• peacefire’s “amnesty intercepted” (dec. 12, 
2000) reported that i-Gear blocked the of-
ficial site of the 1999 international confer-
ence combating child pornography on the 
internet.
• in the March 23, 2001 report “teen health 
Sites praised in article, Blocked by cen-
sorware,” Bennett haselton reported that 
i-Gear’s dynamic document review led 
to the partial blocking of three sites lauded 
in a recent New York Times article describ-
ing health education sites for teens: iemily; 
Kidshealth; and Zaphealth.
internet Guard Dog
internet Guard dog, manufactured by 
Mcafee, claimed in 2001 that it had “a 
comprehensive objectionable content 
database” that prevented “messages deemed 
inappropriate … from reaching your 
child.” “offensive words” as well as sites 
were blocked. a June 9, 2000 review noted 
that Guard dog allowed the user to filter 
by category (e.g., drugs, gambling, the 
occult) from levels 0 through 4, and that 
“when a line contains a disallowed word, 
Guard dog replaces the entire line with as-
terisks.”60 By 2005, Mcafee was no longer 
marketing internet Guard dog, but instead 
offered “Mcafee parental controls”; we 
could find no information about blocking 
categories.61  
60 r eview of internet Guard dog, ZdNet (June 9, 2000), url 
no longer available. a March search found a ZdNet page 
noting that Guard dog 3.0 “is not yet available from any of 
our online merchants.” “Guard dog 3.0 win 9X,” shopper-
zdnet.com.com/Guard_dog_3_0_win9X/4027-3666_15-
1587666.html?tag=search&part=&subj= (visited 3/10/06).
61  us.mcafee.com/root/package.asp?pkgid=146&www_
url=www.mcafee.com/myapps/pc/default.asp (visited 
3/13/05). By 2006, this url led to a different site, advertis-
ing Mcafee privacy Service,” us.mcafee.com/root/package.
asp?pkgid=146&www_url=www.mcafee.com/myapps/
pc/default.asp (visited 3/10/06). 
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“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
Guard dog failed to block 30% of “easily 
located web sites that contain sexually explicit 
content or violently graphic images, or that 
promote drugs, tobacco, crime, or bigotry.” it 
did block nearly 20% of sites that the testers 
deemed politically controversial but not por-
nographic or violent, including the national 
institute on drug abuse and SEX, Etc., the 
rutgers university educational site written by 
and for teens.
Net Nanny
net nanny advertises itself as “the web’s origi-
nal internet filter,” first launched in January 
1994.62 it is a freestanding software product 
that blocks based on “known inappropriate 
key words and phrases” and, as of 2005, on a 
monthly updated block list. customers can 
customize their block lists, filter settings, and 
keyword lists.63 as of 2006, net nanny had 
five blocking categories: “sexual explicitness,” 
“hate,” “violence,” “crime,” and “drugs.”
while generally commended for its will-
ingness to disclose its lists, net nanny has 
nonetheless fared poorly in studies, with high 
rates of both over- and underblocking.
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
Schneider reported that net nanny blocked 
a long-obsolete url containing artistic 
erotica, which was part of an early version 
of yahoo, but did not block www.creampie.
com, a sexually explicit site that had been in 
existence for six months.
christopher hunter, Filtering the Future  
(July 1999)
hunter concluded, based on his designa-
62  “net nanny is cipa-compliant and More,” www.netnanny.
com/p/page?sb=cipa (visited 2/22/06). 
63  “find out More about net nanny,” www.netnanny.com/
page?sb=detailed, and www.netnanny.com/netnanny5/as-
sets/docs/nn5/userguide.pdf (visited 2/22/06).
tions of objectionable and nonobjectionable 
sites (see page 17), that net nanny’s major 
failing lay in its underinclusive blocking. The 
software “performed horrendously,” he wrote, 
“blocking a measly 17% of objectionable 
content” (it failed to block 30 sites, including 
www.xxxhardcore.com and www.ultravixen.
com). But it also blocked the fewest “nonob-
jectionable sites” (3%). That 3% consisted of 
the Queer resources directory; the official 
home page of the white house; the web site 
of northwestern university professor and ho-
locaust revisionist arthur Butz; the adelaide 
institute, another revisionist history site; an 
online casino; and the coalition for positive 
Sexuality.
center for Media education, Youth Access  
to Alcohol and Tobacco Web Marketing  
(oct. 1999)
net nanny allowed every search that the 
cMe attempted, for both promotional and 
educational alcohol- and tobacco-related 
sites. it blocked just 2% of the promotional 
sites in the test sample. Though initially un-
able to access the cuervo tequila site, cMe 
researchers easily viewed it by entering the 
page’s numerical ip address instead of its 
alphabetical one. Thus, “it would appear that 
net nanny does not regularly take ip ad-
dresses into consideration when compiling 
its blacklist” – making it easy to circumvent. 
what net nanny did block was health.org, 
apparently because its front page title, “drug 
abuseXXXXXXXXXX,” was detected by the 
product’s keyword-blocking feature.
peacefire, “net nanny examined” (2000)
among the newsgroups that peacefire found 
inappropriately blocked by net nanny were 
bit.listserv.aidsnews; sci.med.aids; and alt.
feminism. other blocked sites included the 
Banned Books page at carnegie Mellon uni-
versity and femina.com, a “comprehensive, 
searchable directory of links to female friendly 
sites and information.” peacefire observed that 
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“while the Banned Books page and femina.
com are blocked because the urls exist as 
entries on net nanny’s blocked site list, more 
web sites are blocked because they contain 
keywords which activate net nanny’s word 
filter.”
“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
Consumer Reports reinforced hunter’s and 
the cMe’’s conclusions, reporting that net 
nanny failed to block 52% of 86 “easily 
located web sites” selected by the magazine 
that “contain sexually explicit content or vio-
lently graphic images, or that promote drugs, 
tobacco, crime, or bigotry.” The filter did, 
however, block rutgers university’s teen-ori-
ented SEX, Etc.
Miscellaneous reports
• according to Brock Meeks and declan Mc-
cullagh’s “Jacking in from the ‘Keys to the 
Kingdom’ port” (July 3, 1996), net nanny 
blocked every mailing list originating at 
cs.coloradu.edu, the computer science divi-
sion of the university of colorado, as well 
as unspecified “feminist newsgroups.”
• in “adam and eve Get caught in ’net 
filter” (feb. 5, 1998), the Wichita Eagle 
reported that students at wichita’s friends 
university, where net nanny had been 
installed at public computer stations, 
were barred from accessing pages con-
taining educational material on sexually 
transmitted diseases, prostitution, and 
adam and eve.
• net nanny was cited in the digital free-
dom network’s “winners of the foil the 
filter contest” (Sept. 28, 2000) for block-
ing house Majority leader richard “dick” 
armey’s official web site upon detecting the 
word “dick.” it also precluded a high school 
student in australia from accessing sites on 
the genetics of cucumbers once net nanny 
detected the word “cum” in “cucumbers.”
Net Shepherd
in october 1997, the altavista search engine 
and the organization net Shepherd launched 
a “family Search” function to screen the 
results of altavista searches according to 
netShepherd’s database of site ratings. net 
Shepherd claimed to have rated more than 
300,000 sites based on “quality” and “matu-
rity,” relying on “demographically appropriate 
internet users’” judgments of what would be 
“superfluous and/or objectionable to the aver-
age family.”64 
By 2005, net Shepherd seemed to be out of 
business. The original urls for the product 
led to alternative sites, and a “net Shepherd 
world opinion rating” site describing the 
software had not been updated since novem-
ber 1997.65
electronic privacy information center 
(epic), Faulty Filters: How Content Filters 
Block Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the 
Internet (1997)
in november 1997, epic performed the 
same 100 searches on standard altavista and 
the “family Search” version. its sample of 
search terms included 25 schools, 25 charita-
ble and political organizations, 25 educational 
and cultural organizations, and 25 “miscella-
neous concepts and entities” that could be  
of research interest to children, for instance 
“astronomy,” “Bill of rights,” “teen  
pregnancy,” and “Thomas edison.”
The first search term on epic’s list was 
“arbor heights elementary.” This primary 
school’s site contained, among other features, 
an online version of Cool Writers Magazine, 
a literary periodical for ages 7-12. The search 
on unfiltered altavista resulted in 824 sites 
mentioning the school, while the same search 
through net Shepherd returned only three. 
64 net Shepherd press release (dec. 1997).
65  “net Shepherd world opinion rating Service,” www.
research.att.com/projects/tech4kids/net_Shepherd_world_
opinion_rating_Service.html (visited 3/13/05; 2/26/06).
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Thus, epic determined that 99.6%  
of search results were filtered out. in  
subsequent searches for elementary, middle, 
and high schools, epic concluded that  
net Shepherd blocked between 86-99%  
of relevant material.
epic found similar filtering of informa-
tion about charitable and political organiza-
tions, ranging from 89-99.9%. among the 
most heavily filtered search results were those 
for “american cancer Society” (which had 
38,762 relevant sites on an unfiltered search 
but only six with net Shepherd), “united 
Jewish appeal” (for which net Shepherd 
allowed only one of the 3,024 sites that were 
otherwise reported as relevant); and “united 
way” (for which net Shepherd allowed 23 
out of 54,300 responsive sites). net Shepherd 
also filtered between 91-99.9% of relevant 
educational, artistic, and cultural institutions. 
on a search for “national aquarium,” it al-
lowed 63 of the 2,134 sites otherwise reported 
by altavista. Similarly, it blocked 99.5% of 
sites responsive to the search term “photosyn-
thesis,” 99.9% for “astronomy,” and 99.9% 
for “wolfgang amadeus Mozart.”
The authors note some limitations in this 
study, including the fact that the blocking 
percentages could be lower than reported 
because even unfiltered altavista would not 
have provided access to all the responsive sites. 
nevertheless, the obvious inference from this 
study is that net Shepherd was filtering out all 
of the internet except for a relative handful of 
approved, or “whitelisted,” sites. 
Norton internet Securty Famly 
edton (NiS)
The norton internet Security family edition 
is manufactured by Symantec, which also 
produces i-Gear (now embedded in Symantec 
web Security). The methodology and block-
ing categories are the same as i-Gear’s. as 
of 2005, the program had 31 categories of 
disapproved content. There was no override 
function allowing users to unblock mistakenly 
blocked sites.66 
“digital chaperones for Kids,” Consumer 
Reports (Mar. 2001)
Consumer Reports found that the niS fam-
ily edition left unblocked 20% of the sites the 
magazine deemed objectionable, while block-
ing such organizations as the citizens’ com-
mittee for the right to Keep and Bear arms 
and the national institute on drug abuse.
SafeServer
as of 2005, SafeServer relied on “intelligent 
content recognition technology,” which it 
described as “a leading-edge technology based 
on artificial intelligence and pattern recogni-
tion ... trained to detect english-language 
pornography” and to screen requested web 
pages in real time. hence, its advertisement: 
“no lists, no subscriptions. Just fast, reliable 
filtering.” it had seven categories of blockable 
content: “hate,” “pornography,” “gambling,” 
“weapons,” “drugs,” “job search,” and “stock 
trading.”67
Bennett haselton, “SafeServer error rate for 
first 1,000 .com domains” (peacefire,  
oct. 23, 2000)
on a SafeServer proxy in use at a high 
school where a student had volunteered to 
assist with the research, peacefire attempted 
to access a selection of commercial domains 
used earlier in an identical test of Surfwatch, 
and also in concurrent tests of cyber patrol 
and aol parental controls. SafeServer was 
configured to bar the categories of “drugs,” 
“gambling,” “hate,” “pornography,” and 
“weapons.” The filter blocked 44 pages in the 
1,000-site sample; 15 of those 44 were “under 
construction.” haselton determined that of 
66  “topten reviews,” internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/ 
(visited 7/21/05); “norton internet Security,” www.symantec.
com/home_homeoffice/products/internet_security/nis-
30mac/features.html (visited 2/27/06).
67  “foolproof SafeServer,” smartstuff.com/safeserver/fepsafeserv.
html; “frequently asked Questions,” smartstuff.com/safe-
server/fpserverfaq.html (both visited 7/21/05).
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the remaining 29 sites, 10 were inappropriate-
ly blocked: a-1autowrecking.com; a-1coffee.
com; a-1security.com; a-1upgrades.com; a-2-
r.com; a-abacomputers.com; a-artisticimages.
com; a-baby.com; a-build.com; and a-c-r.com. 
as with other filters tested, haselton acknowl-
edged that the resulting error rate of 34% 
was not entirely reliable because of the small 
sample under review, and that SafeServer 
could have an error rate as low as 15%; but 
that the rate of error among .org sites would 
presumably be higher, since pornographic 
sites were more prevalent among commercial 
domains.
SafeSurf
SafeSurf operates a voluntary self-rating sys-
tem. authors of web pages can evaluate their 
sites according to 10 content categories, in-
cluding “profanity,” “nudity,” “glorifying drug 
use,” and “other adult themes.” in addition, 
each page is assigned a numerical rating, or a 
“SafeSurf identification Standard” from 1-9. 
web publishers may assign themselves ratings 
in other categories as necessary – for example, 
a “nudity” rating of one if the site includes 
“subtle innuendo; [nudity] subtly implied 
through the use of composition, lighting, 
shaping, revealing clothing, etc.,” or a rating 
of seven if it presents “erotic frontal nudity.” 
in 1996, SafeSurf and 22 other companies 
founded the platform for internet content 
Selection (picS). after web publishers rate 
their sites, picS-compliant software can read 
the ratings and filter accordingly. SafeSurf ’s 
filter “is a server solution, which means that 
the software is not installed at the end user’s 
computer, but at the iSp level to avoid tam-
pering.”68
peacefire, “SafeSurf examined” (2000)
SafeSurf blocked multiple sites containing 
68  “Just the faQs please,” www.safesurf.com/ssfaq.htm (visited 
3/10/06); see also “Microsoft teams with recreational 
Software advisory council to pioneer parental control over 
internet access,” www.w3.org/picS/960228/Microsoft.html 
(visited 2/26/06).
opposition to web censorship and filtering, 
including: the electronic frontier founda-
tion’s internet censorship and regulation 
archive; a list of free speech links on the web 
site of the american communication associa-
tion; “The X-Stop files” and “The Mind of a 
censor,” two articles in The Ethical Spectacle; 
a CNet news article on guidelines drafted by 
the american library association for coun-
tering campaigns for mandatory filtering ; 
the wisconsin civil liberties union and the 
national coalition against censorship; and 
a Scientific American article on “turf wars in 
cyberspace.” SafeSurf also blocked the online 
edition of Free Inquiry, a publication of the 
council for Secular humanism; a united 
nations paper on “hiv/aidS: The Global 
epidemic”; and the full texts of The Odyssey 
and The Iliad, both of which appeared on 
the university of oregon server. Since it is 
unlikely that any of these sites self-rated, the 
probable explanation for the blocks is that 
SafeSurf filtered out all unrated sites.
SmartFlter
Smartfilter, manufactured by Secure com-
puting, was originally intended for companies 
seeking to limit their employees’ non-work-
related internet usage. By 1999, it was also 
targeting schools.69 The filter’s control list has 
been modified, but on the whole, prior to 
2001 Smartfilter divided objectionable sites 
into 27 categories, which could be enabled 
according to each customer’s needs. when 
Smartfilter 3.0 was unveiled in January 2001, 
three of the categories (“alternative journals,” 
“non-essential,” and “worthless”) had been 
removed, and six others added, including 
“mature” and “nudity.” 
in 2003, Secure computing acquired 
n2h2, and their databases were merged. in 
2006, the Smartfilter control list contained 
69  Secure computing, “education and the internet: a Bal-
anced approach of awareness, policy, and Security” (1999), 
www.netapp.com/ftp/internet_and_education.pdf (visited 
3/14/05).
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73 content-based categories. The company 
says that it uses “a combination of advanced 
technology and highly skilled web analysts” 
to identify sites for blocking.70
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
testing Smartfilter with only its “sex” cat-
egory enabled, tifap found 12 sites blocked 
– seven of them erroneously, in tifap’s 
estimation. These included three sites on 
marijuana use, three gay-interest sites, and a 
site containing safe sex information. 
peacefire, “Smartfilter examined” (1997)
peacefire tested Smartfilter configured to 
block sites falling into categories likely to be 
activated in a school setting: “criminal skills,” 
“drugs,” “gambling,” “hate speech,” and “sex.” 
among the sites blocked were: community 
united against violence, which works to pre-
vent anti-gay hate crime; peaceable texans for 
firearms rights; the Marijuana policy project; 
the national institute on drug abuse; Mother 
Jones magazine; the united States information 
agency; the american friends Service com-
mittee; the consortium on peace research, 
education, and development; the gay-themed 
Oasis Magazine; the Stop aidS project; and 
campaign for our children, a nonprofit or-
ganization working to prevent teen pregnancy. 
Smartfilter also blocked sites containing edu-
cational information on sexually transmitted 
diseases, safer sex, and teen pregnancy.
Michael Sims et al., Censored Internet Access in 
Utah Public Schools and Libraries (censorware 
project, Mar. 1999)
The censorware project secured internet log 
files from Sept. 10-oct. 10, 1998, of the utah 
education network, or uen, a state agency 
responsible for providing telecommunica-
tions services to all the state’s public schools 
and many of its libraries. uen’s internet 
70  “Smartfilter control list,” www.securecomputing.com/in-
dex.cfm?skey=86 (visited 3/3/06). 
access was filtered by Smartfilter. censorware 
deemed about 350 web pages needlessly 
blocked under one or more of the five catego-
ries chosen by uen: “criminal skills,” “drugs,” 
“gambling,” “hate speech” and “sex.”
Secure computing claimed that “sites are 
not added to the control list without first 
being viewed and approved by our staff,” yet 
censorware found that the home page of the 
instructional Systems program at florida State 
university was blocked under the “gam-
bling” category, presumably because the word 
“wager” appears in the url. (walter wager, 
a member of the program faculty, apparently 
maintained the site). Smartfilter also blocked 
“Marijuana: facts for teens,” a brochure 
published by the national institute on drug 
abuse. censorware’s findings also strongly 
suggested that Smartfilter blocked the entire 
wiretap server under the category of “crimi-
nal skills” – on account, it seems, of its url 
– even though wiretap consists solely of 
electronic texts such as presidential inaugural 
addresses, the declaration of independence, 
Shakespeare’s complete plays, The Jungle Book, 
Moby Dick, and the Book of Mormon. 
another server entirely blocked, for reasons 
unclear, was gopher.igc.apc.org, under the 
“drugs” category; this server of the institute 
for Global communications was home to 
numerous nonprofit groups, such as the rain-
forest action network, human rights watch, 
and earth first.
in other cases, possibly owing to keyword 
or url-based filtering, pages were blocked 
whose aims were to raise awareness of such 
issues as hate seech and drugs. among these 
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SmartFilter blocked  
“Marijuana: Facts for Teens,”  
a brochure published by  
the National Institute on  
Drug Abuse. 
were hate watch, a site monitoring and 
opposing online hate speech; a scholarly 
paper titled “‘... as if i were the master of the 
situation’: proverbial Manipulation in adolf 
hitler’s Mein Kampf,” from the archives of 
De Proverbio: An Electronic Journal of Interna-
tional Proverb Studies; the iowa State division 
of narcotics enforcement; and a page on 
the web site of national families in action, 
a national drug education, prevention, and 
policy center.
Three months after Censored Internet Access 
was published, Secure computing issued a 
press release interpreting the report as a con-
firmation of Smartfilter’s effectiveness. dur-
ing the period in question, the release stated, 
“there were over 54 million web access at-
tempts and of those, according to the report, 
less than 300 were denied access because the 
site contacted had been miscategorized. This 
represents stunning accuracy rate of 99.9994 
percent.”71 Similarly, david Burt posted a 
report in which he claimed that only 279 sites 
were actually included in censorware’s study, 
after eliminating sites listed more than once, 
and that of these, only 64 actually constituted 
inappropriate blocks. Burt, however, often 
grouped as one erroneous block what actually 
amounted to the blocking of multiple distinct 
pages on a single server.72
Jamie Mccarthy, “lies, damn lies, and Sta-
tistics” (censorware project, June 23, 1999)
This was the censorware project’s response 
to Secure computing’s and david Burt’s 
claims that its study, Censored Internet Access, 
demonstrated the accuracy of Smartfilter. 
author Jamie Mccarthy stated that the actual 
overblocking rate was about 5% because, “for 
every 22 times Smartfilter ‘correctly’ blocked 
someone from accessing a web page, there 
71  Secure computing press release, “censorware project 
unequivocally confirms accuracy of Smartfilter in State of 
utah education network” (June 18, 1999).
72  david Burt, “Study of utah School filtering finds ‘about  
1 in a Million’ web Sites wrongly Blocked” (filtering facts, 
apr. 4, 1999).
was one ‘wrongly’ blocked access.” he also 
noted that censorware’s investigation did 
not include sites on Smartfilter’s block list 
that were overridden by the uen – such as 
mormon.com, which accounted for 6,434 
of the total 122,700 blocked page requests. 
“counting these accesses,” he wrote, “would 
raise the error rate from 1 in 22 to 1 in 19.” 
in addition, the approximately 300 blocked 
sites actually represented 5,601 individual 
wrongful blocks.
regarding Burt’s analyses of the sites 
deemed needlessly blocked, censorware con-
ceded that he was, in a few cases, correct (the 
sites in question being pornographic after all); 
yet Secure computing actually removed them 
from the Smartfilter database after the first 
report appeared – and added the censorware 
project’s site, in all 27 blocking categories.
Seth finkelstein, “Smartfilter’s Greatest evils” 
(nov. 16, 2000)
finkelstein found that Smartfilter blocked 
a number of privacy and anonymous surfing 
sites, many of which allow users to circumvent 
filtering software, in every category except 
“non-essential.” he named 19 such services, 
including www.anonymizer.com; www.
freedom.net; www.private-server.com; and 
www.silentsurf.com. Smartfilter also blocked, 
under every available classification but “non-
essential,” many sites providing translations 
of foreign language web pages, for instance 
www.babelfish.org, www.onlinetrans.com, 
www.voycabulary.com, and www.worldlingo.
com. while such sites did not fall within 
Smartfilter’s published blocking criteria at the 
time, they would very shortly thereafter, with 
the introduction of Smartfilter 3.0.
Seth finkelstein, “Smartfilter – i’ve Got a 
little list” (dec. 7, 2000)
finkelstein conducted a series of tests with 
Smartfilter enabled to block only “extreme/
obscene” material. among the blocked sites 
were one for gay and lesbian Mormons; oth-
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ers relating to extreme sports such as desert 
off-roading, rock climbing, and motorcycle 
racing; popular music sites devoted to such 
recording artists as primus, tupac Shakur, 
and Marilyn Manson; the comic book series 
Savage Dragon; illustrator h.r. Giger’s home 
page; Gibb computer Services, which adver-
tises the “GcS extreme Series – high perfor-
mance custom computer systems”; and the 
official web site of The Jerry Springer Show.
finkelstein also listed 64 newsgroups 
blocked by Smartfilter. among those barred 
under the “criminal skills” category were the 
Telecommunications Digest and newsgroups 
maintained by the computer professionals for 
Social responsibility and the electronic fron-
tier foundation. newsgroups blocked on the 
grounds that they contained “cult/occult” ma-
terial included one for “studying antiquities of 
the world”; one on Mesoamerican archaeology; 
18 pertaining to genealogy; one on the Baha’i 
religion; a Bible-study group; and 12 others re-
lating to religion, including news:soc.religion.
hindu and news:talk.religion.buddhism.
Miscellaneous reports
• Soon after Smartfilter 3.0’s introduction, it 
was cited by peacefire’s “Babelfish Blocked 
by censorware” (feb. 27, 2001) for filter-
ing out altavista’s foreign language transla-
tion service.
SurfWatch
Surfwatch was one of the first filters. owned 
by Surfcontrol (which also now owns cyber 
patrol), as of 2001 it blocked material in five 
“core” categories: “sexually explicit,” “drugs/
alcohol,” “gambling,” “violence,” and “hate 
speech.” according to its web site, 
Before adding any site to our database, 
each site “candidate” is reviewed by a 
Surfwatch content Specialist. deci-
phering the gray areas is not something 
that we trust to technology; it requires 
thought and sometimes discussion. 
… we use technology to help find 
site candidates, but rely on thoughtful 
analysis for the final decision.73
yet apart from the physical impossibil-
ity of personally reviewing every potentially 
objectionable site, reports of Surfwatch’s 
inaccuracies clearly indicated keyword block-
ing without human review. Surfcontrol no 
longer claims that human beings review every 
blocked page. instead, in its 2006 materials 
the company says that “to give you maximum 
protection from the threats of harmful and 
inappropriate internet content, Surfcontrol 
web filter incorporates: quality content 
understanding, adaptive reasoning technol-
ogy, [and] flexible deployment options,” and 
includes “the industry’s largest and most accu-
rate content database with millions of urls 
and over a billion web pages.”74 
christopher Kryzan, “Surfwatch censorship 
against lesbigay www pages” (email release, 
June 14, 1995)
as early as 1995, Surfwatch was criticized 
for inaccurate and politically loaded blocking. 
in an email release, web activist christopher 
Kryzan wrote that the recently introduced 
software blocked 10 of the 30-40 “queer-relat-
ed sites” he tested, including the international 
association of Gay Square dance clubs, the 
Society for human Sexuality, the university 
of california at Berkeley’s lGB association, 
Queer web, and the Maine Gay network.
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
tifap found Surfwatch blocked nonpor-
nographic sites relating to sexuality (testers 
73  Surfwatch promotional material, www.surfcontrol.com/sup-
port/surfwatch/filtering_facts/how_we_filter.html.  This 
web page no longer exists; in addition to cyber patrol, the 
Surfcontrol company now offers a product that combines 
censorship-style filtering with protection against viruses, 
spyware, and other dangers; see “Surfcontrol web filter,” 
www.surfcontrol.com/default.aspx?id=375&mnuid=1.1 
(visited 3/104/06).
74  “Surfcontrol web filter,” www.surfcontrol.com/general/
guides/web/Swf_datasheet.pdf (visited 3/14/05).
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could not disable Surfwatch’s keyword-block-
ing feature). Though searches for “breast 
cancer” and “chicken breasts” were allowed, 
searches for “penis” and “vaginal” were not. 
Schneider also noted that the filter blocked 
www.utopia-asia.com/safe.htm, a page of 
information on safe sex; and www.curbcut.
com/Sex.html, “an excellent guide,” she wrote, 
to “sexual activity for the disabled.”
ann Grimes et al., “digits: expletive delet-
ed,” Wall Street Journal (May 6, 1999)
This column reported that Surfwatch 
blocked two newly registered domains 
–www.plugandpray.com and www.minow.
com – even though they contained as yet no 
content, apparently because, “in a setup called 
‘virtual hosting,’” they shared ip addresses 
with pornography sites. Surfwatch market-
ing director Theresa Marcroft “conceded that 
the company’s software tends to block even 
innocuous virtually hosted sites if they are 
added to an internet address that has been 
previously blocked,” although she noted that 
the company responds quickly to unblock 
clean sites “once it knows about them.” to the 
censorware project’s Jim tyre, this contra-
dicted the company’s claim of “thoughtful 
analysis”; in a response to the Journal article, 
he said Marcroft’s revelation affirmed “that 
claims made by the censorware vendors (most, 
if not all, not just Surfwatch) that all sites 
are human-reviewed before being banned are 
outright lies.”75
christopher hunter, Filtering the Future (July 
1999)
hunter reported that Surfwatch blocked 
44% of sites he deemed objectionable (16 
out of 36), and 7% of nonobjectionable ones 
(12 out of 164). The nonobjectionable sites 
included free Speech internet television; 
RiotGrrl; all Sports casino; atlantis Gaming 
site; Budweiser beer, absolut vodka; the r.J. 
75  Jim tyre, “Sex, lies, and censorware” (censorware project, 
May 14, 1999).
reynolds tobacco company; the adelaide in-
stitute, which is devoted to revisionist history; 
and the home page of holocaust revisionist 
arthur Butz. while some of these pages may 
have contained no objectionable material 
according to the rSac ratings, they did fall 
within Surfwatch’s published definitions of 
“gambling,” “drugs/alcohol,” or “hate speech.” 
But the product then blocked underinclusive-
ly in regard to other gambling, drug, alcohol, 
and hate-related sites, and thus the overall 
degree of error remained basically the same.
center for Media education, Youth Access 
to Alcohol and Tobacco Web Marketing (oct. 
1999)
The cMe deemed Surfwatch the most ef-
fective of the products it evaluated in prevent-
ing access to alcohol and tobacco promotion 
(it blocked 70% of the promotional-site test 
sample) though testers could still access a 
number of sites, including liquorbywire.com; 
ciderjack.com; and lylessmokeshop.com. 
Surfwatch also blocked, on average, 46% of 
promotional sites generated by yahoo, Go/in-
foSeek, and excite searches, and prohibited 
one search, for the term “drinking games,” 
altogether. The filter did not block any of the 
cMe’s chosen educational or public health 
sites.
Bennett haselton, “Surfwatch error rates for 
first 1,000 .com domains” (peacefire, aug. 2, 
2000)
haselton procured an alphabetical list of 
current dot-com domains from network 
Solutions, which maintains a list of every 
dot-com domain in existence, and eliminated 
the sites that began with dashes rather than 
letters. (as “a disproportionate number of 
these were pornographic sites that chose their 
domain names solely in order to show up 
at the top of an alphabetical listing,” their 
inclusion would have rendered the sample 
insufficiently representative of the domains in 
question.) from the remaining sites, peacefire 
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culled the first 1,000 active domains, and 
attempted to access them against a version of 
Surfwatch configured to filter only “sexually 
explicit” content.
Surfwatch blocked 147 of the 1,000 do-
mains. after eliminating 96 that were “under 
construction,” haselton found that 42 of the 
remaining 51 were nonpornographic, for an 
“error rate” of 82%. while haselton wrote 
that this figure might not be precise given the 
limited number of domains he examined (the 
actual error rate potentially being anything 
from 65-95%), “the test does establish that 
the likelihood of Surfwatch having an error 
rate of, say, less than 60% across all domains, 
is virtually zero.” as with other filters tested, 
haselton remarked, “we should expect the er-
ror rate to be even higher for .org sites that are 
blocked.” and considering the sites that were 
blocked – such as a-1janitorial.com; a-1sier-
rastorage com; and a-advantageauto.com – he 
found highly questionable Surfwatch’s claim 
of “thoughtful analysis.”
Bennett haselton, “amnesty intercepted: 
Global human rights Groups Blocked by 
web censoring Software” (peacefire, dec. 12, 
2000)
Surfwatch blocked a number of human 
rights organizations under the “sexually 
explicit” category: algeria watch; human 
rights for workers; the Mumia Solidaritäts 
index; the Sisterhood is Global institute; the 
international coptic congress; liberte aref, 
which tracks human rights abuses in djibouti; 
the commissioner of the council of the 
Baltic Sea States; Green Brick road, a com-
pilation of resources on global environmental 
education; and the new york university 
chapter of amnesty international. Surfwatch 
also blocked www.lawstudents.org, an “online 
legal studies information center.” 
in its “drugs/alcohol” category, Surfwatch 
blocked (among other sites) the Strategic 
pastoral action network; charter 97, which 
documents human rights violations in Belar-
us; and the Kosova committee in denmark, 
whose mission is to advance the human wel-
fare of the Kosova population and support its 
demands for self-determination. among the 
sites blocked for “violence/hate speech” were 
parish without Borders and dalitstan, an  
organization working on behalf of the  
oppressed Dalits, or black untouchables,  
in india.
peacefire, “Surfwatch examined” (2000)
Surfwatch blocked as “sexually explicit” 
various public health and sex education sites, 
including health-net’s “facts about Sexual 
assault”; “what you Should Know about 
Sex & alcohol,” from the department of 
Student health Services at the university of 
Queensland; “a world of risk,” a study of the 
state of sex education in schools; and various 
informational pages on sexually transmit-
ted diseases hosted by allegheny university 
hospitals, the anchorage community health 
Services division, washington university, and 
the Society for the advancement of women’s 
health research. 
Miscellaneous reports
• a feb. 19, 1996 Netsurfer Digest item 
(“white house accidentally Blocked 
by Surfwatch”) revealed that Surfwatch 
blocked a page on the official white house 
site (www.whitehouse.gov/wh/kids/html/
couples.html), because “couples.html” ap-
peared in the url. The couples in question 
were the clintons and Gores.
• according to an email release from profes-
sor Mary chelton to the american library 
association office for intellectual freedom 
list (Mar. 5, 1997), Surfwatch blocked 
the web site of the university of Kansas’s 
archie r. dykes Medical library upon 
detecting the word “dykes.”
• on Mar. 11, 1999, Matt richtel of the 
New York Times reported that Surfwatch 
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had blocked “filtering facts,” a filter-pro-
moting site maintained by david Burt.
• according to david Burt’s July 14, 1998 
expert witness report in the Mainstream 
Loudoun case, Surfwatch prohibited access 
to 27, or 54%, of sites he considered non-
obscene, including dr. ruth’s official site, 
the Society for human Sexuality, williams 
college’s page on “enjoying Safer Sex,” and 
five sites dedicated to fine art nude photog-
raphy.
• The digital freedom network (“winners 
of the foil the filter contest,” Sept. 28, 
2000) reported that Surfwatch blocked 
house Majority leader richard “dick” 
armey’s official web site upon detecting the 
word “dick.”
We-blocker
we-Blocker is a free filtering service that, as of 
2005, blocked sites falling into any of seven 
categories: “pornography,” “violence,” “drugs 
and alcohol,” “gambling,” “hate speech,” 
“adult subjects,” and “weaponry.” it found 
potentially objectionable sites through recom-
mendations from users. Then, “a we-Blocker 
agent reviews the site – if it is clearly ob-
jectionable, it is automatically entered into the 
database. ... if the site submitted is not clearly 
objectionable, it is passed to the we-Blocker 
site review committee who will make the final 
decision.”76
Gay & lesbian alliance against defamation 
press release, “we-Blocker.com: censoring 
Gay Sites was ‘Simply a Mistake’” (aug. 5, 
1999)
Glaad reported that we-Blocker barred 
the sites of various gay community organiza-
76  “we-Blocker database criteria,” www.we-blocker.com/
webmstr/wm_dbq.shtml (visited 7/21/05). in 2006, this 
page was no longer available; instead, the url switched to 
a page that advised: “we-Blocker is currently undergoing 
some major programming changes that will greatly enhance 
the overall speed of the program and improve user-friendli-
ness.” “we-blocker.com,” weblocker.fameleads.com (visited 
3/11/06).
tions, including the new york lesbian and 
Gay center and the online news service 
GayBc.com. after notification, the company 
unblocked the sites and explained that they 
had been accidentally added to the software’s 
block list after being “flagged” for the key-
word “sex” – and hence the terms “homosexu-
al,” “bisexual,” and “sexual orientation” – but 
not reviewed by a we-Blocker employee. 
“while admirable in its desire to rectify its 
mistake,” the press release stated, “we-Blocker 
illustrates how imperfect internet filtering 
software can be.”
WebSeNSe
webSenSe originally operated with 30 
blocking categories, including “shopping,” 
“sports,” and “tasteless,” which could be en-
abled according to each administrator’s needs. 
The categories were revised with the decem-
ber 2000 release of webSenSe enterprise 
4.0, which extended the number to 53 and 
supplied greater specificity in some of the 
definitions. “alcohol/ tobacco,” “gay/lesbian 
lifestyles,” and “personals/dating” categories 
were brought together, along with the new 
classifications “restaurants and dining” and 
“hobbies,” under an umbrella category, “soci-
ety and lifestyle.” “hacking” was incorporated 
into the larger “information technology” cat-
egory, which also encompassed the previously 
unaccounted-for “proxy avoidance systems,” 
“search engines & portals,” “web hosting,” 
and “url translation sites.” The “activist” 
and “politics” categories were combined, as 
were “cults” and “religion,” while “alternative 
journals” was absorbed into a “news & media” 
category. Separate subcategories were created 
for “sex education” and “lingerie & swimsuit.” 
By July 2005, the webSenSe database 
contained more than 10 million sites, orga-
nized into over 90 categories. These consist 
of 31 “baseline categories,” such as “adult 
material,” which are then subdivided into 
such sub-categories as “adult content,” “lin-
gerie & swimsuit,” “nudity,” “sex,” and “sex 
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education.” other baseline categories include 
“advocacy groups,” “drugs,” “militancy & 
extremist,” “religion,” and “tasteless.”77
in 2002, webSenSe tried an unusual 
marketing technique: it began publishing 
daily lists of pornographic sites that, it said, 
were not blocked by two of its competitors, 
Surfcontrol and Smartfilter. anybody could 
access these lists, including students at schools 
using Smartfilter or Surfcontrol, simply by 
clicking a button on the webSenSe site 
agreeing that they were over 18. in an attempt 
to demonstrate the supposed superiority of 
webSenSe, the company had thus publi-
cized a set of pornographic sites for easy refer-
ence. after five months, webSenSe ended 
this experiment. peacefire reported:  “They 
remain the only blocking software company 
that has ever tried this technique.”78 
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
Schneider’s internet filter assessment 
project found that webSenSe blocked a page 
discussing pornographic videos but not con-
taining any pornographic material, as well as 
the entire www.webcom.com host – because 
one site that it housed had sexually explicit 
content.
censorware project, Protecting Judges Against 
Liza Minnelli: The WebSENSE Censorware at 
Work (June 21, 1998)
The censorware project examined web-
SenSe after learning it had been installed on 
the computers in three federal appeals courts, 
and in some florida and indiana public librar-
ies. The title of the report was inspired by the 
authors’ discovery that a liza Minnelli fan 
page was blocked by webSenSe as “adult 
entertainment.” other “grossly inappropriate” 
blocks, according to censorware, included 
77  webSenSe Baseline url categories, www.webSenSe.
com/docs/datasheets/en/v5.5/webSenSeurlcats.pdf 
(visited 7/21/05).
78  peacefire, “webSenSe examined” (2002).
the Jewish teens page; the canine Molecular 
Genetics project at Michigan State university; 
a number of Japanese-language sports sites 
(presumably, according to the report, because 
the software interpreted a particular fragment 
of transliterated Japanese as an english-lan-
guage word on its block list); the Sterling 
funding corporation, a california mortgage 
loan company; the former site of the Safer Sex 
page, now devoted to aidS prevention; and 
a copy of a British internet service provider’s 
internet policy on censorship. 
Michael Swaine, “webSenSe Blocking 
Makes no Sense,” WebReview.com (June 4, 
1999)
in June 1999, webreview.com’s Michael 
Swaine was notified that Swaine’s world, his 
page on technology-related news, had been 
categorized by webSenSe as a “travel” site 
because Swaine had once posted an article 
about a trade show he attended. Though the 
block, once brought to webSenSe’s atten-
tion, was removed, Swaine writes: “Many web 
sites are being inappropriately blocked every 
day because the blocking schemes are woefully 
inadequate. webSenSe explained to me why 
it had blocked my site, but the explanation 
was hardly reassuring.”
Miscellaneous reports
• The article “Shield Judges from Sex?” in the 
May 18, 1998, issue of the National Law 
Journal reported that webSenSe blocked 
a travel agency site after detecting the word 
“exotic” – as in “exotic locales.”
• in a May 2001 article on various filters’ 
treatment of health information for teens 
(“teen health Sites praised in article, 
Blocked by censorware”), peacefire re-
ported that webSenSe 4.0 blocked www.
teengrowth.com as an “entertainment” site.
X-Stop
X-Stop’s claim to fame was its “felony load,” 
later re-dubbed the “librarian” edition, which 
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the manufacturer, log-on data corpora-
tion, claimed blocked “only sites qualifying 
under the Miller standard” – referring to the 
Supreme court’s three-part test in Miller v. 
California for constitutionally unprotected 
obscenity.79 This was impossible, because no 
filter can predict what will be found “pa-
tently offensive” and therefore obscene in any 
particular community. log-on also asserted 
that “legitimate art or education sites are not 
blocked by the library edition, nor are so-
called ‘soft porn’ or ‘r’-rated sites.”80
after a lawsuit was filed challenging the 
use of X-Stop in loudoun county, virginia 
public libraries, log-on data, which had 
changed its name to 8e6 technologies, only 
maintained that “nobody blocks more por-
nographic sites than X-Stop. we also search 
out and block sources containing danger-
ous information like drugs and alcohol, hate 
crimes and bomb-making instructions.”81 
By late 2005, 8e6 technologies had dropped 
the X-Stop name but continued to market a 
variety of internet filters. 
The software relied on an automated 
“Mudcrawler” that located potentially objec-
tionable sites using 44 criteria that were not 
made public. Borderline cases were allegedly 
reviewed by “‘Mudcrawler’ technicians.” X-
Stop also came equipped with a “foul word 
library,” which prohibited users from typing 
any of the listed terms.
Jonathan wallace, “The X-Stop files” (oct. 5, 
1997)
wallace reported a host of benign sites 
blocked by a version of X-Stop obtained 
in July 1997, including The file room, an 
interactive archive of censorship cases hosted 
79 See the introduction, page 2.
80  By 2001, this claim had disappeared from the X-Stop web 
site, but it was quoted in the intervenors’ complaint in 
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County 
Library, no. 97-2049-a (e.d. va. feb. 5, 1998).
81  “8e6 technologies,” www.8e6technologies.com (visited 
3/13/05). 
by the university of illinois; the National 
Journal of Sexual Orientation Law; carnegie 
Mellon university’s Banned Books page; the 
american association of university women; 
the aidS Quilt site; certain sections of a site 
critical of america online (www.aolsucks.org/
censor/tos); the home page of the heritage 
foundation; and multiple sites housed on the 
institute for Global communications server, 
including the religious Society of friends and 
Quality resources online.
peacefire, “X-Stop examined” (Sept. 1997)
peacefire reported that 15 urls blocked by 
X-Stop’s “felony load” included the online 
edition of the San Jose Mercury News; a web 
site that peacefire said belonged to the holy 
See (eros.co.il); the y-Me national Breast 
cancer organization; art galleries at illinois 
State university; the winona State univer-
sity affirmative action office; community 
united against violence, an organization 
dedicated to preventing anti-gay violence; the 
Blind children’s center; planned parenthood; 
and the entire angelfire host.
Karen Schneider, A Practical Guide to Internet 
Filters (1997)
Schneider’s internet filter assessment proj-
ect also found planned parenthood blocked, 
as well as a “safe-sex web site, several gay 
advocacy sites, and sites with information that 
would rate as highly risqué, but not obscene.”
documents in Mainstream Loudoun v. Board 
of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library
in 1997, citizens in loudoun county, vir-
ginia brought a first amendment challenge 
to a new policy requiring filters on all library 
computers. The library board had chosen 
X-Stop to supply the software, relying on log-
on data’s false claimed that X-Stop blocked 
only illegal content. in november 1998, a 
federal court ruled the policy unconstitutional 
because libraries are “public fora” for the dis-
semination of “the widest possible diversity of 
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views and expressions,” because the filtering 
was not “narrowly tailored” to achieve any 
compelling government interest, and because 
decisions about what to block were contracted 
to a private company that did not disclose its 
standards or operating procedures.82 
• plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief (dec. 22, 1997)
The original complaint lodged by Main-
stream loudoun reported that X-Stop’s “foul 
word” blocking procedure made it impossible 
for library patrons to search for the word “bas-
tard” – and thus for such novels as dorothy 
allison’s Bastard Out of Carolina and John 
Jakes’s The Bastard. also forbidding the term 
“pussy,” X-Stop barred searches for “pussy 
willows” and “The owl and the pussy cat.” 
on the other hand, the filter allowed searches 
for “69,” “prick,” “pecker,” “dick,” “blow job,” 
“porn,” and “nipple.”
• “internet Sites Blocked by X-Stop,” plain-
tiffs’ exhibit 22 (oct. 1997)
plaintiff’s exhibit 22 listed the urls of 62 
sites at one time or another blocked by X-
Stop, among them (in addition to many pages 
also cited by Karen Schneider, the censorware 
project, and others) a page containing infor-
mation on dachsunds, the coalition for posi-
tive Sexuality, a page on the lambda literary 
awards, which recognize “excellence in gay, 
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered literature,” 
and lesbian and Gay rights in latvia.
• aclu Memoranda (Jan. 27-feb. 2, 1998)
an aclu researcher reported that among 
the sites blocked by X-Stop at the Sterling 
branch of the loudoun county public li-
brary were www.safesex.org; www.townhall.
com, a conservative news site; www.addict.
com, which proclaimed itself “addicted to 
82  Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun 
County Library, 24 f. Supp .2d 552 (e.d.va. 1998).  it is 
not clear how much of the court’s reasoning survived the 
Supreme court’s decision in the cipa case (see the introduc-
tion, pages 2–4).
loud noise”; the Queer resources directory; 
and www.killuglytv.com, a teen-oriented site 
containing health information but also vulgar 
words. not blocked were sites promoting 
abstinence as the only safe sex; containing 
anti-homosexuality material (for instance, a 
portion of the american family association 
site); and supporting the communications 
decency act (such as enough is enough, 
Morality in Media, the national campaign to 
combat internet pornography, and oklaho-
mans for children and families).
• plaintiff-intervenors’ complaint for declar-
atory and injunctive relief (feb. 5, 1998)
The intervenors’ complaint described the 
sites of eight plaintiff-intervenors, all blocked 
by X-Stop, including the Ethical Spectacle; 
Foundry, a web magazine that published the 
work of painter Sergio arau; Books for Gay 
& lesbian teens/youth; the San Francisco 
Chronicle- owned SF Gate; the renaissance 
transgender association, whose mission is “to 
provide the very best comprehensive educa-
tion and caring support to transgendered indi-
viduals and those close to them”; and Banned 
Books online, which featured the electronic 
texts of such famous works as Candide, The 
Origin of Species, Lysistrata, and Moll Flan-
ders. as of october 1997, X-Stop blocked the 
entire Banned Books site; by february 1998, 
X-Stop had unblocked most pages on the site, 
with the exception of nicholas Saunders’s 
E for Ecstasy, which, according to the inter-
venors’ complaint, contained “nothing that 
could remotely qualify as ‘pornographic.’”
• aclu memoranda (June 17-23, 1998)
aclu researchers found, in addition 
to many instances of underblocking, that 
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X-Stop barred searches for 
“pussy willows” and “The Owl 
and the Pussy Cat.”
X-Stop blocked www.gayamerica.com, a 
collection of links to gay-interest sites; a dr. 
ruth-endorsed site vending sex-education 
videos; and multiple nonprurient sex-related 
sites, such as Sexuality Bytes, an “online 
encyclopedia of sex and sexual health”; the 
frequently asked Questions page of the alt.
sex newsgroup, which presented “educational 
information” on sex, contraception, and 
sex-related laws, along with textbook-style 
diagrams and photographs of sex organs; 
www.heartless-bitches.com, a “grrrls” site 
with some “harsh language” but no images or 
“really pornographic” material; and a Geoci-
ties-hosted site that contained information 
on and images of amateur women’s wres-
tling – none of which were pornographic or 
sexually oriented. Subsequent memoranda 
reported that X-Stop blocked a page contain-
ing information on genital warts; a page dis-
cussing, in the researcher’s words, “sodomy 
from a philosophical/postmodernist perspec-
tive”; and a site about enemas.
• report of plaintiffs’ expert witness Karen 
Schneider (June 18, 1998)
Schneider tested X-Stop, using the same 
methodology she applied in A Practical Guide 
to Internet Filters, with two copies of the 
program, one purchased in anticipation of 
her testimony, the other furnished by log-on 
data corporation. She reported that the filter 
blocked the page for “Safe Sex – The Manual,” 
which had received an “education Through 
humor” prize at the world festival of ani-
mated films; another safe sex education page; 
a number of sites pertaining to homosexuality, 
including one that sold gay-themed jewelry; 
rainbow Mall, an index to gay-interest sites; 
and Arrow Magazine, an online journal geared 
for “homosexual men in committed relation-
ships” – on which, according to its self-im-
posed rSac rating, neither nudity, sex, nor 
violence appear. 
Schneider also cited some pages allowed by 
X-Stop: a site containing images of “naked 
women urinating, in some cases on other 
people”; absolute anal porn; and two sites 
featuring images of sexual acts. She concluded 
that “X-Stop blocks access to a wide variety 
of web sites that contain valuable, protected 
speech, yet fails to block many arguably ‘por-
nographic’ web sites.”
• report of defendants’ expert witness  
david Burt (July 14, 1998)
Burt selected 100 web sites, 50 of which 
were “likely to be obscene” and 50 of which 
were provocative but “clearly did not meet 
one of the ‘obscene’ categories.”83 This second 
50-site sample comprised 10 soft-core sites, 
10 devoted to fine art nude photography, 10 
that provided safe sex information, 10 devoted 
to nude photographs of celebrities (deemed 
unobjectionable because “this type of pornog-
raphy almost always consists of simple nudity 
and partial nudity”), and 10 nonpornographic 
sites relating to sexuality, such as www.drruth.
com and the coalition for positive Sexuality. 
X-Stop blocked 43 of his 50 “likely obscene” 
sites, or 86%. it left unblocked 70% of the 
soft-core sites; all but one (or 90%) of the 
nude celebrity sites (barring only the British 
Babes photo Gallery); and all of the art nude, 
safe sex, and sexuality information sites. Burt 
determined that, on average, X-Stop allowed 
access to 92% of his unobjectionable sites. he 
concluded: “X-Stop is likely the least restric-
tive filter for blocking obscenity, while [it] 
is reasonably effective at blocking what are 
clearly hard-core sites.” 
• report of plaintiffs’ expert witness Mi-
chael welles (Sept. 1, 1998)
System engineer Michael welles testified 
that even with X-Stop installed on his com-
puter, he had easily accessed pornography, and 
83  Burt defined a “likely obscene” site as one featuring any of 
the following: “1) photographs showing vaginal, anal, or oral 
penetration clearly visible; 2) photographs of bestiality with 
penetration clearly visible; 3) photographs of one person 
defecating or urinating onto another person’s face.” his 
categories did not track the legal definition of obscenity; see 
the introduction, page 2.
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asserted that “one needs a human judge, and a 
human judge or team of human judges cannot 
work quickly enough to process the amount 
of material that is out [on the web].” welles 
concluded that “it is not possible to find a 
technological method by which a person 
seeking to establish a blocking system could 
reliably block sites that must be identified by 
their subject matter without blocking sites 
that contain a different subject matter.”
• loren Kropat, Second declaration (Sept. 2, 
1998)
loudoun county library patron loren 
Kropat testified about sites she found blocked 
using a public internet terminal on which 
X-Stop was installed at the purcellville, 
virginia library. among them were a wash-
ington dc, gay-interest event information 
site; a profile of edinburgh; the home page of 
the let’s have an affair catering company; 
and www.venusx.com, the web site of eye-
land opticians. 
censorware project, The X-Stop Files: Déjà 
Voodoo (1999; updated 2000)
in 1999, a year after a federal district 
court ruled the filtering policies of loudoun 
county unconstitutional, the censorware 
project published this follow-up to Jonathan 
wallace’s “The X-Stop files.” it found that 
log on data had removed many of the bad 
blocks that were identified in the lawsuit, but 
at the same time introduced more blocks of 
innocent sites, so that “a year later, the prod-
uct is no better than it was.”
among the new blocks were Godiva choco-
latier and www.fascinations.com, a dealer 
in toys relating to physics – in both cases, 
most likely because “long ago and far away, 
their domain names belonged to porn sites.” 
X-Stop blocked the home page of Redbook 
magazine, probably because its “meta” de-
scription includes the word “sex.” on account 
of supposed explicit sexual content, the filter 
also barred the academic sites “Sex culture in 
ancient china,” which provided a scholarly 
history of sexology, and wicked pleasures, the 
site for a book on african american sexuality. 
other blocked health and sex-related sites 
included the Medical consumer’s advocate; 
an informational site on massage therapy; a 
site on alternative medicine; a site on aph-
rodisiacs, which stated, on its front page, 
that it did “not contain sexually explicit 
material” (censorware’s emphasis); Great-
Sex.com, which sold books and videotapes 
promoting “clinical and educational sexual 
wisdom” and contained no nudity; c-toons, 
a web comic serial – intended “to reinforce 
‘safe sex’ attitudes through humor” – whose 
protagonist was a condom; and darkwhisper, 
a site dedicated to “exploring the magic and 
mystery of sadomasochism” and carrying an 
adult warning but, according to censorware, 
containing “serious text only, not unlike what 
one can find in many libraries” and hence “a 
good illustration of the lack of any meaning-
ful human review” by X-Stop.
Still other blocked pages included home 
Sweet loan, a mortgage firm whose url 
(runawayteens.com), the report suggested, led 
to the problematic block; the Thought Shop, 
a site that at the time of censorware’s investi-
gation contained a commentary opposing the 
child online protection act; a web graph-
ics page called digital Xtreme!; sites for the 
recording artists Bombay June and Marilyn 
Manson; a site posting weather forecasts for 
the ardennes region of Belgium; and a page in 
tribute to Gillian anderson, which contained 
no nude images.
X-Stop also blocked every site hosted by 
the free web page provider Xoom—a total, 
at the time of Déjà Voodoo’s publication, of 
4.5 million distinct sites. also blocked was 
the so-called “family-friendly” iSp execulink, 
which rated its sites by the rSac system, 
offered Bess filtering at the server level, and 
designated the focus on the family web site a 
“favorite” link.
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center for Media education, “youth access to 
alcohol and tobacco web Marketing” (oct. 
1999)
The cMe deemed X-Stop “the least effec-
tive filter at blocking promotional alcohol 
and tobacco content,” for it did not block any 
of the selected alcohol- and tobacco-related 
promotional sites, and blocked just 4% of 
sites generated by searches for promotional 
terms—this despite its claim to “block sources 
containing dangerous information like drugs 
and alcohol.”
peacefire, “analysis of first 50 urls Blocked 
by X-Stop in the .edu domain” (Jan. 2000)
peacefire investigated the first 50 .edu 
domains on X-Stop’s block list as of Jan. 17, 
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2000. twenty-four of these, or 48%, were 
ruled “obvious errors,” including a number 
of innocuous student home pages, a site 
for a contest in which the grand prize was a 
boat—possibly X-Stop’s Mudcrawler was con-
fused, peacefire wrote, “by the phrase on the 
rules saying you had to be ‘18 years or older’ 
to enter the drawing” – and the paper and 
Book intensive, a summer program on the art 
of the book, papermaking, and conservation, 
offered by the university of alabama’s School 
of library information Studies. ten additional 
urls, 20% of the overall sample, were found 
to contain no pornography, but did feature 
some artistic nudity or harsh language, and 
were thereby judged “marginal errors.”
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introducton: The Resnck crtque
tests of filters’ effectiveness between 2001-06 
have tended to be more statistical and less 
anecdotal than many of the earlier studies. 
This may reflect the fact that filters are now 
entrenched in many institutions, including 
schools and libraries. The focus of the more 
recent studies has therefore shifted from 
investigating whether filters should be used 
at all to accepting their existence and investi-
gating which ones perform best. analysis of 
performance, of course, depends on underly-
ing, and often subjective, judgments about 
whether particular web pages are appropri-
ately blocked. 
Methodologies and results have varied in 
this new world of filtering studies. The lack 
of consistent standards inspired paul resnick 
and his colleagues to write an article pointing 
out some of the pitfalls, and making recom-
mendations for good research techniques.84 it 
is useful to summarize this article before going 
on to describe the studies done during and 
after 2001. 
resnick et al. outline four aspects of test 
design: collecting the list of web sites that 
will be used to test the filters, classifying the 
content of the collected sites, configuring and 
running the filters, and computing rates of 
over- and underblocking. 
first, they say that in order to avoid bias 
during the collection of sites for testing, re-
searchers cannot simply pick the sites that they 
find interesting or relevant, as the authors of a 
number of studies have done. instead, testers 
must use an objective, repeatable process such 
84 paul resnick, derek hansen, & caroline richardson. “cal-
culating error rates for filtering Software,” 47:9 Communica-
tions of the ACM: 67-71 (Sept. 2004).
as collecting all of the sites that a target group 
of users actually visits, or sampling a well-
defined category of sites such as the health 
listings from particular portals.
next, they argue that the set of sites used 
must be large enough to produce statistically 
valid results and, if the testers intend to evalu-
ate the filters’ performance on particular cate-
gories of content, that there are enough sites in 
each category. Thus, they fault several studies 
that had large test sets overall, but too few sites 
in each of their many content categories to test 
the filters’ performance in each category.
resnick et al. point out the pitfalls of evaluating 
whether web sites are in fact incorrectly blocked. 
“in order to test whether filtering software imple-
ments the cipa standard, or the legal definition 
of obscenity,” they say, “sites would have to be 
classified according to those criteria.”  They add 
that “if the goal were simply to test whether filter-
ing software correctly implements the vendor’s 
advertised classification criteria, the sites would 
be independently classified according to those 
criteria.”85 
The authors also identify two distinct 
measures for overblocking and underblocking. 
each measure is independent and provides 
different information. often, researchers use 
the terms “overblocking” and “underblocking” 
without specifying which measure they are 
referring to. 
The first measure of overblocking, which 
resnick et al., call the “oK-sites overblock 
rate,” is the percentage of acceptable sites that 
a filter wrongly blocks. The denominator in 
this fraction is the total number of acceptable 
sites. This measure gives an indication of how 
85 resnick et al., 69.
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much acceptable, useful, and valuable infor-
mation a filter blocks. 
The second measure, the “blocked-sites over-
block rate,” is the percentage of blocked sites 
that should not be blocked. The denominator 
here is the total number of blocked sites. The 
measure tells us how common overblocks are 
relative to correct blocks, but doesn’t shed light 
how a filter affects access to information overall. 
to demonstrate the difference, they say, 
suppose that filter a blocks 99 “oK” sites and 
99 “bad” sites, while only leaving one “oK” 
site unblocked, while filter B blocks only 
one “oK” site and one “bad” site, leaving 
99 “oK” sites unblocked. Both filters have a 
“blocked-sites over-block rate” of 50%, but 
filter a’s “oK-sites overblock rate” is 99%, 
while filter B’s is 1%. although both filters 
have the same ratio of overblocks to correct 
blocks, filter a has a much greater impact on 
the availability of information.86
resnick et al. also show how the “blocked-
sites overblock rate” can be manipulated 
simply by changing the number of accept-
able sites that are in the test set. Because the 
blocked-sites overblock rate is easily manipu-
lable and can be deceptive, resnick et al. say, 
the more relevant measure from the vantage 
point of free expression is the oK-sites over-
block rate.
in fact, though, all of the statistical mea-
sures are manipulable, depending on the web 
sites that researchers choose for their study. as 
the district court in the cipa case observed, 
all statistical attempts to calculate over- and 
underblocking rates suffer from the difficulty 
of identifying a truly random sample of inter-
net sites, or—the relevant inquiry for purposes 
of that case—a sample that truly approximates 
86  resnick et al. similarly identify two measures of underblock-
ing: the “bad-sites underblock rate” (the percentage of “offen-
sive” sites that the filter fails to block), and the “unblocked-
sites underblock rate” (the percentage of unblocked sites that 
should have been blocked under the manufacturer’s criteria). 
like the two measures of overblocking, these numbers give 
very different information about filters’ performance.
“the universe of web pages” that library pa-
trons are likely to visit.87
resnick et al.’s clarifications are valuable, 
but calculating error rates, regardless of how 
carefully it is done, will always be mislead-
ing for a medium as vast as the internet. it is 
rarely possible to know in advance whether a 
web site would violate cipa, and it is even 
more difficult to agree on whether a site meets 
such broad filtering categories as “tasteless,” 
“intolerance,” or “alternative lifestyle.”
in short, using statistics to gauge how well 
filters work can be deceptive. even a 1% error 
rate, given the size of the internet, can mean 
millions of wrongly blocked sites. The statisti-
cal approach also assumes that web sites are 
fungible. if only 1% of “health education” 
sites are wrongly blocked, for example, the 
assumption is that those searching for health 
information can find it on another site that is 
not blocked. But different web sites have dif-
ferent authors, viewpoints, and content (not 
all of it, of course, necessarily accurate). from 
the perspective of free expression, even one 
wrongly blocked site constitutes censorship 
and is cause for concern. it may be the very 
site with the information you need. certainly, 
it is not much consolation to the publisher of 
the site that a web searcher can access another 
site on the same general topic.
with this introduction to the pitfalls of 
filter testing in mind, we turn to the studies 
conducted during and after 2001 that sought 
to test over- and underblocking. our summa-
ries are presented chronologically.
Report for the Australan  
broadcastng Authorty
paul Greenfield, peter rickwood, & huu 
cuong tran, Effectiveness of Internet Filtering 
Software Products (cSiro Mathematical and 
information Sciences, Sept. 2001) 
australian government regulations require 
87 American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. Supp. 2d at 437-38.
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most of the country’s internet service provid-
ers to offer their customers an optional filter 
from a list of approved products compiled 
by the internet industry association (iia). 
This study, commissioned by the australian 
Broadcasting authority and the nonprofit 
organization netalert, evaluated 14 of the 24 
filtering products that were on the iia list as 
of february 2001.88
The study evaluated the filters based on 
their ability to block content the research-
ers deemed objectionable without blocking 
content they deemed innocuous, and on other 
criteria such as reliability, cost, and ease of 
use. it also tested whether the product could 
be deactivated by a filter-disabling tool created 
by peacefire. The filters were tested against 
895 web sites taken from 28 categories 
developed by the authors, containing at least 
20 sites each.89 These categories included both 
those likely to contain sites that the testers 
thought objectionable (e.g., “pornography/
erotica,” “racist/supremacist/nazi/hate,” and 
“bomb-making/terrorism”), and those that 
they deemed likely to include unobjectionable 
content such as “sex education.” “gay rights/
politics,” “drug education,” “art/photography,” 
and “filtering information.” The 28 categories 
also included such other subjects as “swimsuit 
models,” “glamour/lingerie models,” “sex laws/
issues,” “atheism/anti-church,” “anarchy/revo-
lutionary,” and “politics.”
The report did not provide a list of the web 
sites that were tested and did not specify how 
those sites were collected. it presented results 
in the form of rough percentages instead of 
88  The products tested were: aol parental controls 6.0; cyber 
patrol 5.0; cyber Sentinel 2.0; cyBersitter 2001; eyeguard, 
version not specified (our research indicates that this product 
is no longer on the market); internet Sheriff, version not 
specified; i-Gear 3.5 (name later changed to Symantec web 
Security); n2h2, version not specified; net nanny 4.0; nor-
ton internet Security 3.0, family edition; Smartfilter 3.0; 
too c.o.o.l. (which seems to have been discontinued), ver-
sion not specified; and X-Stop 3.04 (now called 8e6 home).
89  The text of the report says 27 categories at one point, and 24 
at another, but an accompanying table lists 28. Greenfield et 
al., 23, 25-26, 31.  
exact figures. it did not report the number  
of sites erroneously blocked by any of the 
filters. nor did it state the criteria that were 
used to categorize the sites or to decide 
whether a given site should be classified  
as objectionable. 
Most problematic, perhaps, the authors did 
not make clear whether they thought that all, 
some, or none of the sites that they placed in 
categories like “art/photography,” “nudism,” 
or “atheism/anti-church” should be blocked. 
They did not explicitly say whether they 
found these sites objectionable or not. and 
since they generally tested the filters at their 
maximum settings, which were designed to 
block categories such as nudity or sex educa-
tion, the authors could hardly rate these filters 
inaccurate simply because they blocked large 
amounts of worthwhile material in these 
categories.
all of the products tested used some combi-
nation of three techniques: blocking all of the 
sites on the internet except those found on a 
whitelist of allowed sites; blocking only those 
sites found on a blacklist while allowing the 
rest; and blocking all sites that contain words, 
phrases, or in the case of eyeguard, images 
that are deemed objectionable. The research-
ers found that the two products that used 
whitelists—the “too c.o.o.l.” children’s 
web browser and the “Kids only” setting of 
america online (aol) parental controls—
blocked almost all of the sites that they tested 
in all of the categories.90 
of the products that used blacklists and 
word or phrase-based filtering, n2h2 set 
to “maximum filtering” was the most effec-
tive at blocking sites in the categories that 
the researchers deemed objectionable—about 
95% of the sites in the “pornography/erotica” 
category, about 75% of those qualifying as 
90  two other products, eyeguard and cyber Sentinel, “were not 
automatable using our test tools and had to be tested manu-
ally, and as a result were not evaluated against the complete 
site list.” Greenfield et al., 26.
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“bomb-making/terrorism,” and about 65% of 
those qualifying as “racist/supremacist/nazi/
hate.” But it also blocked many of the sites in 
potentially unobjectionable categories, includ-
ing about 60% in “art/photography,” about 
40% in “sex education,” about 30% in “athe-
ism/anti-church,” about 20% in “gay rights/
politics,” and about 15% in “drug education.” 
i-Gear and the “young teen” setting of aol 
parental controls performed similarly—they 
blocked nearly as many of the sites in the cate-
gories deemed objectionable, but also blocked 
a substantial portion of the sites in potentially 
unobjectionable categories.
Judged by their ability to block sites the 
researchers thought objectionable without 
blocking too many potentially unobjection-
able sites, aol’s “Mature teen” was rated the 
best performer. it blocked about 90% of the 
sites in the “pornography/erotica” category, 
60% of those in “racist/supremacist/nazi/
hate,” and 25% of those in “bomb-mak-
ing/terrorism,” while blocking about 15% in 
“sex education,” 10% in “gay rights/politics,” 
and 5% in “drug education.”  Smartfilter 
performed nearly as well, according to the 
researchers.
The rest of the products were substantially 
worse. cyBersitter, cyber Sentinel, norton 
internet Security, and internet Sheriff blocked 
virtually as many potentially unobjection-
able sites as n2h2 and i-Gear while blocking 
fewer sites that the researchers deemed objec-
tionable. although cyber patrol, net nanny, 
and X-Stop blocked relatively few potentially 
unobjectionable sites, they did not block 
many of the sites that the researchers thought 
objectionable either. 
finally, despite the fact that eyeguard, 
which uses image analysis to try to identify 
pornographic images, managed to block about 
80% of the sites in the “pornography/erotica” 
category, it did not block other content that 
the researchers deemed objectionable, such 
as “racist/supremacist/nazi/hate” or “bomb-
making/terrorism.” its image analysis also 
blocked about 65% of the sites in the “art/
photography” category. in fact, eyeguard’s 
image analysis blocked all images larger than 
a certain size that contained colors resembling 
caucasian skin tones, including innocuous 
pictures of faces and desert scenes. at the 
same time, it failed to block pornographic im-
ages that were black-and-white, were small in 
size, or had unusual lighting.
Some of the filters had other quirks. 
cyber Sentinel’s keyword filtering blocked 
all content in web browsers, chat programs, 
and even word processing programs contain-
ing words deemed objectionable without 
regard to their context. Thus, cyber Sentinel 
blocked a nudist site containing the phrase: 
“This site contains no pornography. it con-
tains no pictures of male or female genitals 
…,” because it used the words “pornog-
raphy” and “genitals.”91 cyBersitter and 
cyber Sentinel both blocked about half the 
sites tested that discussed internet filtering 
products.
The authors acknowledge the difficulty of 
judging filters based on their capacity to block 
“objectionable” content. lists of sites for test-
ing, they say, “reflect the values of the orga-
nizations and people who compile them … 
cultures differ considerably in their concepts 
of ‘acceptable’ content.”92 
91 Greenfield et al., 46. 
92 Id., 6.
Eyeguard’s Image analysis 
blocked all images that  
contained colors resembling 
Caucasian skin tones,  
including innocuous pictures  
of faces and desert scenes.
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“beSS Won’t Go There”
valerie Byrd, Jessica felker, & allison dun-
can, “BeSS won't Go There: a research 
report on filtering Software,” 25:1/2 Current 
Studies in Librarianship 7-19 (2001)
Byrd and two fellow South carolina librar-
ians evaluated five commercial filtering prod-
ucts with an eye toward their suitability for li-
brary use.93 They compiled a list of 200 search 
terms from medical and slang dictionaries 
and from their own brainstorming, and then 
partitioned this list into “bad” and “good” 
terms. from these lists, they chose 10 “good” 
and 10 “bad” terms at random,94 entered each 
into the Google search engine, and tested the 
filters against the first 10 hits that each search 
returned. each filter was tested against a total 
of 200 urls.
to decide whether the sites they collected 
were “acceptable” or “unacceptable,” the 
researchers combined criteria from the federal 
communications commission’s “indecency” 
standard, the child online protection act 
(copa), and the america online terms of 
Service. They defined “acceptable” sites as 
those containing: “mild expletives”; “non-
sexual anatomical references”; “photos with 
limited nudity in a scientific or artistic con-
text”; “discussion of anatomical sexual parts 
in reference to medical or physical condi-
tions”; “graphic images in reference to news 
accounts”; and “discussions of drug abuse in 
health areas.” They defined “unacceptable” 
sites as containing: “actual or simulated  
sexual act or contact”; “actual or simulated 
93  The five products tested were: fortres 101; cyber patrol; cyBer-
sitter; the “Mature teen” setting of america online parental 
controls; and Bess. The product versions were not specified, and 
the report did not indicate which configuration of cyber patrol, 
cyBersitter, and Bess were used. fortres 101, they reported, is 
not really a filter; it is simply software that allows users to enter 
sites they would like blocked. accordingly, it did not block any 
of sites tested. (it was included in the study because it was being 
used in at least one South carolina school district.)
94  The “good” terms were: “anonymous sex,” “barnyard,” “bite,” 
“blossom,” breast cancer,” “colon cancer,” “dick cheney,” “ovar-
ian cancer,” “pictures,” and “white house.” The “bad” terms 
were: “babes,” “bestiality,” “bitch,” “boner,” “bong,” “butt,” 
“cock,” “cunt,” “fuck,” and “porn.”
normal or perverted sexual act”; “lewd  
exhibition of genitals or post-pubescent  
female breasts”; “blood and gore, gratuitous 
violence”; and “discussions about or depic-
tions of illegal drug abuse.” Their final defini-
tion, which they posed as a rhetorical ques-
tion, was that sites are unacceptable  
(“obscene”) if “they lack literary, artistic,  
political, or scientific value.”95 
after evaluating the sites they collected, the 
researchers decided that 94% of the ones they 
found using the “good” search terms were 
“acceptable.” But 65% of the sites found using 
the “bad” search terms were also “acceptable” 
to them, and therefore should not be blocked 
in public libraries. 
a major problem with this article is that 
table 2, on which the researchers summa-
rize their findings, is not clear on what it is 
reporting. The table contains two columns, 
one for the “good words” and one for the 
“bad words.” The first box in each column 
gives percentages of “acceptable” and “unac-
ceptable” sites within the 200-site sample. The 
succeeding boxes give blocking percentages 
for each filter. These boxes seem to be report-
ing simply the percent of sites blocked by each 
filter using “good” and “bad” search terms. 
But it makes little sense to report such results, 
because they tell us nothing about how many 
“acceptable” and “unacceptable” sites were 
blocked. reading this ambiguous table as in-
stead reporting the percentages of “acceptable” 
and “unacceptable” sites blocked using both 
“good” and “bad” search terms” is more consis-
tent with the text of the report, which describes 
results in terms of blocking “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” sites. But it is not entirely con-
sistent, as the following example suggests.96
95 Byrd et al., 12.
96  in february 2005, ariel feldman wrote to valerie Byrd request-
ing clarification on several questions of methodology, as well 
as back-up data. She replied in March that she and the other 
researchers “have all been looking for the requested information, 
but unfortunately, we have come up with nothing.” email cor-
respondence between ariel feldman and valerie Byrd, feb.-Mar. 
2005. we received no reply to a follow-up inquiry to valerie Byrd 
in March 2006, specifically addressing the ambiguity in table 2.
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The researchers write that cyber patrol 
failed to block “unacceptable” sites 69% of 
the time. depending on how one reads table 
2, however, cyber patrol either failed to block 
69% of the sites found using “bad” search 
terms, or it failed to block 69% of “unaccept-
able” sites found using “bad” search terms. 
it also failed to block 91% of the sites found 
using “good” search terms, or—following the 
other possible reading of table 2—it failed to 
block 91% of the “unacceptable” sites found 
using “good” search terms.  if we think that 
table 2 refers to blocking rates for “accept-
able” and “unacceptable” sites, we would have 
to merge cyber patrol’s 69% underblocking 
rate using “bad” search terms with its 91% 
underblocking rate using “good” search terms, 
for an average of 80% underblocking. either 
way, the text of the article is inconsistent 
with the table that summarizes the findings. 
Because of these ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies, the numbers reported in the study are 
not very meaningful.  
The researchers did not specify any of the 
sites they deemed acceptable or unaccept-
able, but they did, “just for fun,” sit down 
at a computer and test the filters outside the 
contours of their formal study. with Bess, 
they found that they could not access infor-
mation about the film, “Babes in toyland,” 
nor could they find out who won Super Bowl 
XXX. Bess sometimes appeared to replace the 
sites it deemed unacceptable with other web 
sites, but this did not happen consistently. 
Bess blocked all web sites that included the 
word “vaginal,” which left out a number of 
women's education health sites.97
Bess, they decided, blocked “too much ac-
ceptable information for it to be considered a 
successful filter.” They felt that aol “Mature 
teen” setting “seems to be the most accurate 
as far as the number of sites blocked com-
pared to the number of unacceptable sites.” 
But then they said: “we believe that for those 
97 Byrd et al., 16
who prefer to use a filter, the best choice is 
cyBersitter. it did not block cancer sites or 
other acceptable sites.”98
Report for the european  
commsson: currently Avalable 
cotS Flterng tools
Sylvie Brunessaux et al., Report on Currently 
Available COTS Filtering Tools, D2.2, Version 
1.0 (Matra Systèmes & information, oct. 
1, 2001)
Sylvie Brunessaux and her colleagues evalu-
ated 10 commercial filtering products and 
collected basic information about 40 more as 
part of the “netprotect” initiative, designed to 
produce a prototype anti-pornography filter 
that “takes into account european multilin-
gual and multicultural issues.”99 They ranked 
the filters according to numerical scores based 
on their ability to block pornographic content 
from sites in five european languages (english, 
french, German, Greek, and Spanish), on 
their rates of overblocking, and on other crite-
ria such as reliability, cost, and ease of use.100
The researchers tested the filters against 
4,449 urls in the five different languages, 
of which 2,794 represented sites they deemed 
pornographic, and 1,655 sites they deemed 
“normal.”101 They collected the urls of the 
pornography sites both by entering terms like 
“sex” into search engines, and by following 
links from personal web pages, chatrooms, 
and other sources. for content they deemed 
normal, they collected both the urls of 
sites that they did not expect would confuse 
98  Id., 12, 15. note that in other studies, cyBersitter was 
found highly inaccurate and ideologically biased.   
99 Sylvie Brunessaux et al., 5. 
100  The 10 filters tested were: BizGuard workstation 2.0 (available 
from Guardone.com); cyber patrol 5.0; cyBersitter 2001; 
cyber Snoop 0.4 (manufactured by pearl Software); internet 
watcher 2000 (manufactured by Bernard d&G); net nanny 4; 
norton internet Security 2001 family edition 3.0; optenet pc; 
SurfMonkey; and X-Stop (now called “8e6 home”). of these, 
BizGuard and SurfMonkey web sites can no longer be found.  
“cotS” stands for “commercial off-the-shelf.”  
101  Throughout the report, they use the term “harmful” as 
equivalent to pornographic.
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filters, such as web portals, news sites, and 
sites designed for children, and the urls of 
sites they thought would confuse filters, such 
as sex education sites, sites dedicated to gay 
and lesbian issues, and nonpornographic sites 
that contained ambiguous words like “kitty,” 
pussy,” or “gay.”
They tested the 10 filters using a program 
called checkprotect since, as they explain, 
“given the huge number of urls tested, it 
was not possible to do the test manually.”102 
The results for both under- and overblocking 
are given in statistical form; no specific web 
sites are identified. in fact, the report only 
once mentions an individual site—when an 
optional feature of internet watcher 2000 re-
directed traffic from blocked pages to the web 
site of the coca cola company.103
The researchers configured each filter to 
what they called its “most secured profile 
(i.e., the youngest in most cases).”104 They 
found that none of the products fared well 
when tested against their collected sites in five 
languages. The product that was most effec-
tive at blocking pornography, optenet, only 
managed to block 79% of these sites, while 
blocking 25% of the sites considered harm-
less, including 73% of those pertaining to gay 
and lesbian issues, 44% of those devoted to 
sex education, 43% of those containing am-
biguous words, and 14% of those designed for 
children. These numbers support the percep-
tion, later articulated by experts during the 
cipa trial, that the more effective filters are at 
blocking pornography (or other disapproved 
content), the more they are likely to overblock 
“normal” sites. 
cyber Snoop and SurfMonkey also per-
formed poorly—each blocked only 65% of 
the sites deemed pornographic while block-
ing large numbers of innocuous sites. cyber 
Snoop blocked 59% of the sites devoted to sex 
102 Sylvie Brunessaux et al., 23.
103 Id., 60.
104 Id., 23.
education, 55% of those pertaining to gay and 
lesbian issues, and 29% of those containing 
ambiguous words. SurfMonkey blocked 22% 
of the sites devoted sex education, 20% of 
those containing ambiguous words, and 13% 
of those on gay and lesbian issues.  
The remaining filters were similarly flawed. 
none blocked more than 55% of the content 
deemed pornographic while the worst, net 
nanny, only managed to block 20%. despite 
their low effectiveness, BizGuard and norton 
internet Security also significantly over-
blocked. 
on average, the filters blocked only 52% 
of the sites deemed pornographic in all five 
languages. This rate rose to 67% when only 
the english sites were considered, which 
suggests the difficulty of compiling lists of 
“bad” keywords in multiple languages. as 
for overblocking, the average rate for all of 
the products was 9%. But this is somewhat 
deceptive because many of the sites considered 
nonpornographic were relatively uncontrover-
sial and easy to classify, such as web sites for 
children, news sites, and search engines. The 
overblocking rates were much higher for the 
kinds of sites that typically are problematic for 
filters—sex education, gay and lesbian issues, 
and sites containing ambiguous words, which 
had 19%, 22%, and 13% overblock rates 
respectively. 
on the other hand, given that the filters 
were tested at their most restrictive settings, 
it is not surprising that they blocked large 
numbers of gay and lesbian or sex education 
sites. even though nonpornographic, these 
are precisely the sites that many filters are 
designed to block. if, as they reported, the 
researchers were only interested in finding the 
most accurate filter for blocking pornography 
while allowing access to educational materials, 
they should have set the filters at their “adult/
sexually explicit” or “pornography” settings, 
rather than their “most secured profile.”
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The researchers concluded by ranking the 
filters according to numerical scores, but those 
scores were based on many factors, of which 
filtering effectiveness was only one. in fact, 
the products with the two highest overall 
scores, cyBersitter and internet watcher 
2000, scored poorly on blocking pornography, 
with rates of 46% and 30% respectively. The 
researchers expressed surprise that many com-
mercial products had such high rates of error. 
This report formed the basis for a later 
“final report” in June 2002, which lists one 
author, Stéphan Brunessaux. The later docu-
ment states that it is an “edited version” of the 
original “restricted final report that was sent 
to the commission.”105 in fact, it is a very dif-
ferent, and much shorter, report, which sum-
marizes nine separate documents that were 
produced during the netprotect project. 
The major difference between the lengthy 
“restricted” report and the briefer final 
report is that the initial report criticized the 
performance of all the products tested. The 
final report states that netprotect has been 
successful and that a prototype filter us-
ing optenet has now been created.106 Both 
reports, however, acknowledge the “problems 
of current existing filtering solutions: inap-
propriate blocking/filtering techniques which 
sometimes block legitimate web sites and 
occasionally allow questionable web sites, 
inability to filter non-english web sites and 
therefore most web european sites, [and] lack 
of transparency, disabling the user [of ] the 
right to know why some sites can be accessed 
and not others.”107
The final report notes that the prototype 
filter includes image-recognition as well as 
text-based filtering. it points to the “value 
105  Stéphan Brunessaux, Report on Currently Available COTS 
Filtering Tools, D5.1, Version 1.0 (Matra Systèmes & 
information, June 28, 2002), 4. See “netprotect results” for 
links to all of the documents, np1.net-protect.org/en/results.
htm (visited 2/28/06).
106 Stéphan Brunessaux, 5.
107 Id.; Sylvie Brunessaux et al.,5.
of combining [these] different techniques,” 
even while acknowledging that image-based 
programs “are not able to distinguish between 
what is just skin and what is nudity and much 
less what is pornography.”108 in fact, one 
of the other netprotect reports found that 
image-based filters blocked pictures of deer, 
sheep, dogs, penguins, and other animals. 
That report is described below.
Report for the european  
commsson: Flterng technques 
and Approaches
ana luisa rotta, Report on Filtering Techniques 
and Approaches, D2.3, Version 1.0 (Matra 
Systèmes & information, oct. 23, 2001)
rotta examined five products that use im-
age analysis, four that use text-based filtering, 
and three that combine the two methods.109 
originally, she intended to test these tools us-
ing the same 4,449 urls assembled by Sylvie 
Brunessaux for the Report on Currently Avail-
able COTS Filtering Tools, discussed above; 
but this was not possible for technical reasons. 
in the end, it appears that rotta did not test 
some of the products, but instead reproduced 
information from other sources. for other 
products, she used different lists of urls for 
testing. 
like Brunessaux, rotta used checkprotect 
to run her tests, and evaluated the products 
based not only on their effectiveness (over- 
and underblocking), but on such factors as 
speed, ease of integration with other applica-
tions, and facility at blocking in different 
languages. focusing on effectiveness, she 
concluded that three “text-based” products 
(optenet, The Bair, and puresight) failed 
to block about 40% of pornographic web 
108 Stéphan Brunessaux, 9, 17.
109  The text-only products were optenet; contexion embedded 
analysis toolkit (eatK), manufactured by rulespace; pure-
sight; and Sail labs classifier. The image-analysis products 
were eyeguard; first 4 internet; lookThatup image filter; 
easyGlider; and wipe wavelet image pornography elimi-
nation. The three hybrid products were The Bair filtering 
System, filterix, and web washer ee.
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sites; their overblock rates ranged from 6.2-
18.12%.110 Since we do not know what data-
base of urls was used, these rates of over- 
and underblocking are not very meaningful. 
rotta gives no test results, but only a prod-
uct description, for contexion/rulespace. 
for Sail lab text classifier, described as an 
“automatic text classification” system, rotta 
assembled a database of 369 pornographic 
and 110 nonpornographic urls, along with 
about 5,000 reuters news articles. She re-
ported 97% effectiveness, .3% overblocking 
overall, but 13% overblocking if measured 
on a set of “specially collected nonporno-
graphic urls.”111 
The five image-recognition filters are 
covered in similarly disjointed fashion. rotta 
describes eyeguard, in language seemingly 
drawn from its promotional literature, as a 
technology that “checks the images being 
displayed for excessive skin tones, thereby 
protecting the user from pornographic imag-
es”; evidently, no testing was done. Similarly, 
there are no tests reported for easyGlider. 
for first 4 internet, described as an “artifi-
cial intelligence” technology that analyzes 
images to determine if they have “attributes 
of pornographic nature,” rotta states that a 
company called tescom found 95% effec-
tiveness at blocking pornography, but that it 
gave no indication of the rate of overblock-
ing. Similarly, for wipe wavelet, she reports 
only tests done by others, which found over 
96% effectiveness at identifying pornogra-
phy, but overblocking rates of 9-18%.112 
rotta did test lookThatup, described as 
“a highly sophisticated system of algorithms 
based on image techniques,” which rates im-
ages for pornographic content on a scale of 
1-100. She used 100 “harmful images” and 
110  The Bair is listed as a hybrid in the table of contents, but is 
designated as a text-based product later in the report. rotta, 
17.
111 rotta, 24-25.
112 Id., 26-36.
100 “harmless” ones for testing. of the 100 
“harmful” images, the filter failed to analyze 
27; of the remaining 73, its pornography-
identifying scores for a quarter of them 
were below 70%—that is, it failed to recog-
nize them as clearly pornographic. of the 
“harmless” images, which included animals, 
clothed people, and nonpornographic nudes, 
the filter scored almost a quarter of them 
at above 70%—that is, it identified them as 
pornography. among the misidentified im-
ages were a woman in a swimsuit waterskiing 
and a pair of deer in a forest. in a second test 
of 100 nonpornographic images (landscapes, 
famous places, animals), lookThatup did 
somewhat better, but still gave high “porn 
scores” to images of sheep, dogs, koalas, and 
penguins. overall, the filter identified 24% 
of “potentially harmless pictures” and 8% of 
“harmless pictures” as pornographic.
despite these results, rotta concluded that 
lookThatup can “bring an added-value to 
an integrated solution as the one we intend 
to develop in the context of the netprotect 
project.”113  The goal seemed to be maximum 
porn-blocking without regard to how  
many pictures of animals, landscapes,  
or other nonpornographic content are  
also eliminated. 
Reports From the ciPA ltgaton
a number of empirical studies of filter effec-
tiveness were introduced in evidence during 
the trial of the lawsuit challenging cipa. 
we summarize these reports below.114 The 
researchers who conducted these studies were 
cross-examined in court, but in order to keep 
this report to a manageable size—and also be-
113 Id., 32.
114  Three of the reports from the cipa case are not described 
here. one, by christopher hunter, is described in part i, 
pages 17–18. we were unable to locate two others, from 
librarians Michael ryan (for the plaintiffs) and david Biek 
(for the government). See note 121 for the district court’s 
description of ryan’s testimony. The court gave Biek’s testi-
mony little credence. American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. 
Supp. 2d at 441-42.
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cause the authors of the other tests and studies 
we describe were not cross-examined—we 
won’t attempt to summarize the cross-exami-
nations. we do note points where the district 
court judges commented on the empirical 
reports.
Geoffrey nunberg, a scientist at the Xerox 
palo alto research center and a professor 
at Stanford, also served as an expert witness, 
providing the court with background on the 
operation and effectiveness of filters. although 
nunberg did not present any test results, it 
is useful to summarize his report because the 
three district court judges relied on it exten-
sively in their decision striking down cipa.115 
nunberg’s report explained first that filter 
manufacturers locate most of the sites they 
classify by following the hyperlinks on web 
pages accessible through search engines and 
directories. But since only a minority of web 
pages are accessible through search engines 
and many pages cannot be reached through 
simple hyperlinks, filter manufacturers actual-
ly classify only a small fraction of the web.116
Second, nunberg said that most filters 
classify sites automatically, based on their 
text. This method is flawed because even the 
most sophisticated text classification systems, 
including those described as “artificial intel-
ligence,” are easily confused and are incapable 
of taking context into account. filters that 
classify based on images are even worse, and 
are easily fooled by flesh-colored pictures of 
pigs, pudding, and Barbie dolls. 
115  a decision reversed by the Supreme court, but not because 
of any disagreement with the district court’s fact-findings 
regarding the operation of internet filters; see the introduc-
tion, pages 3-4.
116  expert report of Geoffrey nunberg in American Library 
Ass’n v. United States.
next, nunberg explained that, in an effort 
to keep up with web sites’ changing names 
and reduce the number of pages they have to 
review, filtering manufacturers often block 
sites by their ip addresses instead of names, 
and block whole sites after reviewing only a 
handful of their pages. These shortcuts lead to 
substantial overblocking because a single ip 
address can correspond to multiple web sites, 
not all of them necessarily “objectionable,” 
and because sites that contain a few “objec-
tionable” pages may contain thousands of 
“acceptable” ones. he added that filters usu-
ally block language translation, anonymizer, 
and web caching sites because, as a side effect 
of their operation, such sites can be used to 
bypass filters.117
finally, nunberg said that the use of human 
reviewers is inherently limited. despite filter 
manufacturers’ claims to the contrary, it is im-
possible for all of the sites on filters’ block lists 
to be reviewed individually. Moreover, there 
are numerous errors even among the sites that 
are hand-screened because the people hired to 
review sites are often poorly trained and more 
concerned with blocking anything that might 
offend some of their customers than with 
avoiding overblocking. he also pointed to 
instances in which screeners have deliberately 
blocked sites critical of filters.
nunberg noted, among examples of wrong-
ly blocked sites: an article on “compulsive hair 
pulling” on a health information site, blocked 
by n2h2, probably because other articles on 
the site pertained to sexual health; a bulletin 
board called “penismightier.com,” blocked by 
n2h2 and Smartfilter, probably because an 
automatic text filter detected the word “penis” 
in the site name; and an article on Salon.com 
criticizing Bess, which nunberg thought was 
probably blocked by n2h2 deliberately. 
nunberg pointed out that there is always 
a tradeoff between efficiency in blocking 
117  See Benjamin edelman’s separate study on this issue,  
page 64.
One filter gave high “porn 
scores” to images of sheep,  
dogs, and penguins.
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presumably offensive sites and overblocking 
of valuable sites. Because they are such crude 
tools, filters designed to minimize overblock-
ing will also be less effective at the job they are 
supposed to do. 
nunberg concluded that it is impossible 
for filters to get much better. computerized 
classifiers lack the knowledge and human 
experience that are crucial to comprehending 
the meaning of texts. computers certainly 
lack the subjective judgment to understand a 
legal definition of obscenity that even human 
beings cannot agree on. finally, the sheer size 
of the internet makes it impossible to replace 
automatic classification with human screen-
ers. in fact, nunberg observed that the entire 
staffs of all the filter manufacturers combined 
could not review the new sites that are added 
every day, let alone classify every site on the 
web.
initial report of plaintiffs’ expert Benjamin 
edelman (oct. 15, 2001)
Benjamin edelman, a systems administra-
tor and multimedia specialist at harvard’s 
Berkman center for internet and Society, 
tested cyber patrol, n2h2, Smartfilter, and 
webSenSe against a list of nearly 500,000 
urls that he collected.118  
edelman collected the urls, first, by 
gathering a substantial portion of those listed 
in the yahoo! directory under nonporno-
graphic categories such as “arts,” “business 
and economy,” “education,” and “govern-
ment.” he expanded this list by locating 
similar sites using Google’s “related” function; 
and adjusted it based on recommendations 
from the plaintiffs’ attorneys. he then used 
an automated system to run this list through 
118  This figure is not mentioned in edelman’s report, but it 
appears in the district court opinion, 201 f. Supp. 2d at 
442. The filters tested were: cyber patrol 6.0.1.47; n2h2 
internet filtering 2.0; Smartfilter 3.0.0.01; and webSenSe 
enterprise 4.3.0. edelman also gave an overview of the 
design and operation of internet filters, mentioning several 
of the flaws that Geoffrey nunberg also discussed.
each of the filters, and recorded which web 
pages were blocked. he configured each of the 
filters to block sites that contained “adult con-
tent,” “nudity,” “sex,” and “pornography.” he 
updated the filters’ block lists before running 
them and archived a copy of each blocked site 
as it appeared when it was tested. This process 
yielded a list of 6,777 pages blocked by at 
least one of the four filters. portions of this list 
were then given to plaintiffs’ experts Joseph 
Janes and anne lipow for analysis.
edelman’s results showed very little agree-
ment among the filters on which content 
should be blocked. only 398 web pages out 
of 6,777 were blocked by all four of the filters, 
and the vast majority—5,390—were blocked 
by only one. n2h2 was the most restrictive, 
blocking nearly 5,000 pages as compared to 
the other three filters, which blocked between 
1,500 and 2,200. in fact, n2h2 blocked 
nearly 3,000 sites that were not blocked by 
any other filter.
edelman also offered insights gleaned from 
depositions of filter company representa-
tives that were taken in preparation for the 
cipa trial. The representatives admitted that 
despite studies indicating that effective human 
screening of the web would require a staff of 
thousands, their companies each employed 
8-40 screeners, some of whom only worked 
part-time. The representatives also admitted 
that their companies almost never reexamine 
sites they have already classified, and rarely 
evaluate the accuracy of their employees’ 
ratings. and despite some manufacturers’ 
continuing claims that every site they block 
has been evaluated by a human screener, an 
n2h2 official admitted that sites classified as 
pornography by its automatic classification 
system are often added to its block list with-
out review. edelman’s own research confirmed 
this lack of human review: for example, “red 
hot Mama event productions” was blocked 
by Smartfilter and cyber patrol, and www.
the-strippers.com, a furniture varnish removal 
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service, was blocked by cyber patrol and 
webSenSe.
report of plaintiffs’ expert Joseph Janes  
(oct. 15, 2001) 
Joseph Janes, a professor at the university 
of washington, was asked to determine how 
many of the 6,775119 sites that plaintiffs’ expert 
Benjamin edelman found to be blocked by 
four internet filters contained material that 
belonged in libraries. Janes and 16 reviewers 
recruited from the university’s information 
School, five of whom had extensive experience 
in building library collections and 11 of whom 
had less experience, evaluated a randomly 
selected sample of 699 of the blocked sites.
Janes divided the 699-site sample into 
groups of about 80 sites each, and ensured 
that each group was evaluated by two of the 
less experienced judges. if both of these judges 
agreed that a site belonged in libraries, the site 
was considered appropriate. otherwise, it was 
submitted to the more experienced judges, 
who then made a final decision on its appro-
priateness.
to be considered appropriate, a site had to 
contain information:
• similar to that already found in libraries;
• that a librarian would want to have, given 
unlimited space and funds; or 
• that a librarian would recommend to a 
patron who appeared at the reference desk. 
The judges were told to consider sites with 
only erotic content to be inappropriate, and 
sites that were primarily commercial in nature 
to be appropriate.
Janes’s judges concluded that 474, or 68% 
of the 699 sites sampled, contained material 
that belonged in libraries. extrapolating to the 
6,775 total blocked sites, Janes concluded that 
65-71% of them were wrongly blocked. 
119  not 6,777 because of errors in data processing. See Initial 
Report of Benjamin Edelman, 9.
even taking into account some valid criti-
cisms of Janes’s methods, the district court 
credited his study “as confirming that edel-
man’s set of 6,775 web sites contains at least 
a few thousand urls that were erroneously 
blocked by one or more of the four filtering 
programs” that were tested.120
report of plaintiffs’ expert anne lipow 
“web-Blocking internet Sites: a Summary  
of findings” (oct. 12, 2001)
anne lipow, a consultant and former librar-
ian, was asked to determine how many of a 
sample of 204 sites contained material that a 
librarian would either want to have, or would 
be willing to recommend to a patron. The 
sample was taken from edelman’s list of 6,777 
sites blocked by one or more of the filters he 
tested.121
lipow examined the home page and sev-
eral other pages on each site; then put them 
into one of four categories: (a) high quality 
information that a librarian would want in 
a library; (B) useful information, but that 
would not be included in a library collection 
because of limited usefulness to most patrons; 
(c) information of lower quality or having 
authors with questionable credentials, but 
that still might be useful to a library patron 
if nothing else were available or if the patron 
were doing comprehensive research; and (d) 
sites inappropriate for children.
of the 204 sites in the sample, lipow 
deemed only one, cyberiron Bodybuild-
ing and powerlifting, to be inappropriate for 
120  American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. Supp. 2d at 445. The 
district court gave numerous examples of such wrongly 
blocked sites (see the introduction, pages 3-4).
121  The district court decision mentions another librarian, 
Michael ryan, who reviewed a list of 204 sites that edelman 
forwarded to him to evaluate “their appropriateness and 
usefulness in a library setting.” The court said that both 
ryan’s and lipow’s evaluations were not statistically relevant 
because the sites they reviewed weren’t randomly selected, 
but that nevertheless, the testimony of both librarians 
“established that many of the erroneously blocked sites that 
edelman identified would be useful and appropriate sources 
of information for library patrons.” 201 f. Supp. 2d at 444 
n.17. 
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children. her 49 category a sites included 
the willis-Knighton cancer center depart-
ment of radiation oncology and a guide to 
internet searching. her 70 category B sites 
included a Southern california animal rescue 
organization and the Southern alberta fly 
fishing outfitters. in category c, she placed 
74 sites, including one offering menstruation 
information but not authored by an expert, 
and another advertising a Manhattan podia-
try group. lipow concluded that virtually all 
of the sites in her sample had been wrongly 
blocked.
report of defendants’ expert cory finnell 
(oct. 15, 2001) 
cory finnell of certus consulting Group 
evaluated the filters used by public libraries 
in tacoma, washington, westerville, ohio, 
and Greenville, South carolina by examining 
their usage logs. finnell believed this method 
was more accurate than many earlier studies 
because it was based on web sites that library 
patrons actually sought rather than sites that 
researchers thought they would seek. howev-
er, finnell acknowledged that his results could 
be skewed because library patrons, knowing 
that filters were installed, might have refrained 
from seeking controversial sites.
finnell collected tacoma’s cyber patrol 
usage logs for august 2001;westerville’s 
webSenSe logs for october 1-3, 2001; 
and Greenville’s n2h2 logs for august 2-
15, 2001. he computed the overblocking 
rate for each of the filters by, first, reducing 
each blocked web page listed in the logs to 
the host that contained the page. Thus, for 
example, if the log showed blocked requests 
for www.fepproject.org/issues/internet.html, 
www.fepproject.org/issues/sexandcens.html, 
and www.fepproject.org/news/news.html, 
finnell would reduce all three requests to 
www.fepproject.org. This meant that finnell 
was undercounting the actual number of 
blocked pages.
Second, he examined the default page of 
each blocked host and sometimes a sample of 
the host’s other pages (although not neces-
sarily the pages that the library patrons had 
tried to visit), to determine whether the pages’ 
content was consistent with the filter’s block-
ing criteria. Then, for each filter, he computed 
overblocking as the percentage of incorrect 
blocks—what paul resnick and his colleagues 
term the “blocked-sites overblock rate.”122 
finally, finnell checked to see whether any 
of the incorrect blocks had been corrected in 
newer versions of the filters’ block lists, and 
calculated separate figures that took these cor-
rections into account. he computed under-
blocking rates for webSenSe and n2h2 the 
same way, arriving at an “unblocked-sites un-
derblock rate,” to use resnick’s terminology. 
finnell determined that for tacoma’s cyber 
patrol, 53 out of the 836 blocked hosts were 
errors, for an overblocking rate of around 6%. 
for westerville’s webSenSe, 27 out of the 
185 blocks were wrong—an overblocking rate 
of about 15%—and one out of 159 unblocked 
hosts should have been blocked, for an under-
blocking rate of less than 1%. when he took 
webSenSe’s updated block list into account, 
the overblocking and underblocking rates 
dropped to around 13% and 0%. finally, he 
decided that 154 out of the 1,674 hosts that 
Greenville’s n2h2 blocked were incorrect, for 
an overblocking rate of about 9%; and three 
of the 254 unblocked hosts should have been 
blocked, for an underblocking rate of around 
1%. taking n2h2’s updates into account, he 
reduced their overblocking and underblocking 
rates to about 5% and less than 1% respec-
tively.
in a rebuttal report, Geoffrey nunberg 
harshly criticized finnell’s methods, especially 
his decision to reduce the individual page re-
quests in the usage logs to the hosts that con-
tain them. nunberg pointed out that treating 
multiple requests for pages on a single host as 
122 See page 45 for a description of resnick’s article.
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a single request distorts the test results because 
whether a host is requested one time or 40 
times, it will only be counted once for the 
purposes of computing over- and underblock-
ing. numerous different pages on the wrongly 
blocked hosts were requested, producing 
actual overblocking rates for the tacoma and 
westerville filters of more than 50%.123 
nunberg also noted that finnell did not 
specify how many raters he used, how they 
were trained, or what was done if they dis-
agreed.  he pointed out that many of the sites 
in the Greenville logs that finnell classified 
as “offensive” were in fact “innocuous”—for 
example, a company that sells internet retail-
ing software packages, an icelandic internet 
service provider, and The Journal of Contem-
porary Obituaries. This led nunberg to doubt 
that finnell examined all of the sites that he 
claimed to have rated. finally, nunberg criti-
cized finnell’s decision to correct the original 
overblocking and underblocking figures by 
using the filter manufacturers’ updated block 
lists because although updated lists may cor-
rect some errors, they are liable to introduce 
others. accounting for these misclassifications, 
nunberg found the overblocking rate for 
Greenville’s n2h2 filter was at least 20%—
twice what finnell had calculated. 
finnell’s method of calculating overblock-
ing, as the percentage of a filter’s blocks that 
are incorrect, is also problematic. as resnick 
et al. explained, this figure does not indicate 
the degree to which a filter limits library 
patrons’ access to particular kinds of informa-
tion. even if most of a filter’s blocks are cor-
rect, it could still wrongly block an unaccept-
able percentage of sites of a particular kind, 
such as health education.
his method of computing underblock-
ing, as the percentage of unblocked sites 
that should have been blocked, is even more 
deeply flawed. The problem with this measure 
123  Expert Rebuttal Report of Geoffrey Nunberg in American 
Library Ass’n v. United States, 19-20.
is that the more “innocuous” web sites that 
are included in the test set, the lower the un-
derblocking rate will be. for example, imagine 
a filter that is incapable of blocking anything. 
if the filter is evaluated using a test set com-
prised of one “offensive” site and 99 “innocu-
ous” sites, the underblocking rate, according 
to finnell’s method, would be only 1%. Since 
it is likely that most of the library patrons in 
finnell’s study were not searching for por-
nography, the vast majority of the unblocked 
sites in the usage logs were likely “innocuous.” 
as a result, the filters’ underblocking rates, 
computed using finnell’s method, were likely 
to be low regardless of how badly the filters 
actually performed.
etesting labs, Updated Web Content Filtering 
Software Comparison (report prepared under 
contract from the u.S. department of Justice, 
oct. 2001) 
The department of Justice (doJ) commis-
sioned etesting labs to evaluate five filters 
according to their ability to block images that 
meet the “harmful to minors” definition in the 
cipa law. The researchers, led by defendants’ 
expert chris lemmons,124 also assessed the fil-
ters’ mistaken blocking of “acceptable” content.
lemmons began by compiling a list of 197 
“objectionable” sites that he thought porno-
graphic and 99 sites that he deemed “accept-
able” but potentially confusing to filters. he 
collected “objectionable” sites by entering the 
phrase “free adult sex” into a popular search 
engine, “randomly” visiting some of the sites 
that were returned by the search, and then 
placing on the objectionable list those sites 
that he believed met the doJ’s criteria. he 
then surfed to other “objectionable” sites by 
following hyperlinks, and added some of these 
to the list. finally, he extracted additional 
pornography-related keywords from the ob-
124  as identified by the district court, 201 f. Supp. 2d at 437. 
The filters tested by doJ were Smartfilter 3.01; cyber pa-
trol for education 6.0; webSenSe enterprise 4.3.0; n2h2 
internet filtering, version not specified; and foolproof 
SafeServer, version not specified.
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jectionable sites already collected, entered the 
keywords into the search engine, and added 
some of the resulting sites to the list. he used 
a similar combination of searches, surfing, and 
keywords to compile the list of “acceptable” 
sites.
as resnick et al. point out, this method of 
collecting sites is not repeatable and is subject 
to bias. although lemmons claimed to have 
“randomly” selected the sites on the “objec-
tionable” and “acceptable” lists, his samples 
were not statistically random but were influ-
enced by the sites and hyperlinks that caught 
his and fellow researchers’ attention while they 
were surfing the web. The district court lev-
eled a similar criticism: the selection method 
“is neither random nor does it necessarily 
approximate the universe of web pages that 
library patrons visit.”125
The doJ specified which settings should be 
used for each filter. Since none of the filters 
had settings that matched cipa’s definitions, 
the doJ picked the settings that it thought 
most closely matched: for Smartfilter, the “ex-
treme/obscene/violent” and “sex” categories; 
for cyber patrol, “adult/sexually explicit”; for 
webSenSe, the “sex” subcategory of “adult 
materials”; for SafeServer, “pornography”; and 
for n2h2, “pornography,” with exceptions 
for sites categorized as “education,” “history,” 
“medical,” and “text/spoken only.”
after testing the filters against the two lists 
of sites, lemmons computed the percent of 
“objectionable” sites that each filter blocked. 
he found that n2h2, Smartfilter, and 
webSenSe blocked more than 90% of the 
“objectionable” sites, while cyber patrol and 
SafeServer blocked 83% and 76% respectively. 
as for overblocking, he found that web-
SenSe did not block any of the “acceptable” 
sites, while n2h2 blocked only one. cyber 
patrol, Smartfilter, and SafeServer blocked 
6%, 7%, and 9% respectively. examples of 
incorrectly blocked sites included an Std 
125 American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. Supp. 2d at 437-48.
information site for teenagers, a list of web 
resources for lesbians, the web site of a sexual 
abstinence education program, an online 
condom store, the web site of Schick and 
wilkinson brand razors, a list of web re-
sources aimed at african-american women, 
and a site discussing the Bible’s position on 
homosexuality.
plaintiffs’ expert Geoffrey nunberg lev-
eled numerous criticisms at the etesting labs 
report. he contended that the results were 
unrealistic because the researchers did not 
make any effort to ensure that different types 
of sites appeared on their lists in the same 
proportions as they do on the web. like other 
commenters, nunberg also chastised etesting 
for not specifying what standards its raters 
used to judge sites as objectionable or accept-
able, how many raters were used, and how 
difficult-to-classify sites were handled.126
rebuttal report of plaintiffs’ expert Benjamin 
edelman (nov. 30, 2001) 
edelman elaborated on the flaws of internet 
filters and leveled specific criticisms against 
the studies of etesting labs and cory finnell.
The first flaw was filters’ inability to block 
content from sources outside the web, such 
as email and streaming video. edelman tested 
the same four filters that he examined for his 
initial report—cyber patrol, n2h2, Smart-
filter, and webSenSe—and found that none 
stopped him from receiving sexually explicit 
images through email. he also found that 
although the filters blocked access to most of 
the web sites he visited containing links to 
sexually explicit videos, he could view those 
videos if he typed their urls directly into a 
video player program.
like nunberg, edelman criticized etest-
ing labs’s decision to focus on sites that they 
deemed likely to confuse filters. he argued 
that this method significantly understates 
overblocking because it excludes whole cat-
126 Expert Rebuttal Report of Geoffrey Nunberg, 1-11. 
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egories of sites that filters wrongly block for 
no apparent reason. examples from edelman’s 
test set included the Southern alberta fly 
fishing outfitters, blocked by n2h2 and 
webSenSe, and action for police account-
ability, blocked by n2h2, Smartfilter, cyber 
patrol, and webSenSe.
also like nunberg, edelman contended that 
because etesting used a search engine to com-
pile a list of sites to test, its results were biased 
by the search engine’s method of ranking web 
pages. Search engine results are skewed toward 
popular sites, especially among the first few 
hundred hits. Since internet filters use meth-
ods similar to search engines to compile their 
block lists, they are likely better at blocking 
popular sexually explicit sites than they are 
at blocking obscure ones. consequently, if 
etesting collected most of its test sites from 
the first few hundred hits returned by Google, 
its results would overstate filters’ effectiveness 
because its test set would be comprised of just 
the sort of sites that filters are best at blocking.
to test this theory, edelman searched 
Google for “free adult sex” and collected 795 
results. he then tested these sites against the 
four filters he had examined in his initial 
report and found that they were better at 
blocking the first hundred than subsequent 
results. on average, the filters blocked 86% 
of hits 1-100, but only 79% of hits 701-795. 
in fact, the filters only performed as well 
as etesting had claimed on the first 50 hits 
and significantly worse thereafter. edelman 
concluded that, despite its claims to the 
contrary, etesting generally did not examine 
search results beyond the first 50 hits.
finally, edelman criticized finnell for 
adjusting the results of his analysis using 
updated versions of the filters’ block lists be-
cause although the updated lists might have 
corrected some errors, they were liable to 
introduce new ones. it was wrong, he argued, 
for finnell to assume that just because filter 
manufacturers had corrected some errors, the 
overall performance of filters had improved.
Supplemental report of plaintiffs’ expert  
Benjamin edelman (Mar. 13, 2002) 
Several months after submitting his initial 
report, edelman retested three of the four 
filters he had initially examined—n2h2, cy-
ber patrol, and webSenSe—to see whether 
they continued to block the sites they had 
blocked in his initial study. he found that 
n2h2 continued to block 55% of these 
sites, while webSenSe continued to block 
76%. By contrast, cyber patrol only contin-
ued to block 7%. That is, cyber patrol had 
unblocked 93% of the sites on edelman’s 
list. The district court found that this behav-
ior constituted an admission that thousands 
of pages had been wrongly blocked.127
two Reports by Peacefire 
“More Sites found Blocked by cyber patrol” 
(Jan. 2002)
peacefire found numerous web sites wrong-
ly blocked by cyber patrol. These included 
the religious organizations catholic Students 
association and hillel of Silicon valley; the 
youth organizations aleh (which provides 
medical care to disabled children in israel), 
acorn community enterprises, and the va-
riety club of Queensland; the environmental 
and animal rights groups universal ecology 
foundation, columbia river eco-law en-
forcement, and South carolina awareness and 
rescue for equines; the gay and lesbian issue 
sites parents, families, and friends of lesbians 
and Gays and lesbian and Gay psychotherapy 
127 American Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 f. Supp. 2d at 443.
The more “innocuous” Web sites 
that are included in the test set, 
the lower the underblocking 
rate will be.
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of los angeles; and other sites including 
adoption links worldwide, and first day 
of School america (a site promoting parental 
involvement in schools). all were blocked as 
“sexually explicit.”
peacefire concluded that, given these errors, 
cyber patrol’s original claim that all sites on 
its block list were hand-reviewed was not 
credible. it noted that the claim “no longer 
appears on their web page.”
“webSenSe examined” (2002)
peacefire reported that webSenSe wrongly 
blocked, as “sex,” KinderGarten.org (an orga-
nization funding free vaccinations for children 
in india); the navarra, Spain chapter of the 
red cross; and Keep nacogdoches Beautiful 
(a site devoted to cleaning up nacogdoches, 
texas), among others. it blocked autism Be-
havioural intervention Queensland, as “gam-
bling,” and the Shoah project (a holocaust 
remembrance site), as “racism/hate,” possibly 
because it includes the names of prominent 
holocaust deniers. 
peacefire also recounted an experiment it 
undertook to determine whether webSenSe 
is biased in favor of large, well-known orga-
nizations. it took anti-gay quotes from the 
web sites of four prominent groups with 
homophobic viewpoints,128 and posted them 
to four small sites that were hosted at no cost 
by companies like Geocities. it then used 
anonymous email accounts to submit the 
free pages to webSenSe’s manufacturer for 
review without revealing the sources of the 
quotes. in response, the manufacturer agreed 
to block three of the sites as “hate speech,” but 
when it was told that the quotes on the small 
sites came from prominent conservative sites 
that its filter did not block, it refused to block 
the prominent sites.
128  The groups were: the family research council, focus on 
the family, the official dr. laura web page, and concerned 
women for america. for details of the experiment and the 
quotes used, see www.peacefire.org/BaitandSwitch/ (visited 
2/16/06).
two Reports by Seth Fnkelsten
“BeSS vs. image Search engines” (Mar. 2002)
This short article documented Bess’s whole-
sale blocking of popular image search engines 
that can be used to find both “objectionable” 
and “unobjectionable” content. with only its 
“pornography,” “nudity,” or “swimsuit” cat-
egories activated, Bess blocked Google, lycos, 
ditto.com, altavista, and alltheweb image 
searches. 
Bess now categorizes these sites as “search” 
or “visual search engine.”129 Because of their 
ability to display both pornographic and 
nonpornographic thumbnails, image search 
engines continue to cause difficulty for 
filters. 
“BeSS’s Secret loophole” (aug. 2001, revised 
and updated nov. 2002)
This article describes how Bess, like other 
popular filters, blocks anonymization, trans-
lation, htMl validation, and “dialectizer” 
sites that contain no “objectionable” material 
simply because, as a side effect of their opera-
tion, the sites can be used to circumvent 
filters. That is, by routing requests through 
these sites, users can hide the requests from 
filters. 
Thus, Bess blocked the anonymization sites 
anonymizer.com, idzap, and Megaproxy; the 
language translation sites Google translate, 
Babel fish, and dictionary.com translation 
service; the htMl validation services any-
browser.com and delorie Software web page 
purifier; and the humorous “dialectizer” sites 
“Smurf the web!” and “Jar-Jargonizer.” at the 
time finkelstein published this article, Bess’s 
blocking of these so-called “loophole” sites 
was completely undocumented and could not 
be disabled. That has since changed, but Bess’s 
manufacturer warns that “unless this category 
[i.e. loophole sites] is selected, the system’s 
129  Bess’s categorizations were verified using the BeSS url 
checker located at database.n2h2.com/cgi-perl/catrpt.pl 
(visited 6/30/05).
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internet content filtering protection can be 
compromised.”130
The Kaser Famly Foundaton: 
blockng of Health informaton 
caroline richardson, et al., “does por-
nography-Blocking Software Block access to 
health information on the internet?” 288:22 
Journal of the American Medical Association 
2887-94 (dec. 11, 2002); summarized in 
victoria rideout, caroline richardson, & 
paul resnick, See No Evil: How Internet Filters 
Affect the Search for Online Health Information 
(Kaiser family foundation, dec. 2002)
in response to studies showing that ado-
lescents are increasingly using the internet to 
find health information, researchers under 
contract with the henry J. Kaiser family 
foundation investigated the degree to which 
filters designed to block pornography also 
prevent teenagers from accessing information 
on several health topics. They tested six filters 
commonly used in schools and libraries, and 
one designed for home use,131 against a list of 
health sites that they believed would be of in-
terest to teenagers. They also tested the filters’ 
efficiency at blocking pornographic sites.
The researchers collected their list of sites 
both by simulating adolescents’ search habits 
and by consulting the health site recommen-
dations for teenagers in the online directo-
ries of yahoo! and Google. to simulate teen 
searching habits, they chose five categories 
of content: “(1) health topics unrelated to 
sex (e.g. diabetes); (2) health topics involving 
sexual body parts, but not sex-related (e.g. 
breast cancer); (3) health topics related to sex 
(for example, pregnancy prevention); (4) con-
troversial health topics (e.g. abortion); and (5) 
130  See the description of the “p2p/loopholes” category at 
www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=1379 (visited 
3/11/06).
131  The six filters commonly used in schools or libraries were: 
Smartfilter 3.0.1; 8e6 filter 4.5; webSenSe 4.3.1; cyber 
patrol SuperScout 4.1.0.8; Symantec web Security 2.0; and 
n2h2 filter 2.1.4. The filter commonly used in homes was 
america online parental controls.
pornography.” for each category, they chose 
six frequently used search terms from the 
search engine logs of overture.com and excite 
and entered them into six search engines 
popular among teenagers. The simulation of 
teenagers’ search behavior yielded 3,987 sites, 
of which the raters concluded that 2,467 
contained health information, 516 contained 
pornography, and 1,004 contained neither. 
The search of yahoo! and Google online 
directories produced 586 health sites recom-
mended for teens. 
to evaluate the sites they collected, the 
researchers employed two raters who each 
explored 60% of the sites and assigned them 
ratings of “health information,” “pornogra-
phy,” or “other.” in an attempt to be consis-
tent with u.S. obscenity law, they considered 
a site pornographic if it depicted genitals or a 
sexual act, if it seemed designed to appeal to a 
prurient interest, and if it did not appear to be 
educational or scientific.132 
The school and library filters were tested 
using three different levels of blocking. The 
“least restrictive” configuration generally 
was designed to block only pornography. 
The “intermediate” setting was supposed to 
block sites dealing with illegal drugs, nudity, 
and weapons in addition to pornography. 
The third and most restrictive configuration 
included all of the categories that “might plau-
sibly be blocked” in a school or library. for 
aol parental controls, the researchers tested 
two configurations: its moderately restrictive 
configuration for mature teens and its very 
restrictive configuration for young teens.
The results overall showed, first, that how 
a filter is configured has a big impact on the 
number of health information sites that are 
erroneously blocked; and second, that using 
a more restrictive configuration does little to 
132  on the u.S. Supreme court’s standard for illegal “obscen-
ity,” see the introduction, page 2; see also free expression 
policy project, Fact Sheet on Sex and Censorship (n.d.). 
pornography is not a legal term, and is not the same as 
obscenity under the law.
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improve a filter’s ability to block pornography, 
while dramatically increasing the number of 
health sites that are wrongly blocked.
on their least restrictive settings, the six fil-
ters common in schools and libraries blocked 
an average of 87% of the pornographic sites 
and of 1.4%, overall, of the health informa-
tion sites. when filtering was increased to 
the “intermediate” level, the blocking rate for 
pornography only increased to 90%, while 
the blocking rate for health information 
increased to over 5%. at the most restrictive 
configuration, the blocking rate for porno-
graphy inched up to 91% while the blocking 
rate for health information reached 24%. The 
researchers observed similar results for aol 
parental controls.
examples of erroneous blocks on the filters’ 
least restrictive settings (i.e., ostensibly only 
blocking pornography) included a health 
information site for gays and lesbians, a sex 
education site run by columbia university, 
a site discussing sexually transmitted diseases 
run by the national institute of allergy and 
infectious diseases, and an online condom 
store. on the intermediate blocking level, 
the errors, according to the authors, included 
a lung cancer information site, a directory 
of suicide prevention telephone hotlines, 
planned parenthood, and a Spanish-language 
herpes information site sponsored by the 
children’s hospital in Boston. on the most 
restrictive settings, the blocks that the authors 
considered erroneous included the american 
academy of pediatrics’ “woman’s Guide to 
Breastfeeding,” the Journal of the American 
Medical Association’s women’s health Std 
information center, and the sites of the depo 
provera birth control company, the national 
campaign to prevent teen pregnancy, the 
american Society of clinical oncology, and 
the u.S. center for disease control’s diabe-
tes public health resources.
Since the average overblocking rate at the 
least restrictive configurations was just 1.4% 
for all health sites, the researchers concluded 
that filtering products set at their least restric-
tive settings are only a minor impediment 
to teens’ ability to find information on most 
health topics, especially compared to other 
factors such as “spelling errors, limited search 
skills, and [the] uneven quality of search en-
gines.”133 But the 1.4% error rate may be mis-
leading. Some of the blocked sites might have 
had information not available elsewhere; and 
even a seemingly low error rate, when applied 
to the internet, could amount to thousands of 
wrongly blocked health sites.
Moreover, even on their least restrictive 
settings, the filters erroneously blocked 
roughly 10% of the nonpornographic sites 
returned by searches on controversial top-
ics such as “safe sex,” “condom,” and “gay.” 
with the intermediate configuration, the 
blocking rate for the nonpornographic sites 
on these topics was 20-25%, and on the 
most restrictive configuration, that figure 
rose to 50-60%. 
in addition to computing the average block-
ing rate at each of three levels, the research-
ers calculated the percentage of sites at each 
level that were blocked by at least one filter. 
These figures were substantially higher than 
the average blocking rates. for example, at the 
least restrictive blocking level, 5% of health 
information sites were blocked by at least one 
filter, and on the most restrictive, that num-
ber was 63%. 33% of the nonpornographic 
health sites returned by a search for the term 
“safe sex” were blocked by at least one filter 
even at the least restrictive blocking level, and 
91% were blocked by at least one filter at the 
most restrictive level. although these figures 
don’t indicate how any of the individual filters 
performed, the disparities between average 
and the cumulative blocking rates show how 
greatly filters disagree about exactly what 
should be blocked. 
133 rideout et al., exec. Summary, 12. 
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in light of their findings about the impor-
tance of a filter’s configuration, the researchers 
argue that the choice of settings should not be 
left to network administrators and should be 
considered a policy decision that is at least as 
important as the decision to install internet 
filters in the first place.
reactions to this study varied. The Kai-
ser family foundation’s press release began: 
“The internet filters most frequently used 
by schools and libraries can effectively block 
pornography without significantly imped-
ing access to online health information—but 
only if they aren’t set at their most restrictive 
levels.”134 The foundation’s Daily Reproductive 
Health Report, however, cited articles in the 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal that 
emphasized: “internet filters intended to block 
access to pornography on school and library-
based computers often block access to sites 
containing information on sexual health … 
among the sites blocked were a centers for 
disease control site on sexually transmitted 
diseases; a food and drug administration site 
on birth control failure rates; and a prince- 
ton university site on emergency contracep-
tion.” 135 one commentary described the 
study’s more dramatic findings—63% block-
ing of general health sites and 91% blocking 
of sexual health sites by at least one filter— in 
a way that suggested these were across-the-
board findings for searches of “sexually related 
materials.”136
134  Kaiser family foundation news release (dec. 10, 2002), 
www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/See-no-evil-how-internet-
filters-affect-the-Search-for-online-health-information-
news-release.pdf (visited 3/11/06).
135  Kaiser family foundation, Daily Reproductive Health Report 
(dec. 11, 2002), www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_
index.cfm?hint=2&dr_id=15033 (visited 3/28/05). 
136  paul Jaeger & charles Mcclure, “potential legal challenges 
to the application of the children’s internet protection act 
in public libraries,” First Monday (Jan. 16, 2004). The de-
scription is inaccurate for two reasons: first, the results that it 
quotes were only obtained at the most restrictive block-
ing level when the filters were configured to block several 
other categories of content in addition to “sexually related 
materials”; and second, the figures are cumulative, and don’t 
describe the performance of any single filter.
two Studes by the berkman  
center for internet and Socety
Benjamin edelman, “web Sites Sharing ip 
addresses: prevalence and Significance” (feb. 
2003) 
about a year after his testimony in the 
cipa case, edelman published a report on ip 
address filtering. when someone attempts to 
access a web site, the site’s domain name is 
first converted into a numerical internet pro-
tocol (or ip) address. These numbers identify 
the server that hosts the site. current technol-
ogy enables a single server with a single ip 
address to host more than one web site. 
This creates problems for internet filters 
because some filtering works by blocking the 
ip address of the server instead of blocking 
the domain name of the “offending” site. to 
gauge the scope of this potential overblocking, 
edelman sought to find out what percentage 
of the sites on the web share their server, and 
therefore their ip addresses, with other sites.
edelman collected the ip addresses of more 
than 20 million active web sites ending in 
“.com,” “.net,” and “.org,” and found that 
ip sharing was the rule, not the exception. 
The great majority—87%—of the sites shared 
their servers and ip addresses with at least one 
other site. 82% of the sites resided on servers 
that hosted at least five sites; 75% resided on 
servers that hosted at least 20; and 70% re-
sided on servers that hosted at least 50. often, 
the sites sharing an address had nothing to do 
with one another. for example, a server with 
the ip address 206.168.98.228 hosted both 
www.phone-sex-jobs.com and www.christian-
newswatch.com.
despite this showing that filtering based 
on ip addresses inevitably causes overblock-
ing, edelman noted that the technique is still 
widely used because it is less expensive than 
filtering based on domain names. he does not 
identify which products use ip-based filtering. 
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Benjamin edelman, “empirical analysis of 
Google SafeSearch” (apr. 2003)
a second study by edelman concerned 
the Google search engine feature SafeSearch, 
which screens for explicit sexual content. 
Google says that SafeSearch primarily uses an 
automated system instead of human review-
ers, and it readily admits that its system is 
inaccurate.137 although SafeSearch does not 
block users from accessing particular sites, its 
filtering of search results can prevent them 
from finding or even knowing about whole 
categories of content. 
edelman entered approximately 2,500 
search terms on a wide variety of topics, 
chosen in an ad hoc fashion, into Google’s 
web search and compared the results of unfil-
tered searches to those of searches conducted 
with SafeSearch. he found a total of 15,796 
distinct urls omitted from SafeSearch; in 
some instances, the entire corresponding site 
was excluded. it is not clear how many of the 
15,796 edelman considered errors; he wrote 
that his “[r]eporting focuses on urls likely 
to be wrongly omitted from SafeSearch, i.e. 
omitted inconsistent with stated blocking 
criteria” (that is, “explicit sexual content”). 
among the many pages without any ap-
parent sexual content that SafeSearch elimi-
nated were: u.S. government sites (congress.
gov, thomas.loc.gov, shuttle.nasa.gov); sites 
operated by other governments (hong Kong 
department of Justice, canadian northwest 
territories Minister of Justice, israeli prime 
Minister’s office); political sites (vermont re-
publican party, Stonewall democrats of aus-
tin, texas); news reports (from the New York 
Times, the BBc, C/net news, the Washington 
Post, and Wired); educational institutions (a 
chemistry class at Middlebury college, viet-
nam war materials at u.c.-Berkeley, and the 
university of Baltimore law School); and re-
137  SafeSearch is described in two sections of Google’s help 
site, www.google.com/help/customize.html#safe and www.
google.com/safesearch_help.html (visited 4/1/05).
ligious sites (the Biblical Studies foundation, 
Modern literal Bible, Kosher for passover). 
edelman observed that some of these sites 
“seemed to be blocked based on ambiguous 
words in their titles (like hardcore visual 
Basic programming),” but “most lacked any 
indication as to the rationale for exclusion.”
edelman also recorded the frequency of 
blocking when search results were unrelated 
to sex. in a search for “american newspapers 
of national scope,” SafeSearch excluded sites 
from among the top ten results 54% of time. 
it excluded sites from among the top ten re-
sults 23% of the time for searches on “ameri-
can presidents,” 20% of the time for searches 
on “most selective colleges and universities,” 
and 16% of the time for searches on “ameri-
can states and state capitals.” reviewing some 
of the excluded sites, edelman found that 
most were not sexually explicit.
for searches on more controversial topics 
such as sexual health, pornography, and gay 
rights, SafeSearch’s blocking seemed to be 
arbitrary. for example, in response to a search 
for “sexuality,” SafeSearch listed the Soci-
ety for the Scientific Study of Sexuality, but 
excluded the peer-reviewed Electronic Journal 
of Human Sexuality. in response to a search 
for “pornography,” it included a national 
academy of Sciences report on internet 
pornography, but omitted a book on the topic 
published by the national academies press.
despite Google’s claim that SafeSearch is 
only designed to block sexually explicit mate-
rial, edelman determined that it also excluded 
other controversial material. it omitted 
several sites advocating illegal drugs but also 
the white house office of national drug 
control policy. it also excluded gambling 
Even at their narrowest  
settings, filters block much  
more than CIPA requires.  
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sites; online term paper mills; sites that discuss 
pornography without exhibiting it such as the 
pittsburgh coalition against pornography; 
companies making internet filtering software; 
and edelman’s own reports on internet filter-
ing in china and Saudi arabia.
edelman discovered a quirk in SafeSearch’s 
design that might explain some of its over-
blocking. when Google explores the inter-
net, it makes a copy of the web pages that 
it encounters and stores them in a cache. 
Sometimes, though, the software fails to 
record a site in the cache—for example, when 
a web site operator indicates that she doesn’t 
want the site to be cached or when a site is 
temporarily unavailable. edelman learned, by 
consulting with Google staff, that SafeSearch 
excludes all sites that are missing from the 
cache even though their absence has noth-
ing to do with their content. out of his list 
of sites omitted by SafeSearch, he discovered 
that 27% were missing from Google’s cache. 
This suggests that many sites excluded by 
SafeSearch are blocked not because they 
meet Google’s blocking criterion, but simply 
because of SafeSearch’s design.
electronc Fronter Foundaton/
onlne Polcy Group Study
Internet Blocking in Public Schools: A Study  
on Internet Access in Educational Institutions 
(June 26, 2003) 
This study had two main purposes: to 
measure whether filters block material relevant 
to state-mandated school curricula, and to 
determine how well filters perform schools’ 
obligations, under cipa, to block visual im-
ages that are “obscene,” child pornography, or 
“harmful to minors.”
The researchers conducted web searches for 
topics taken directly from the K-12 curri-
cula of california, Massachusetts, and north 
carolina; then tested the two internet filters 
most popular in schools—Bess and Surfcon-
trol—against the resulting sites. retrieving up 
to 50 results from each search, they produced 
a list of nearly a million relevant web pages, 
including duplicates. 
for Bess, they used an existing installation 
at an unnamed public high school, and did 
not know which categories were activated, but 
“speculated” that they were “similar to those 
of many other schools.” on the other hand, 
they tested Surfcontrol against a “test tool” 
which a company representative assured them 
provided “the same results as the product sold 
to schools.”138 They tested Surfcontrol on its 
“core” configuration set to block 10 categories 
(“adult/sexually explicit”, “chat,” “criminal 
skills,” “drugs, alcohol & tobacco,” “gam-
bling,” “hacking,” “hate speech,” “violence,” 
“weapons,” and “web-based email”), as well 
as its “core plus” (the 10 core categories plus 
“glamour & intimate apparel,” “personals & 
dating,” and “sex education”); and an “all” 
configuration that blocked all Surfcontrol 
categories. 
The researchers did not examine every  
web page that they collected to determine 
whether or not it was correctly blocked or 
unblocked. instead, they examined random 
samples of approximately 300 sites each. 
The report does not specify how many raters 
evaluated the sites or whether their ratings 
agreed.
for the first measure of performance, the 
researchers concluded, not surprisingly, that 
the vast majority of blocked sites did not need 
to be blocked in order to comply with cipa. 
out of the more than 31,000 pages that Bess 
blocked, only 1%, they thought, fit cipa’s 
definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or 
“harmful to minors” images. even expanding 
cipa’s criteria to include nonvisual material, 
the researchers said that only 2% needed to be 
blocked.139 
138 Internet Blocking in Public Schools, 15.
139  Most of the pages blocked by Bess were not classified as 
“pornography” or “sex,” but fell into categories like “free 
pages” and “electronic commerce.” among the blocked pages 
that Bess classified as “pornography” or “sex,” the researchers 
concluded that only 6% fit cipa’s criteria.
Brennan center for Justice
as for Surfcontrol, the researchers deter-
mined that out of 3,522 pages blocked using 
the “core plus” configuration, only 3% fit 
cipa’s criteria (5% if text and not just images 
are included). of the blocked pages that Surf-
control classified as “adult/sexually explicit,” 
6% fit cipa’s criteria, in the researchers’ judg-
ment. 
The second measure of performance, the 
percentage of curriculum-relevant search 
results that each filter blocked, was reported 
both overall and by curriculum topic. Some of 
these sites were arguably within one or more 
of the filters’ broad blocking categories. for 
example, both filters blocked five web pages 
associated with a curriculum topic on the 
u.S. populist movement. The five pages all 
contained information on national Socialism, 
which was probably blocked as “hate/dis-
crimination” by n2h2 and as “hate speech” 
by Surfcontrol. 
among the many sites that the researchers 
thought Bess wrongly blocked, both because 
they were relevant to school curricula and 
because they had no visual depictions that 
would require blocking under cipa were: 
heroines of the revolutionary war, a site cre-
ated by a librarian for the use of 4th grade stu-
dents (blocked as “recreation/entertainment”); 
poetry-making and policy-making (miscat-
egorized as “pornography”); Maryland Mental 
health online and electrical & electronics, 
ohm’s law, formulas & equations (both 
miscategorized as “free pages”); and abraham 
lincoln inaugural address (miscategorized as 
“recreation/entertainment”).
examples of sites the authors said were 
wrongly blocked by Surfcontrol were: Social 
changes in Great Britain Before 1815 (mis-
characterized as “glamour and intimate appar-
el”); punctuation primer (blocked as “adult/
sexually explicit”—the authors suggest that 
“perhaps ‘period,’ as in menstruation, was the 
trigger”140); responding to arguments against 
140 Internet Blocking in Public Schools, 26.
comprehensive Sexuality education and oral 
contraceptive pill (both categorized correctly 
as “sex education,” but inappropriately filtered 
because they had “no visual depictions that 
would require blocking under cipa”); Mount 
olive township fraternal order of police: 
Mistreatment of the elderly (miscategorized 
as “adult/sexually explicit”; the page mentions 
sexual assault on elderly persons); and his-
tory, Science and consequences of the atomic 
Bomb (miscategorized as “weapons”).
turning to how well the filters’ performance 
matched the manufacturers’ blocking criteria, 
the study found that Bess misclassified 30% 
of the sites that it blocked, while Surfcontrol 
misclassified 55-66%. The researchers also 
report a number of instances where the filters 
did not block clearly pornographic sites.
This study demonstrates two points about 
filtering in schools. first, even at their nar-
rowest settings, filters block much more than 
cipa requires. Second, when schools go 
beyond cipa’s requirements, to activate such 
filter categories as weapons, drugs, gambling, 
hate speech, and electronic commerce, they 
end up blocking a great deal of material on 
school curriculum subjects.  
american rifleman
“internet filter Software Blocks only  
pro-Gun Sites” (nov. 2003)
This short article reported that the Syman-
tec internet Security filter blocks national 
rifle association sites under certain configura-
tions, but does not block the web site of the 
Brady center, which favors gun control. a 
Slashdot blogger reporting on this news did 
a follow-up test which confirmed that even 
the nra’s institute for legislative action was 
blocked, while anti-gun sites including“Good 
Bye Guns” were not.141
141  “Symantec Says no to pro-Gun Sites” (nov. 2, 
2003), yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/11/02/
1729239&mode=thread&tid=103&tid=153&tid=99 
(visited 2/10/06).
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colorado State lbrary
carson Block, A Comparison of Some Free 
Internet Content Filters and Filtering Methods 
(Jan. 2004)
The colorado State library tested six filters 
against 25 search terms to learn whether they 
blocked materials in legitimate library-selected 
research databases such as eBSco, the den-
ver public library’s western history collec-
tion, and access colorado library  
information network Best websites. four 
of the filters were either free or bundled at 
no additional cost with resources such as 
Google.com or internet explorer; and two 
were “for-pay filters” (cyber patrol and  
Smartfilter). 142
of the free filters, we-Blocker blocked 
research database materials when the search 
terms “incest,” “pierce,” “transsexual,” 
“whipped,” “teen,” and “wicca” were used. 
examples included health information on 
body piercing from Black entertainment 
television; dictionary definitions of “wicca”; 
and a review of the movie “whipped” from 
Rolling Stone magazine. “The family Browser” 
was more restrictive, blocking legitimate 
research materials when these terms as well as 
the following others were used: “cum,” “Sa-
tan,” “stud,” “tattoo,” “witchcraft,” “breast,” 
“nazi,” “aidS,” “beaver,” “gun,” “model,” and 
“pagan.” among the questionable blocks was a 
State of colorado wildlife site—because of the 
word “beaver.”
content advisor was by far the most 
restrictive, blocking access to materials using 
any of the 25 terms, regardless of how inno-
cent their context. This was because content 
advisor is essentially a whitelist: it only 
allows access to sites that have voluntarily 
self-rated.
142  The free filters were winnocence (free software from 
peacefire which has just three sites on its block list—Play-
boy, Hustler, and www.sex.com); we-Blocker, The family 
Browser, and content advisor (which is built into many 
browsers, including internet explorer).
cyber patrol blocked research database 
materials containing the words “cum,” “gun,” 
“incest,” “model,” “nazi,” “stud,” “bomb,” 
“pot,” and “teen.” for example, it blocked 
as “adult/sexually explicit” a list of magazine 
articles containing physical and mental health 
information for victims of incest; and, as 
“glamour and intimate apparel,” sites having 
nothing to do with glamour or intimate ap-
parel (the trigger word was “model”). 
Smartfilter did not block materials in any 
of the three library databases—probably, ac-
cording to the author, because it “is config-
ured to work with the fort collins public 
library.”143 
openNet intatve: Advsory 00
Unintended Risks and Consequences of  
Circumvention Technologies: The IBB’s  
Anonymizer Service in Iran (May 3, 2004)
opennet initiative is a joint project of 
the university of cambridge, england, the 
Munk centre for international Studies at 
the university of toronto, and the Berkman 
center at harvard. its aim is to “excavate, 
expose and analyze filtering and surveillance 
practices in a credible and non-partisan 
fashion.” although its research focuses on 
internet filtering by foreign governments 
such as Saudi arabia and china, one of its 
studies should be mentioned here because it 
involved a use of filtering technology by the 
u.S. government.
in 2003, the u.S. government’s interna-
tional Broadcasting Bureau (the iBB) cre-
ated a plan to give internet surfers in china 
and iran the ability to bypass their nations’ 
notoriously restrictive blocks on web sites 
such as BBc news, Mit, and amnesty inter-
national. But the iBB used technology that, 
as journalist declan Mccullagh reported, 
prevents surfers “from visiting web addresses 
that include a peculiar list of verboten key-
143 Block, exec. Summary, 9.
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words. The list includes ‘ass’ (which inad-
vertently bans usembassy.state.gov), ‘breast’ 
(breastcancer.com), ‘hot’ (hotmail.com and 
hotels.com), ‘pic’ (epic.noaa.gov) and ‘teen’ 
(teens.drugabuse.gov).”144 
The technology in question was anonymiz-
er, inc.’s built-in anti-pornography filter that 
included “trigger” keywords. in addition to 
usembassy.state.gov, according to the open-
net initiative report, blocked sites included 
www.georgebush.com, www.bushwatch.com, 
www.hotmail.com, hotwired.wired.com, 
www.teenpregnancy.com, www.tvguide.com, 
and www.arnold-schwarzenegger.com. 
Mccullough noted that if the government’s 
filter blocked only hard-core pornography, 
“few people would object.” instead, the filter 
revealed a conservative bias that included 
“gay” in its list of forbidden words—thereby 
blocking not only sites dealing with gay and 
lesbian issues but dioceseofGaylord.org, a 
roman catholic site. he quoted the presi-
dent of anonymizer as offering to unblock 
nonpornographic sites upon request by 
chinese or iranian ’net surfers, but as saying 
that “we have never been contacted with a 
complaint about overbroad blocking.”145
Rhode island Aclu 
amy Myrick, Reader’s Block: Internet Censor-
ship in Rhode Island Public Libraries (rhode 
island affiliate, american civil liberties 
union, apr. 2005) 
in the course of a 2004 survey conducted 
to learn how many rhode island librar-
ies were using filters,146 the aclu’s rhode 
island affiliate also collected evidence of over-
blocking. researchers found that the installed 
webSenSe filter blocked, among others, the 
official site of the photographer robert Map-
144  declan Mccullough, “u.S. Blunders with Keyword Black-
list,” C/net News (May 3, 2004). 
145 Id.
146  See a summary of the findings in the introduction,  
pages 5–6.
plethorpe, a men’s health site, an interview 
with actor peter Sellers on Playboy’s web site, 
and a Google search for “nudism.” 
Consumer reports
“filtering Software: Better, But Still fallible” 
(June 2005)
This article begins by asserting that filters 
are “better at blocking pornography than 
in recent years,” but “our evaluation of 11 
products, including the filters built into on-
line services aol and MSn, found that the 
software isn’t very effective at blocking sites 
promoting hatred, illegal drugs, or violence.” 
in addition, “as we found in our tests in 2001, 
the best blockers today tended to block many 
sites they shouldn’t.”147
The researchers created two lists—one 
consisting of objectionable sites “that anyone 
can easily find”; the other of “informational 
sites to test the filters’ ability to discern the 
objectionable from the merely sensitive.” They 
configured the filters as they thought the par-
ents of a 12-15 year-old would. They found 
that although filters “keep most, but not 
all, porn out,” the “best porn blockers were 
heavy-handed against sites about health issues, 
sex education, civil rights, and politics.” Seven 
products blocked “KeepandBeararms.com”; 
four blocked the national institute on drug 
abuse. Kidsnet was the worst, blocking 73% 
of useful sites.
“research can be a headache” with filters, 
the report concluded. “These programs may 
impede older children doing research for 
school reports. Seven block the entire results 
page of a Google or yahoo search if some 
links have objectionable words in them.” aol 
blocked newsMax, a conservative political 
site, and operation truth, an advocacy site for 
veterans of the iraq war.
147  among the 11 filters tested were aol, Kidsnet, cyBer-
sitter, norton internet Security, Safe eyes, and MSn. The 
online article did not give a complete list.
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experences of Hgh School  
Students conductng term  
Paper Research
lynn Sorenson Sutton, Experiences of High 
School Students Conducting Term Paper 
Research Using Filtered Internet Access (phd 
dissertation, Graduate School of wayne State 
university, 2005)
lynn Sutton, director of the wake for-
est university undergraduate library, studied 
the experience of students at a suburban 
high school using Bess. She focused on two 
classes—one consisting of 11th grade rhetoric 
students who were preparing for an advanced 
placement literature course in their senior 
year; the other, 10th-12th grade general 
composition students. Sutton contacted nine 
teachers who assigned research papers, but 
only two agreed to have their classes partici-
pate. Sutton used group interviews, emails 
with individual students, review of students’ 
journal entries, and observation of actual 
research activity to gather data. 
The school district’s director of technology 
told Sutton that Bess was being used at the 
default setting, with an option for staff to 
adjust the settings at their discretion. The de-
fault blocked “adults only,” “alcohol,” “chat,” 
“drugs” (but not the subcategory drug educa-
tion), “jokes,” and “lingerie.”
Sutton reported that students were frus-
trated, annoyed, and angered by the opera-
tion of the filter. a girl preparing a paper on 
the Motion picture association of america’s 
movie rating system was completely unable 
to do her research on the school’s computers. 
another girl was blocked from www.cannabis.
com and similar sites while researching the le-
galization of marijuana for medical purposes. 
a boy was blocked from accessing www.ncaa.
org while seeking information about college 
athletes. another student researching the sub-
ject of book banning was repeatedly blocked 
when using the search terms “corruption” and 
“banned.”
The students also reported instances of 
underblocking. The girl who was trying to re-
search the Mpaa rating system noted that she 
accidentally accessed a site offering porn mov-
ies, even while a large number of informative 
sites were blocked. She eventually completed 
her research on her unfiltered home computer. 
among Sutton’s other findings were that 
the majority of teachers and students did not 
know that they could ask for the filter to be 
disabled, or for wrongly blocked sites to be 
unblocked. The technology director was par-
ticularly ignorant of the problems caused by 
filtering, and out of touch with the situation 
at the school. as Sutton later told a meeting 
of the american association of School librar-
ians: too often “the technology director just 
installs the filter. he isn’t aware of the prob-
lems people are having. and no one ever tells 
him.”148
although the librarians, and some of the 
teachers, felt that filtering didn’t work, their 
input was not credited during the school’s 
decisionmaking process. during the study, the 
students offered many alternative suggestions 
for addressing concerns about unfiltered inter-
net access, “but sadly, they were never asked 
for input by their school.” The students, she 
concluded,
did not dismiss lightly societal concern 
for sexually explicit materials on school 
premises. They understood that some, 
presumably younger, children may 
need guidance in sorting out “bad” 
materials on the internet. But they 
resented a poorly conceived and disas-
trously implemented artificial device 
that prevented them from accessing 
needed information without any input 
148  as reported in corey Murray, “overzealous filters hinder 
research,” eSchool News Online (oct. 13, 2005). 
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into the decision or any effective way 
to redress inequity.149 
among the drawbacks of this study were its 
small sample size and limited scope. Sutton 
notes that this was a mostly white suburban 
school, most of whose students had internet 
access at home. The study group was self-se-
lected and the research was largely anecdotal. 
nevertheless, the study gives a vivid sense of 
the frustrations that filters cause for students.
Computing Which? Magazne 
“Software alone can’t create a Safe online 
playground” (aug. 30, 2005)
The British magazine ComputingWhich? 
reported that in its tests of seven popular fil-
ters,150 the software often failed to block por-
nographic and racist web sites. norton inter-
net Security and Microsoft’s MSn premium 
performed the worst, with scores of less than 
35% across a series of tests. The magazine’s 
editor commented: “Software can help make 
the internet a safer environment for children 
but there’s no substitute for parental involve-
ment. parents need to take an active role in 
monitoring what their children are looking at 
online so they don’t inadvertently put them at 
risk.”151
PamRotella.com: experences  
wth Prsm
pam rotella, “internet ‘protection’ (cipa) 
filtering out political criticism” (nov. 22, 
2005; updated nov. 23, 2005)152 
149 Sutton, 86-87.
150  The magazine’s press release gave the number as six, but then 
listed seven: net nanny 5.1, aol 9.0, cyber patrol 7, Mcafee 
internet Security Suite, MSn premium, norton internet Secu-
rity 2005, and MacoS X tiger. Computing Which? press release, 
“Software alone can’t create a Safe online playground” (aug. 
30, 2005). 
151  Id. The study was referenced in Bobbie Johnson, “nanny Soft-
ware ‘fails to protect’ children,” The Guardian, (aug. 30, 2005), 
and email release from yaman akdeniz to cyber-rights-uK@
cyber-right.org listserv (aug. 31, 2005).
152  rotella’s site gives the date as dec. 23 (wed.), but this ap-
pears to be a typo. 
pam rotella publishes a web site on vegan 
vegetarianism, nutrition, alternative medicine, 
and politics. in november 2005, she reported 
on her blog that she had been blocked from 
the political satire page presidentMoron.com 
at her local library.153 She received a message 
that the site was “adult political humor.” off 
to the side of the computer was a notice that 
the iprism filter had been installed in order 
to comply with cipa, and that patrons could 
request that the filter be turned off if they be-
lieved that sites had been erroneously blocked. 
rotella made the request, and the librarian 
unblocked this one site for one hour.
although presidentMoron.com vigorously 
criticizes the Bush administration, it is not 
sexually explicit. rotella wondered if “cipa is 
being used as a way of blocking political free 
speech”?
The next day, she returned to the library 
“and decided to try a few more political sites.” 
none had vulgar language but all were critical 
of the Bush administration. here’s what she 
found:
• www.toostupidtobepresident.com was 
blocked as “tasteless”;
• www.whitehouse.org was blocked as “adult, 
mature humor”;
• www.comedyzine.com was blocked as 
“adult”;
• several other comedy sites were blocked as 
“mature humor,” “adult,” or “politics.”
rotella noted, meanwhile, that rush 
limbaugh’s site was not blocked.
further research by fepp revealed that 
iprism is marketed by St. Bernard Software 
and uses iGuard technology. as of february 
2006, it had 65 blocking categories, ranging 
from “copyright infringement” and “question-
able” to “alt/new age,” “politics,” “religion,” 
153  The library is in topton, pennsylvania and is part of the 
Berks county library system; email from pam rotella to 
Marjorie heins (feb. 20, 2006).
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and “K-12 sex education.”154 St. Bernard 
claims that “each and every website” on the 
iprism url block list has been “reviewed 
by human eyes, leading to the most accurate 
database in the industry.” its promotional 
material elaborates:
internet analysts visit each site and 
assign it one or more category ratings 
based on the site’s content. This 100% 
“real person analysis” approach is supe-
rior to scanning and rating via software 
or artificial intelligence technology 
that use techniques such as keynotes, 
word pairs or custom dictionaries. 
These systems are susceptible to a high 
rate of false positives/negatives. These 
errors are virtually eliminated with 
iprism because the iGuard filter list is a 
result of careful review by our team of 
professional analysts.155
nowhere does the promotional literature 
explain how its staff could possibly analyze the 
“hundreds of millions” of web pages that the 
company states have been reviewed. 
to access iprism’s white papers, which 
explain its technology in more detail, we 
had to supply contact information on one of 
the company’s web pages. within an hour, 
we were contacted by a sales representative, 
whom we questioned about the claim of 
100% human review. he stuck to this as-
sertion, although acknowledging that it was 
difficult to believe. he said that the company 
had classified “several million” web pages with 
“maybe a dozen” employees assigned to the 
154  “iprism—Site rating category descriptions,” www.stber-
nard.com/products/iprism/products_iprism-cats.asp (visited 
2/1/06). 
155  St. Bernard Software, “iprism faQs” (feb. 2003).
task. he acknowledged that “bots” are used to 
identify potentially questionable content, and 
that the reviewers probably spend less than 
ten seconds on average reviewing any given 
site.156 
even if their employees’ review took only 
one second per web page, iprism’s claims are 
not credible, given the “several million” pages 
the salesman said had been reviewed, or the 
“hundreds of millions” claimed in the compa-
ny’s “iprism faQs.”157 
new York times: SmartFlter  
blocks bong bong 
tom Zeller, Jr., “popular web Site falls 
victim to a content filter,” New York Times 
(Mar. 6, 2006)
This article reported that Smartfilter, as 
installed at the offices of halliburton, fidelity, 
and many other major corporations, blocked 
the popular web site Boing Boing because, it 
seemed, “a site reviewer at Secure computing 
spotted something fleshy at Boing Boing and 
tacked the nudity category onto the blog’s 
classification.” protests from employees, “now 
deprived of their daily fix of tech-ephem-
era,” led to an inquiry to Secure computing. 
evidently, the offending page discussed two 
history books about adult magazines from 
the art publisher taschen. Secure comput-
ing explained that it would take far too long 
for its staff to review the tens of thousands of 
posts on Boing Boing, “so, in order to fulfill 
their promise to their customers, for Secure 
computing, half a percent is the same as 100 
percent,” and the entire site is blocked.
156  John owens, St. Bernard sales representative, phone conver-
sation with Marjorie heins (feb. 1, 2006).
157  a careful reading of the product literature suggests that the 
company doesn’t claim human review for updates, once 
a site is on the block list; the faQ says: “the database is 
updated on a daily basis via automatic incremental updates” 
(emphasis added). 
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The more sophisticated and statistically ori-
ented tests of filtering software in the period 
from 2001-06 differ widely in their purposes 
and results. although statistics and percent-
ages in this field of research can be misleading, 
one conclusion is clear from all of the stud-
ies: filters continue to block large amounts of 
valuable information. even the expert wit-
nesses for the government in the cipa case, 
who attempted to minimize the rates of error, 
reported substantial overblocking. internet 
filters are powerful, often irrational, censor-
ship tools.
filters force the complex and infinitely vari-
able phenomenon known as human expres-
sion into deceptively simple categories. They 
reduce the value and meaning of expression 
to isolated words and phrases. an inevitable 
consequence is that they frustrate and restrict 
research into health, science, politics, the arts, 
and many other areas. 
filters are especially dangerous because they 
block large amounts of expression in ad-
vance. This “prior restraint” aspect of filtering 
contrasts sharply with the american tradition 
of punishing speech only after it is shown to 
be harmful. filters erect barriers and taboos 
rather than educating youth about media 
literacy and sexual values. They replace edu-
cational judgments by teachers and librarians 
with censorship decisions by private compa-
nies that usually do not disclose their operat-
ing methods or their political biases, and that 
often make misleading, if not false, marketing 
claims. 
cipa—the law mandating filters in schools 
and libraries that receive federal aid—is not 
likely to be repealed very soon, nor are most 
school districts or libraries likely to throw 
away filters despite their dangers and flaws. 
There are, however, many things that can be 
done to reduce the ill effects of cipa and 
promote noncensorious methods of increasing 
internet safety. These include:
• avoiding filters manufactured by compa-
nies whose blocking categories reflect a 
particular ideological viewpoint. These may 
be appropriate for home or church use, but 
not for public libraries and schools.
• choosing filters that easily permit disabling, 
as well as unblocking of particular wrongly 
blocked sites. 
• only activating the “sexually explicit” or 
similar filtering category, since cipa only 
requires blocking of obscenity, child por-
nography, and “harmful to minors” materi-
al, all of which must, under the law, contain 
“prurient” or “lascivious” sexual content.
• establishing a simple, efficient process for 
changing incorrect or unnecessary settings.
• promptly and efficiently disabling filters on 
request from adults, or, if permitted by the 
portion of cipa that applies to them, from 
minors as well.
• configuring the default page—what the 
library user sees when a url is blocked—to 
educate the user on how the filter works 
and how to request disabling.
• developing educational approaches to 
online literacy and internet safety. despite 
the superficial appeal of filters, they are not 
a solution to concerns about pornography  
or other questionable content online. 
internet training, sex education, and media 
literacy are the best ways to protect the next 
generation.
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